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ABSTRACT
A History of Liberal Education and Liberalism:
The Traditional Humanist in Conflict with
the Liberal Ideologue
(February 1986)
Richard A. Farrell, University of Wisconsin
M.Ed., Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

Professor David Schuman

In this century much has been written about the "search for a
common learning" and whether or not the liberal tradition should be
buried or can be revived.

This dissertation shows that there are in

fact two liberal traditions and our discussion of these issues have
been confused by our failure to distinguish between the two.

One

liberal tradition is essentially educational in nature, inspired by
the life of ancient Greece and formalized for centuries as the liberal
arts.

The second is essentially political in nature and stems from

the thought of John Locke and the philosophes of the Enlightenment.
The two traditions have been in conflict over the course of this
country's history, the former attempting to preserve a traditional
sense of liberal education and the latter serving to reshape the ideal
of liberal education to fit the tenets of liberalism.
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The dissertation shows that the two traditions have become
confused through the rise of liberalism and its success in shaping the
structure of higher education and educational thought through the
university movement in the last century and the progressive education
movement in this century.

The dissertation traces the history of both

liberal traditions and shows how the tenets of liberalism have come to
permeate present day discussions about liberal education. The world
views of the ancient Greeks, Renaissance humanists, American Puritans,
and American liberals are compared and contrasted, with a particular
emphasis on the relationship between Puritanism and liberalism.

The

Puritans initiated and maintained their version of liberal education
for over two-hundred years and it was this curious situation that made
liberalism seem, in comparison, to represent the "true" vision of
liberal education.

Like the Puritans, liberals have reconstructed the

concept of liberal education to suit their own purposes, and this
reconstruction is examined.
The dissertation concludes with suggestions to traditional
humanists for reviving the humanist ideal of liberal education.

The

point is made that rather than concentrating upon plans for shared
learning humanists must first recreate a common language with which to
discuss liberal education and, to avoid confusion this language must
be distinguished from that of liberalism.
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INTRODUCTION
If we hope to live not just from moment to moment,
but in true consciousness of our existence, then
our greatest need and most difficult achievement is
to find meaning in our lives. It is well known how
many have lost the will to live, and have stopped
trying, because such meaning has evaded them. An
understanding of the meaning of one's life is not
suddenly acquired at a particular age, not even
when one has reached chronological maturity. On
the contrary, gaining a secure understanding of
what the meaning of one's life may or ought to be-this constitutes having attained psychological
maturity.
Bruno Bettelheim
The debate about technical training versus liberal
arts really misses the point. We need to rethink
the whole idea of what education adds to--or
subtracts from—any single person. It is time that
a college education provides a chance for a student
to really begin and practice what the student
thinks best.
David Schuman
This study is motivated by the belief that education should help
the individual develop a meaningful perspective on his or her own
life.

We are familiar with the critiques of modern Western society,

the emphasis on the alienation of the individual, the "future shock
of rapidly expanding knowledge, the breakdown of traditional ties.

It

seems that individuals are more than ever in need of help in finding
meaning in their lives and that despite all of our talk of meeting
student needs, we concentrate least upon this one.

1

As elusive as the
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question of meaning is, we can consider the ways in which education
either adds to or subtracts from the individual's sense of meaning.
When speaking of meaning in relation to education we often refer
to "liberal education." About 150 years ago this term had a meaning
that was generally shared by those who discussed education; however,
this meaning has been become muddled through the numerous adaptations
of the concept to the circumstances of twentieth century life.
so,

Even

the promise of liberal education is often articulated by

educators, a promise that one is better off developing a general
knowledge rather than a specialized one, for gradually this general
knowledge will become integrated into a meaningful perspective on
life.

Though this integration is the most problematic step of the

process, educators give it little attention.

We seem to assume that

with maturity we will integrate this knowledge into a meaningful
perspective.

Bettelheim seems to suggest something different, that

psychological maturity i_s this meaningful perspective.
Allow me to use myself as an example.

By general standards I

had as good a liberal education as most before entering graduate
school.

A history major at the University of Wisconsin, I had a broad

course of study and a few inspiring teachers.

I proceeded to

supplement this formal education through travel, various kinds of
work, and sel f-expl oration through acting and therapy.

Yet, I

returned to school sensing that something was missing, not sure that
this "something" was possible to find there, but with the hope of
integrating knowledge and experience in a satisfying way.
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The public explanation for my return to school was the need to
"retool" myself to be better able to compete in the job market.

Given

the few work prospects in foundations of education departments, this
could not have been my primary motive, but it sounded more sensible
and mature than saying; "I am groping for meaning." In retrospect, I
see that I was searching for my own aesthetic sense, which David
Schuman describes as "the critical cord that ties life together." I
had believed in the promise of a liberal education, but the promise
had yet to be fulfilled.
Looking back upon my own liberal education I admit that it did
give me a broad understanding of many fields of knowledge, did compel
me to think about things, and to realize how little I know.

My

liberal education had taught me to question, to be skeptical, to see
other points of view, but it did not give me that aesthetic sense,
that critical cord with which to tie things together.

Instead it

overwhelmed me with how little I knew and how much there is to know.
Many think that this is exactly what a good education should teach,
but such a realization does not simply teach one a proper humility; it
also teaches despair of ever knowing enough to act.
I am not alone in feeling that my education has failed to give
me sufficient help in making sense of the world.

A recent article in

The Chronicle of Higher Education states that "a growing number of
adults, many of them older people with college degrees" are returning
to study the liberal arts.

The author then speculates upon their

moti vations-"an attractive alternative to the singles bar," or
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"successful lawyers and other professional people want programs that
cover what they did not get initially," or "as one gets older, one
ponders the eternal verities more." I speculate that a number of
these students feel a more pressing need than the author recognizes,
that they, like myself, are looking for that critical cord, but I
doubt that a course or two in the liberal arts will be of much help.
The habits of mind, categories of thought, assumptions and
values that are dominant in our society work against our developing
our own points of view, our own aesthetic senses.

We share a

collective point of view based upon a system of biases that we hold as
assumed truths; grouped together they have been called the liberal
ideology.

Collectively we think in terms of progress, reform,

welcoming new knowledge and diversity.

We are individualistic,

pragmatically realistic, believing in greater opportunities for all,
reason, compromise, diversity, toleration, and we strive to understand
all points of view.

The problem is that we seem better able to see

the points of view of others and to compromise than we are able to
distinguish our own point of view and advocate it--unless, of course,
one's own point of view accords closely with liberalism.
Liberalism provides three basic points of view, three brands of
meaning, through our education.

One is centered upon striving for

success--!iberal individualism; a second stresses one's contribution
to a more perfect society-liberal humanitarianism; the third and most
recent emphasizes personal

exploration, self-acceptance, and

clarification of val ues-1 i beral psychological humanism.

Having
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explored these paths I have come to believe that none of these
perspectives--or a combination of them--can give me the meaningful
perspective that I have sought through my liberal education.
By experiencing and studying the history of liberal education I
have come to realize that the concept is incompatible with our liberal
ideology in important ways.

Understanding the nature of this

incompatibility is difficult, for it is obscured by the rhetoric of
freedom and possibility of liberalism and the liberals' partially
successful transformation of liberal education to fit the liberal
mind-set.

Since one finds only occasional mention of the distinctions

between liberalism and liberal education in the literature on the
latter--only as asides--the significance of these differences goes
largely unnoticed.
Gilbert Highet provides an example of such an aside in The
Immortal Profession.

While discussing the qualities of a liberal

teacher-- "liberal" as in liberal education--he feels obliged to
insert: "The word 'liberal' has frequently been misused by political
writers.

It has been suggested that a liberal education ought to be

controlled by the principles of those political parties which preempt
the word 'liberal' in their titles or their programs.

This is a

mistake, and a dangerous mistake."^ Highet warns us but goes no
further with the issue.
How does one differentiate liberal education from liberalism?
David Schuman's study on the meaning of higher education helped me to
begin to distinguish between the two.

Using interviews totaling
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"about twenty hours apiece," Schuman concludes that, "People who do
best in the world...are those who have a sense of what they think is
most beautiful, what is aesthetically pleasing." And he suggests that
college as it is now structured seems to give little help in this
regard.

Schuman attributes this to our liberal vision of the market¬

place of ideas, in which truth is supposed to prevail in open
competition.

He feels this view is unrealistic: "We know that in the

academy, academics fight for power so that their ideas will win,
instead of the other way around." Rather than working to bring
students closer to the "truth," the marketplace of ideas produces many
truths making "the student divide himself or herself into parts: a
history part; a science part; a social science part.

Five courses,

five truths, and five selves." And Schuman concludes: "The structure
of college is such that the student learns, quite naturally, many
visions of the truth.

In the end it makes it very difficult to see

the world in any kind of unified way, or to know who you are in it."^
Masked by the idealization of the marketplace of ideas, the education
that our universities actually provide runs exactly opposite to the
"connected vision" that has been central to the concept of liberal
education.
Let us consider another significant difference between liberal
education and liberalism.

The key to liberal education has been the

teacher, the educated individual directing the uneducated, not simply
through subject matter but by example.

One developed a thoughtful

perspective by spending time with teachers who exemplified it.

The

7
teacher's moral authority is central to the tradition of liberal
education, and if the teacher abuses his or her authority or is
unworthy of it then the teacher should be replaced, not the idea of
authority itself.

However, the liberal's mistrust of authority has

been combined with his optimism about human nature to glorify the idea
of self-directed learning, which has been the rationale for electives
at the college level and progressive education at lower levels.

(It

might be that this emphasis on self-directed learning is simply our
admission that we ourselves do not fare well at making sense of the
world, and so have little to teach in this regard.) The glorification
of self-directed learning only further confuses us in our attempts to
offer or find a meaningful education.

We have lost a sense of liberal

education through the habits of mind of our liberalism; although the
two share the word "liberal," the attitudes of mind are essentially
different.
In the conclusion of his study, David Schuman suggests that we
replace the idea of the university as a marketplace of ideas with "a
multiplicity of 'pure' institutions," in which "structure, ethics,
ideology,

and outlook should be coordinated." With serious

playfulness he suggests the possibility of an

Ultra-Conservative

University, a Freudian University, a Capitalist University, even (a)
Liberal

University."^ Such a suggestion clarifies, perhaps by

exaggeration, the fact that there are many other assumptions and
values included in the liberal ideology that also contradict or
distract from the traditional concept of liberal education.

In order
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to develop a sense of what liberal education can be in our times we
must distinguish it from liberalism, including our own.
In the first chapter I will describe the nature of our present
confusion between liberalism and liberal education, and how this
confusion prevents us from seeing the possibilities of a meaningful
liberal education.

I will begin by describing the loss of traditional

beliefs in religion and philosophy that once gave a sense of meaning
and purpose to life.

I will then describe the insights traditional

liberal education has to offer and how these insights are lost in our
confusion between liberalism and liberal education.

I will support

this contention by describing the general nature of discussion
regarding liberal education today, indicating how this discussion is
more reflective of liberalism than traditional liberal education.

I

will conclude by describing the gap in our historical perception of
liberal education, and suggest that we must examine the history of the
concept to understand our present confusion.
Having described the nature of the problem in the first chapter,
in the second I will describe the Greek spirit which has inspired the
admiration of the humanist over the centuries and in turn given life
to the tradition of liberal

education.

In doing so, I will

distinguish between the spirit of liberal education and its
formalization in the liberal arts and systematic philosophy, and will
show how the spirit was lost in the process of formalization.

A sense

of this spirit will be important in later chapters when we examine
liberal education from the perspectives of Renaissance humanists.
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American Puritans, and American liberals.

We will compare and

contrast their spirits with that of the Greeks, and in turn judge
whether or not their education should be called liberal education.
In the third chapter I will describe the humanist revival of the
Greek spirit in the Renaissance and the Calvinism that evolved out of
humanism.

The general purpose is to explain how the humanists were

largely in accord with the Greek spirit while the Calvinists were not.
This is an important difference since Calvinists initiated liberal
education in this country and controlled its practice for over 200
years.
In the fourth chapter I will

examine the nature of this

Calvinist, or Puritan, mind and its version of liberal education,
since it was the curious nature of a Puritan liberal education that
made the liberal seem to be the "true" advocate of liberal education.
In order to understand the Puritan version of liberal education I will
examine the founding of Harvard College, both its purposes and
operating principles.
In the fifth chapter I will trace the decline in Puritan
influence on liberal education along with the rise of the liberal
perspective.

I will show how the central issues in American higher

education have revolved around the struggle between Puritanism and
liberalism.

I will also show how in this century the advocates of a

traditional sense of liberal education were forced to contend with a
new version of the concept based upon 20th century liberalism, and how
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with the ascendancy of the progressive movement in education and
politics the old sense of the term became confused with the new.
Having clarified our confusion between liberal education and
liberalism education, I will conclude with a few suggestions for
humanists who are interested in reviving the traditional sense of
liberal education.
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FOOTNOTES
^Gilbert Highet, The Immortal Profession: The Joys of Teaching
and Learning (New York; Weybright and Talley, 1976)," p. 46.-^
2
David Schuman, Policy Analysis, Education, and Evervdav life
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1962)', pp. 233-241.-^^Ibid.

CHAPTER

I

LIBERALISM AND THE LOST MEANING OF LIBERAL EDUCATION
The humanist tradition of liberal education has much to offer
those of us who believe that education should help individuals make
more sense of their lives, but it does not fit well with our modern
biases which since the seventeenth century have been increasingly
based upon a scientific search for truth.

From the scientific

perspective the "eternal verities" often associated with liberal
education are now thought of as mere personal

opinions and

consequently carry much less weight than the verifiable discoveries of
science.

And hand in hand with science, liberalism has grown, the

primary cause of our lost sense of liberal education.

With the rise

of liberalism the concept of liberal education increasingly became
confused with an education in liberalism.

Education was increasingly

defined and conceived of in the terms of liberalism, with its emphasis
upon individualism, scientific knowledge, and the new over the old.
The general purpose of this chapter is to explain why traditional
humanism might in fact have insights to offer us regarding a
meaningful education, and then to describe how liberalism interferes
with discussion of these insights and with educational practices based
upon them.
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The Problem of Meaning in Our Time
We live at a time when it is particularly difficult to find an
explanation of life that we find meaningful, a sense of belonging to
this world. A meaningful explanation of life helps make one feel at
home in the world, while alienation is the feeling of being isolated
from, of not being a part of this world, and in turn not feeling at
home in it.

In this section I will expand upon this point with the

help of three humanists: Hannah Arendt, Michael Denneny, and William
Barrett.
My images of homelessness stem from the thought of Hannah Arendt
as does much of the following sketch of our contemporary malaise.
When she speaks of the "world" she is referring not merely to the
natural world but to a world made human by speaking and thinking about
it.

Traditionally this world was interpreted through transcendent

ideas such as God, immortality, and freedom and it is our loss of such
interpretation which underlies our pervasive sense of meaningless¬
ness.

As Michael Denneny adds, it was the "accepted assumption of

Western thought that the world around us (Becoming) could be
understood only through the illumination of a transcendent,
intelligible world (Being)." As tenuous as this invisible "world" of
ideas was, the belief in them provided the ground for the traditional
authority of religion and philosophy, which maintained a meaningful
explanation of life, via religion for the many and philosophy for the
few.
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Since Descartes we have developed a modern way of thinking which
no longer tries to tie us to the natural world but instead divides us
from it.

With Descartes thinking about the world became divided into

an objective material world and our subjective responses to it.

The

sense of human reality which had traditionally tied the natural world
to an invisible "world" of ideas gave way to a sense of reality which
conformed to that which could be empirically tested.

The pursuit of

knowledge, which had been directed by a sense of ideals intuited from
the invisible realm of ideas became restricted to a knowledge of the
material world.

Transcendent ideas were reduced to a matter of

personal subjectivity.^ Without the explanations provided by both
religion and philosophy each of us is left with the task of making
sense of things alone without the aid of general concepts or universal
rules.
Voltaire said something to the effect that if there were no God
man would invent one.

If not a God, certainly a secular faith was

developed along with the rise of science, a faith based upon the
belief that science could both enlighten the human condition and
improve it.

Thus, while the traditional ways of making sense of the

world were in decline this modern faith sustained many individuals
with the belief that if we were only free of the superstitions of
religion and other traditional constraints a more perfect world could
be built guided by the discoveries of science.

While there still are

some who seem to find their sense of meaning in this philosophy the
idea of progress no longer seems to stir the imagination as it did in

15

the late nineteenth century.

There has been much questioning over the

past thirty years over the nature of that which we have assumed to be
progress, combined with the more current sense that we do not seem to
be progressing in any sense of the term, except technologically.
We go about our lives in a world that lacks the sense of
permanence provided by either a transcending order of ideas, or a
stable material world, or even the permanence of nature.

With the

rise of the scientific mind nature has become viewed as something
simply to be exploited and controlled, to the point that there are now
a number of endangered species, including ourselves.

Without a sense

of permanence in either things, nature, or ideas it is very difficult
to feel at home in the world and to find meaning in life.^
This then is our modern human predicament, and there is an
additional dimension to the problem which William Barrett describes in
The Illusion of Technique.

Barrett points out that not only is this

problem of meaning a difficult one for us to grapple with at this
time, but that few of those who might be expected to give us help in
this regard, the professional philosophers, even address the issue.
With the rise of scientific thought and its subsequent application to
all fields of human endeavor, ideas have all become instrumental in
nature, all a means to the end of controlling the material world.

We

suffer from an "illusion of technique," believing our primary problems
are technical in nature and can be solved by improved techniques.
Barrett cites Buckminster Fuller as a representative of this way of
thinking.

Fuller's position is that technology has created grave
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problems as well as many benefits, so we must perfect our technology,
create a more comprehensive technology, a technological utopia, or
technology will lead us to oblivion.

Barrett argues that even if this

technological utopia were realized, it would still fail to give our
lives a sense of significance: "With life become [sic] empty and
sterile, even while mechanically perfect, we might very well find that
utopia and oblivion coincide."
Rather than improved techniques Barrett argues that we need
ideas that make a difference in our lives, ideas that "may not serve
so much as an instrument we use but as something into whose service we
are called." Stated another way, we need ideas that inspire us at
least to some extent in the way that the idea of "God" once did.
In particular he talks about the idea of "being" which as we
noted earlier, was traditionally considered the highest concept in
Western philosophy, but now is largely ignored by most English and
American philosophers.

They too suffer from the illusion of technique

and are busy tidying up philosophy into a science, preoccupied with
linguistic analysis, telling us what we mean by what we say rather
than attempting to come to grips with the issue of meaning in its
deeper sense.

These philosophers argue that answers to these

questions are, strictly speaking, unknowable.-^
I

have turned to the humanists because individuals such as

Arendt and Barrett are willing to reflect upon these issues while few
others are.

As if in response to the reluctance of the analytical

philosophers to think about the unknowable, Hannah Arendt has asserted
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that "men have an inclination, perhaps a need, to think beyond the
limitations of knowledge, to do more with this ability than to use it
as an instrument for knowing and doing." Let us now take an initial
look at the tradition from which such thought sterns.^

Meaning and the Humanist Perspective on Liberal Education
A university education "is concerned not merely to
keep an intellectual inheritance intact, but to be
continuously recovering what has been lost,
restoring what has been neglected, collecting
together what has been dissipated, making more
intelligible, reissuing and reinvesting."
Michael Oakeshott
Michael Oakeshott suggests a key element in the humanist
attitude of mind, the tendency to search the past to make the best of
it still alive to the present.^ As Hannah Arendt describes this
attitude, it "knows how to take care and admire the things of the
world." Engagement with the world through thinking and caring about
it, and in turn feeling a part of it, gives the humanist a sense of
meaning.

When Arendt, Barrett, and Denneny discuss meaninglessness,

they do so in a meaningful way in illuminating what has been lost,
clearing the ground of our confusion and prompting us to think about

it.
While "humanism" has come to mean different things to different
people in this century, it had a singular meaning to the historical
scholar who coined the term in the last century.

It was used to
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describe the

spirit of the renaissance

scholars who had

enthusiastically rediscovered many of the great works of ancient
Greece and Rome.

These scholars were particularly inspired by

Cicero s portrayal of the human ideal of the Greeks, which he called
"humanitas," and since Renaissance scholars often referred to this
"humanitas," in their own works, 19th century historians labelled them
'humanists." Thus, in the original sense of the term, "humanism"
referred to those who looked to the Greeks for "that ideal pattern of
humanity which stirs our imagination," in the words of Werner Jaeger.^
Even among traditionalists this meaning has been broadened in this
century to include the great works and deeds of the past, in general,
although ancient Greece tends to be given preeminence.
In the following pages, I will use "humanist" and "humanism" to
refer not simply to the Renaissance scholars but to the tradition
which they embodied, a tradition characterized by study and reflection
upon great human works and acts prompted by the desire to find a
pattern of humanity that inspires.

In this loose sense of the term,

Socrates may be considered a humanist as well, for he is the paradigm
of the individual thinking about life, and he has been particularly
admired for his refusal

to give up either his thinking or his

conversing with others about it, even though this refusal cost him
his life.
As with humanists who have followed him, Socrates' thought was
inspired by "admiring wonder" at the acts of his fellow Greeks.
Seeing just or courageous deeds inspired him to ask what is justice
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and what is courage?

Socrates attempted to discover the ultimate aim

of life by exploring the meaning of what we now call concepts.

As

Hannah Arendt suggests, the basic Socratic question was: What do we
mean by such words as "courage" or "justice" or "beauty" or
"excellence"?

And to this Arendt incisively adds that our inability

to give exact answers to these questions does not diminish the
original sense of wonder, but reinforces it.
How marvelous that men can perform courageous or
just deeds even though they do not know, can give
no account of, what courage and justice are.'
Despite the fact that such discussions do not bring a clear knowledge
of the nature of courage or justice or excellence, one feels enriched
by

them.

According to the philosopher J. Glenn Gray, such

conversations satisfy our "hunger for the sense and significance of
human life in terms of the relations we can discover between the world
of appearance and the world of thought." Stated another way, as we
relate the particularities of our lives to concepts such as beauty or
excellence or friendship we give those concepts real content and make
them our own.

Over time this develops our sense of taste, which in

turn shapes a point of view.

It is my sense that this development of

one's individual judgment is a fruitful pathway towards a meaningful
perspective on lifej we may feel gratified by what we choose to honor
and what we chose to despise, and in turn make choices which give our
Q

lives a sense of meaning.^
In this initial sketch of the humanist attitude of mind, I have
implied an emphasis on thinking over knowing.

I have done so in the
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light of an important distinction made by Hannah Arendt about a decade
ago between the need to think and the need to know.

She argued that

thinking is ultimately a quest for meaning while knowing is a quest
for truth.

In the quest for meaning, thinking transcends the

limitations of knowledge.

Therefore, the criteria of "certainty and

evidence" that we apply to our quest for truth are not the ultimate
criteria to be applied to our quest for meaning.

In other words,

there are certain matters worth thinking about despite the fact that
they are unknowable.^ According to J. Glenn Gray, Arendt was the
first to clearly make this distinction between truth and meaning,
although it was implied by both Kant and Heidegger.
Although Gray noted that "it will likely require years for the
implications of her insight to be realized in full," one implication
is that this insight placed the old works on liberal education in a
new light.While a liberal

education has always implied an

attainment of a broad knowledge, humanists have always implied that
the aim of liberal education was more than the attainment of knowledge
per se.

Plato spoke of the highest form of knowledge, and Aristotle

of a "liberal knowledge" that gives pleasure in itself.

Cicero spoke

of a philosophic attitude that resulted from liberal studies.

Newman

spoke of an "enlarged mentality" which provided one with the capacity
to make judgments.

This is summed by Whitehead:

You cannot be wise without some basis of knowledge;
but you may easily acquire knowledge and remain
bare of wisdom...(which)...is the way knowledge is
held.
It concerns the handling of knowledge, its
selection for the determination of relevant issues.
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its employment to add value to our immediate
experience.
Therefore, in the light of Arendt's distinction, while these
humanists often spoke in terms of knowledge, I think they were
actually emphasizing thought and its relation to judgment.

The aim of

liberal education was always defended in terms of knowledge, because
thinking was assumed to be a quest for knowledge, primarily a
philosophic knowledge, a knowledge related to Plato's ideal forms.

As

I have already indicated with the rise of science this form of
knowledge was discredited, and since now "knowledge" is the province
of science rather than traditional philosophy, Arendt's distinction
seems all the more important.
Education within a framework of tests and grades puts a premium
upon knowledge.

What if we reversed this emphasis?

An education

guided by the quest for meaning would be shaped differently than that
guided by the pursuit of truth.

And the difference captures a key

distinction between liberal education, which emphasizes thinking in
the quest for meaning, and liberalism education, which emphasizes the
attainment of knowledge, and the application of knowledge to problem
solving.

While we may refashion the world through knowledge, we make

a home out of it through thought.
However, before we can think about and discuss this matter of a
liberal education aimed at meaning, we must first free ourselves from
the liberal ideology that confuses our thought on the topic.

Within

the framework of our liberal ideology, liberal education has been
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misconstrued to seem like an education in liberalism.

I will now

begin to describe the nature of this confusion.

Liberal Education and Liberalism
For over a decade, it has been argued that the
liberal arts no longer liberate, that indeed the
liberal tradition itself is either dying or dead.
If the latter is true, the obituary will be hard to
phrase, for the concept of liberal education is
ambiguous.
Clifton Conrad and Jean Wyer
Liberal Education in Transition^^
The concept of liberal education has always been ambiguous for
it has revolved around ideas such as excellence, freedom, and wisdom,
which are themselves ani)iguous.

The problem with the concept today is

not its inherent ambiguity, but the fact that this ambiguity has given
way to incoherence.

The source of this incoherence is the confusion

of liberal education with liberalism.

In this section I will discuss

the causes and nature of this confusion, indicating differences
between the traditional humanist's vision of liberal education and
that which has evolved out of liberalism.
Conrad and Wyer seems to share the confusion in referring to the
tradition of liberal education as the "liberal tradition." As most
commonly used the "liberal

tradition" refers to the political

philosophy of liberalism that has had an increasing influence on
Western educational thought over the past two hundred years.

However,

this liberal tradition has its roots in the Enlightenment, not in
ancient Greece, and is separate from the tradition of liberal
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education.

A primary source of our confusion between the two stems

from the curious origins of liberal education in this country.

It was

initiated and promulgated for over two hundred years by Puritans who
rejected the whole pagan theory of life," in the words of the
historian Harry Elmer Barnes.

The liberal tradition in education

developed out of this Puritanism and has been aimed at freeing
education from its constraints.

However, liberals had relatively

little interest in the traditional concept of liberal education.

In

other words, the choice in America has been between liberal education
in the hands of Puritans, or a liberalism education which either
ignores or distorts the concept of liberal education to fit the
assumptions and values of liberalism.
It is important to distinguish between the two traditions
because each reflects a distinctive mind-set.

The mind-set of liberal

education is best represented by the humanist whose primary
educational concern is to introduce students to the life of the mind,
to arouse in them the love of thought, and to persuade them to think
through their experiences.

The liberal, on the other hand, is

primarily concerned with the perfection of society and the role that
education can play in this.

Thus, the humanist has tried to encourage

thinking about such thought-things as excellence, freedom, and
justice, while the liberal has been "bound up with the spirit of
reform, a sense that education could be consciously arranged to make
1

American society more open, more just, and more democratic."
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The liberal

has attempted to make the tenets of political

liberalism serve as the guideposts of education.

Thus, we have

President Charles Eliot of Harvard defending the elective principle in
the last century by arguing that liberty is the best education for
liberty, and we have the progressive education movement in this
century making the classroom into a micro-democracy where one learns
to be cooperative.

More recently President Adele Simmons of Hampshire

College suggested that "the complexity of social and environmental
i ssues... di c tates interdisciplinary attempts to solve them and
underscores the value of interdisciplinary training."^^ These various
attempts at shaping education into an instrument for creating good
citizens and solving our social problems are examples of liberalism
education, not liberal education.
The situation has been further confused by a split within the
liberal

mind itself between an emphasis on the freedom of the

individual on the one hand and the desire to perfect society on the
other, a split reflecting the complex historical association of
liberalism with the rise of capitalism on the one hand and Enlighten¬
ment thought on the other.

While the principle of individual freedom

protects individual selfishness, the aim of liberalism education is
the inculcation of "reason" to transform selfishness into enlightened
self-interest.

In its contemporary form -- well represented by

Hampshire College and the School of Education at the University of
Massachusetts -- it tends to emphasize self-directed learning on the
one hand and a curriculum that points towards reforming society on the
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other.

There is also a concentration on what are called individual

needs on the one hand and societal needs on the other.

Given the

complexity of our society, and the vast stores of specialized
knowledge about it, the effort to envision reform requires a great
emphasis on cognition.

To balance this, liberalism educators also

stress the need to develop the affective realm as guided by the
theories of humanist psychologists as opposed to humanists.

It is my

sense that this emphasis on exploring the self is a turning away from
a world that one cannot make sense of, a world in which the liberal
split-vis ion of rugged individualism on the one hand and perfecting
society on the other are not as believable or inspiring as they once
were.
The meaning of a liberal education, on the other hand, lies in
the process itself; this is how I interpret the phrase "learning for
learning's sake," traditionally associated with liberal education.

To

the humanist, thinking and talking about what matters in life is
itself meaningful.

As Hannah Arendt has noted, "thinking does not

have a real goal, and unless thinking finds its meaning in itself, it
has no meaning at all." Thought and dialogue about what is important
to us in this world create a sense of belonging to it.

Through shared

reflection on ideas whose reality lies beyond knowledge, the humanist
literally creates a human world, together with those that she or he is
conversing with.^^'
This concern with the invisible world of thought is quite
different than liberalism's vision of perfecting society through
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education.

While humanists may be concerned with societal issues, in

terms of education they are more concerned with specific individuals
than with the abstraction that we call society.

The humanist's aim is

to develop the quality of being thoughtful, whether one's politics are
conservative, liberal, or radical.

While I would not quite classify

Daniel Bell as a humanist, he is free enough of his own liberalism to
state that while he is politically a liberal, he is economically a
socialist, and educationally a conservative.

He reflects the

humanist's perspective to the extent that he can see that different
areas of endeavor may be best guided by different principles.
The humanist also tends to look askance at the emphasis of
liberalism educators on the development of the affective realm along
with the cognitive realm as a way of developing the whole person.

To

redress our overemphasis on the cognitive with a new emphasis on the
affective does not dissolve the split; it maintains it.

Instead, the

humanist tends to think in terms of what Hannah Arendt called
"passionate thinking, where thinking and aliveness become one." From
this perspective,

the liberal's alternative emphasis on self-

realization dwells too much on the self, while his or her attention to
society dwells too much on society, leaving a gulf between the two, a
gulf not spanned by mixing interdisciplinary attempts at studying
social and environmental issues with courses on self-realization
techniques.

Instead the gulf is bridged by studying works that cause

one to reflect upon one's assumptions in an educational setting which
stresses reflection upon ideas combined with reflection upon
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experience.

The aim is not a clarification of values-another aspect

of liberalism education--but a thoughtful perspective on what is
worthwhile, what is worthy of aspiration.^^
This is but a cursory attempt to suggest that liberal education
in a humanist perspective differs from the liberal tradition.

While

there are several reasons why we have lost sight of this distinction,
the principle one is that liberalism in the form of progressive
education has come to dominate our educational philosophy.

The

progressives, led by John Dewey, have viewed the traditional concept
as elitist and archaic.

They have attempted to replace the

traditional concept with one of their own, and in the process have
dismissed the traditional sense of the term.

For example, in terms of

the tradition of liberal education, the opposite of liberal is not
conservative but illiberal, referring to those pursuits that are
conducted not for their inherent worth or pieasure--or, in
contemporary terms, meaning--but for the sake of something else.
Under the influence of the progressive education movement and
the rise to dominance of liberal

ideas in Political Science,

Psychology, and Economic Departments, liberal education has become
identified with liberalism in the minds of many.

In turn, the

traditional sense of the term as well as the distinction between
liberal and illiberal have been forgotten or ignored.

In a recent

book on liberal education the author begins by stating,
"Conservative" in this context is taken as the
contradictory of "liberal." Thus, some so-called
"liberal arts colleges" are in reality conservative
arts colleges.^'
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Here is a good example of the liberal mind at work.

First, it ignores

the fact that the opposite of "liberal" was not "conservative" but
"illiberal," and then denies that liberal
sufficiently liberal.

arts colleges are

If this definitional slight of hand is allowed

to stand our historical amnesia concerning the tradition of liberal
education becomes complete, and liberal education is transformed into
liberalism education.
Of course, the attempt of the progressive movement to transform
the sense of the term has been only partially successful.

There are

too many academics and intellectuals who share the traditional sense
of the term.

Thus, a review of the literature on liberal education

reveals works written from both perspectives and often one that
combines elements of each.

Since there is also no attempt to

distinguish the principles from each other, the reader understandably
becomes confused.

Before we can talk about the elements that make

liberal education meaningful we must first disentangle the two broad
poihts of view of liberalism and traditional humanism.

Liberal Education Trapped Within the Liberal Mind
By experimenting with various types of college
courses, we in the United States are attempting to
find the modern equivalent which was once the
product of "the collegiate way of life"...
President James Conant of Harvard^®
What I have called "liberalism education" is best represented by
"general

education," a phrase liberals hoped would provide a

contemporary equivalent to traditional liberal education.

General
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education" has grown in usage during this century because the concept
of "liberal education" had undergone so many changes in trying to
adapt to the twentieth century that for many a new term seemed a good
idea, especially to liberals who wanted this "modern equivalent" to be
free of the elitist and archaic connotations of the old concept.
will show,

As I

'general education" has been an empty concept which both

traditional humanists and liberal progressives have tried to fill with
their beliefs, which has made the concept signify intellectual
confusion more than a common search for a modern equivalent to the old
liberal education.
The attempt to avoid confusion by coming up with a new term has
ironically simply created more confusion.

As Conrad and Wyer point

out, there has been an "unbridled diversity" in the number of
curricular schemes and proposals over the past decade or so, which has
led a Carnegie Commission to report that "general education is a
disaster area." Fairly recently a group of individuals have
attempted to salvage something from this disaster by developing what
they seem to think is an even newer concept which they call
"liberating education," which has no common principle other than that
those involved should feel that the education they are involved in is
"liberating" to them.
It is appropriate that "unbridled diversity" has been identified
as the problem with general education, because to the liberal mind
diversity is nearly always good, associated with progress and the
promise of new ideas.

Liberals are always willing to "entertain"
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ideas but rarely seriously; they juggle rather than grasp them.

If.

for example, one proposed a reconsideration of the traditional ideal
of liberal education, the liberal might well respond: "Fine, if that
is liberating to you; there is certainly room for another form of
liberating education." The liberal mind is difficult to struggle with,
for it is a very tolerant mind that often lauds the idea of liberal
education and then diminishes it by lauding everything else as well.
For example, the idea that liberal education should aid one in
developing a "connected vision" is endorsed by many educational
leaders today, but they assume that this will lead to an understanding
of how acid rain in Pennsylvania affects us here in Massachusetts, or
whether or not American force should be applied to Nicaragua.

A

"connected vision" becomes an analysis of how everything relates to
everything.

This is not exactly what Cardinal Newman had in mind when

he used the term over a century ago.

He was thinking more along the

lines of Thomas K. Hearn when he writes, "...we must somehow recover
an enriched conception of reason which emphasizes our quest for beauty
and goodness as well as truth." Or when Hannah Arendt speaks of
"moral

taste" or David Shuman of an "aesthetic sense." Yes, the

liberal mind thinks these are good as well; let us have them as well
as an understanding of how everything relates to everything on this
planet.

With this kind of thinking President Charles Eliot opened the

way for the rise of the modern American university over a century ago
by dismissing arguments over what subjects should be taught by saying.
"We would have them all and at their best.''^^
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The primary problem with struggling against the liberal mind is
that it believes there should be room for everything that we would
generally consider to be good.

The liberal fails to notice that in

having everything, we have in turn less of each particular thing, and
furthermore, while the liberal mind would seem to advocate all goods,
it actually favors some things over others.

It favors that which can

be organized and measured over that which cannot.

It favors what it

thinks to be action over reflection; it favors doing over being.
is willing to choose repressive order over chaos.

It

And it favors

conformity over idiosyncracy.
Needless to say, those who identify closely with liberalism
would bristle at such a portrait, but it was Lionel Trilling, a
liberal, who pointed to the tendency of doctrinaire liberalism to
undermine its own principles.
the liberal mind.

Trilling saw a number of paradoxes in

It is concerned with the emotions in that it

advocates happiness for all, but it tends to deny emotions in their
"full possibility." In the abstract the liberal mind "sets great
store by variousness and possibility," but in trying to organize the
world in such a way as to give everyone a maximum chance to experience
"variousness and possibility," it depreciates these values by
simplifying everything so as "to organize the elements of life in a
rational way." Thus, "as far as liberalism is active and positive, so
far, that is, as it moves toward organization, it tends to select the
emotions and qualities that are most susceptible to organization."
This is why I

suggest the liberal mind favors conformity over
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idiosyncracy; it is as if idiosyncracies should be kept on hold until
the entire liberal organizational franiework is constructed.

Of

course, if there did come such a time there would be no idiosyncracies
left.
The important point of Trilling's insight for our discussion is
that some ideas, qualities, and characteristics fit easily within the
scope and framework of the liberal mind, and others do not.

Science,

analysis, clear definitions, precise measurements, fit well into the
liberal mind, which rose to prominence along with science.

Figurative

speech, profound ideas, "those exceptions to the rule which may be the
beginning of the end of the rule,"^^ aesthetic sense, spirit, wisdom,
being, the mystery of life, do not fit well, and here we begin to have
a key to making sense of that which passes for liberal, or general, or
liberating education these days.
An example of what I mean is provided by the contrast between
William James and John Dewey.

That they have been linked under the

label of pragmatism seems a great misfortune, for James was not bent
on social organization and Dewey was, a difference as important as
their similarities.

Thus, while Dewey could have agreed with James

when he wrote: "Mind, as we actually find it, contains all sorts of
laws-"those of logic, of fancy, of wit, of taste, decorum, beauty,
morals, and so forth, as well as perception of fact,"^^ Dewey reduced
this complexity of mind by making thinking essentially a matter of
problem solving, which his followers reduced even further to life
adjustment.
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While Trilling's humanism and liberalism lay in a delicate
balance. Dewey was foremost a liberal and secondly a humanist, and his
liberalism distorted his humanism.

Dewey reduced the human mind to a

tool for problem solving because he believed that education should be
a preparation for the solving of social problems.

Believing education

to be the primary instrument of social change. Dewey and other
liberals have proposed reforms to make education more effective along
these lines, but these reforms have not adequately dealt with the
chaos and powerlessness individuals experience in their own lives.
Rather than helping individuals make sense of their lives, the liberal
has added the burden of responsibility for the improvement of society.
Based on a combination of simplifications, liberal proposals for
educational reform either are too simplistic to be taken seriously or
place such a heavy burden on the individual that the proposals should
not be taken seriously.

They illustrate Trilling's criticism of the

liberal mind: "it unconsciously limits its view of the world to what
it can deal with, and it unconsciously tends to develop theories and
principles, particularly in relation to the human mind, that justify
its limitation.
If I were to invent a representative of the limitations of the
liberal mind at work, I could no no better than the model provided by
Harland Cleveland, Director of the Hubert Humphrey Institute for
Public Affairs.

In 1981 he was a featured speaker at a national

conference of higher education, and he called upon higher education to
go beyond specialization to the development of "integrative brainwork"

34

necessary for enlightened citizenship.

Noting that we have largely

succeeded in making college education into a pathway to success open
to the large majority of citi2ens--a longstanding liberal goal-he
asserted that the mission of higher education should now be to produce
get-it-al1-together people." The citizen of today should have an
education in "social goals, public purposes, and the ethics of
citizenship,

an education that offers some "practice in real-world

negotiation," and "the rudimentary knowledge, the integrative tools,
and...above all the concern to feel a sense of responsibility for the
situation as a whole"--and he literally means the whole world.

His

"get-it-al1-together" people would understand "the management of
population, food, energy, and resources," that "the environment is
clearly a globe as well as a local problem," and "how domestic affairs
and international policy are linked."
While Cleveland does include humanities in his vision—so that
one may attain "some fluency in answering the question "Who am I?"--he
reflects a bias against taking much time to ponder such a question in
the motivations he sees for going to college: "education as an
investment (for the poor), education as a consumer product (for the
affluent), education as a device for avoiding decisions about what to
do next (for the unattached, uncertain, and the unemployed)." I
suspect that those who went to college for leisurely, reflective
studies would be cast as indecisive malingerers by Cleveland.
Where do our twentieth century individuals looking for the
meaning of life fit into Cleveland's scheme?

They should obviously
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decide quickly who they are and what they want to do and join together
in
organizations designed to transmute their separate
expertnesses and their collective insights into
wise decisions about real world problems--which are
all interdisciplinary, interdepartmental, inter¬
professional and (increasingly) international. And
the priceless ingredient is this: each of the
participants in this complex choreography has to
have some understanding of the whole scene in order
to play his or her bit part in the big complexity.
Cleveland s

get-it-al 1-together" people are obviously expected to

find meaning in continuously getting together with others.

One

imagines a life of endless meetings, of incessantly integrative
brainwork that will help humanity control its destiny.

But nowhere in

Cleveland's vision is there room for individual destiny.
Cleveland's vision of higher education is simple-minded
liberalism at its worst, including its marketplace vocabulary, its
faith in group-work, its emphasis on doing and its sense of urgency
that the twenty-first century is rushing towards us.

In a way I am

setting up a straw man in citing Cleveland, but it seems noteworthy
that such people are invited to speak at national conferences of
higher education, and no one raises a voice of protest against such
simple-minded visions.

Perhaps this is because we tend to think that

all of this talk of purposes of higher education doesn't mean much
anyway.

But then that is part of my point.

While Cleveland is

inciting individuals to think in terms of controlling the world, most
of us feel we have no control over our own university, and little over
our own lives.
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A less simple-minded example was presented at the conference the
previous year by John Sawhill. President of New York University.
Rather than simply suggesting that higher education could be improved
by more togetherness, Sawhill reflected upon what he would include in
a general education curriculum.

Like Cleveland, Sawhill asserts

students must be taught to understand their interrelatedness," but he
makes more specific curricular suggestions.
He sees several areas of study as more or less "essential." For
those who wish to go back to basics he offers a reinstatement of
expository writing for freshman and a re-emphasis on foreign
languages.

To this he adds "some familiarity with one of the computer

languages,"

while believing that students should also be

"scientifically better informed" to deal with social and ethical
issues related to the "major scientific discoveries and issues of the
day." He also likes interdisciplinary approaches, and praises other
areas of study as well.

As Sawhill continues to cite studies that

seem to be an "essential" part of his curriculum, one realizes he is
advocating just about everything and dropping nothing from the list of
essentials. It is the liberal's vision of having-it-al1 at work,
pointing in the opposite direction from his earlier contention that
each college should have a distinct identity.

It also places an

enormous burden on the student who would try to follow Sawhill's
suggestions.

Sawhill has been called an "avowed workaholic" and his

vision would require each student to be the same.
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Now If we turn to Yale University, where Bartlett Giamatti is
president, we might think we have finally found a university in which
a traditional sense of liberal education exists, for Giamatti speaks
the language of the traditionalist.

Yale's

aim is not to make one technically proficient, but
to instill some sense of the love of learning for
its own sake, some capacity to analyze any issue as
it comes along, the capacity to think and to
express the results of one's thinking clearly,
regardless of what the subject matter might be.
However, Mark Ryan, a dean at Yale, reveals what happens to liberal
education in the competitive atmosphere of a prestigious university.
He tells us of Louise, a high achiever, who in her junior year "just
got turned off" by scholarly endeavors.

As Louise described her

feelings which promoted her taking a year of absence: "You get all
caught up in it, studying like crazy, worried about your grade point
average, thinking everyone else is going to beat you for a place in
law school.

I guess I just got burned out." This is how Louise

experienced "the love of learning for its own sake."27
While Yale may give real emphasis to the idea of the integrated
curriculum, the message is the same as at other universities, if not
more so: "Be a leader; scramble for success with high grades and
honors;

attain professional

distinction." In this emphasis on

competition the universities are monuments to nineteenth century
rugged individualism, the spirit out of which they evolved.

To

counteract this competition and emphasis on the cognitive Ryan would
like to give "psychological counseling" a place in the liberal arts
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curriculum.

Ryan seems to represent the position of the student

personnel movement, of which Arthur Chickering is a noted spokesman,
that stress the "development of the whole person." These people play
particular havoc with the concept of liberal education, for they often
refer to humanist psychologists like Abraham Maslow, whose "humanism"
has little to do with that of the tradition of liberal education, but
rather stems from their differences with behaviorists.
In terms of liberalism, the student personnel movement seems an
off-shoot of the progressive education movement with its emphasis on
the needs of the child extended to include older students as well.
Yale exemplifies the efforts of twentieth century progressives to
ameliorate the effects of nineteenth century rugged individualism.
But, as I have already noted, this new emphasis on the affective to
compensate for the liberal's long standing emphasis on the cognitive
does not in itself bring the two together, and in any event has little
to do with the traditional humanists' emphasis on integrated thought.
Ryan does not even see problems in making his affective classes
part of the competition, arguing that they too could be graded, if
"very sensitively." Among other things, the instructors could judge
the way students "verbally handle" their self-data, "the degree if not
the precise character of expressed self-insight." Are we to believe
that an instructor might fail a student for his inability to express
self-knowledge, or if not, isn't there something spurious about graded
psychotherapy?^®
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Though Cleveland, Sawhill, Giamatti, and Ryan all make
suggestions for improving liberal or general education, the direction
that each would have us go so reflects the assumptions and values of
liberalism and if acted upon would lead us further away from liberal
education.

Cleveland's vision is simplistic to the point of

caricature.

Sawhill's perspective, while more sophisticated, is

flawed by his preoccupation with all the knowledge he thinks essential
while ignoring the frenzy that his proposals make of a student's life.
While Giamatti speaks the language of humanism well, he ignores the
conflict between his "love of learning" and the pressures to compete
fostered by a liberal capitalist society.

Finally, while Ryan sees

how the liberal's vision actually overwhelms individual students with
the frenzy of Cleveland's incessant meetings and Sawhill's endless
studies, and the competitive pressures that undermine Giamatti's "love
of learning," his own liberal assumptions lead him to suggest a
solution which may be worse than none at all.

These are some of the

ways in which liberal minds attempt to improve liberal education
today, but rather than enhancing our sense of liberal education they
bury it further within the assumptions and values of liberalism, or in
Giamatti's case--fail to acknowledge how humanism is undermined by
1iberalism.

The Confused Humanist
While many liberals are critical of the current state of liberal
or general education, their criticisms either emphasize the failure of
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higher education to develop sufficiently enlightened citizens
(Cleveland) or to attend to the psychological "needs" of students
(Ryan).

In both cases their criticisms lead us away from a

revitalization of traditional liberal education concerned with our
Western cultural heritage, though they obscure this by making their
proposals seem compatible with traditional liberal education.

The

problem is further complicated by the fact that in our liberal society
most humanists share many of the assumptions and values of liberalism,
and seem unclear themselves whether they are essentially humanists or
liberals vis-a-vis education.

And even humanists who are aware of the

distinctions between liberalism and humanism, often state their views
in terms calculated to influence the liberal mind, minimizing whatever
may seem elitist, impractical, or archaic in their thought.

Since few

people are aware of the conflict between the values of liberalism and
those of liberal education, humanists themselves become confused by
the intellectual muddle made of the two liberal traditions.
This muddle is unintentionally illustrated by Adel Simnons,
President of Hampshire College.

In "Harvard Flunks a Test," Simmons

seems a traditional humanist one moment and a progressive liberal the
next.

Simmons sounds like a traditional humanist in criticizing the

attention that Harvard's latest "core curriculum" has received, noting
that it is not a core curriculum shared by all undergraduates but
instead an individually selected group of eight courses from a total
of one hundred divided into eight areas.

Simnons supports her own

contention by quoting the traditionalist, Mortimer Adler, to the point
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that Harvard's core curriculum "can hardly be defended as a
restoration of the truly general education."
However, when Simmons presents her own vision it is obviously
not that of a traditional humanist, but instead a combination of
Cleveland's and Sawhill's.
I believe that today's undergraduates will need an
unprecedented breadth of knowledge and richness of
imagination. The technical and moral subtleties of
the decisions they will face can leave one defense¬
less before the temptation to renounce personal
responsibi 1 i ty... (and)...the complexity of social
and environmental issues (to give two examples
only) dictates interdisciplinary attempts to solve
them and underscores the value of interdisciplinary
training.
But then Simmons again seems a traditionalist by crediting St.
John's with establishing the modern prototype of the core curriculum,
mentioning the success of Robert Hutchins in developing a core
curriculum at the University of Chicago in the 1930s.

She seems

unaware that Chicago's core curriculum was not what Hutchins and Adler
had wanted, which is why St. John's came into being.

She also seems

unaware that the philosophy underlying St. John's core curriculum
directly contradicts her belief that colleges today must give students
an unprecedented amount of knowledge.

Rather than an "unprecedented

breadth of knowledge," St. John's concentrates on a selection of great
works aimed at developing the "arts of understanding."29
Simmons' paper is a muddle of ideas, resulting from either a
superficial understanding of the history of liberal education or a
willingness to minimize her differences with traditionalists in order
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to have greater influence.

Simmons seems resentful of the attention

that prestigious universities like Harvard and Yale receive for their
ineffective efforts to develop a general education, while the more
serious efforts of small colleges like Hampshire and St. John's are
largely ignored.

However, in portraying St. John's as an ally in the

struggle for a true general education, she implies a false similarity
in vision between the two colleges that adds to our confusion.^^
Many traditionalists also seem willing to minimize their
differences with progressives for the purpose of greater influence.
Mortimer Adler, for example, is clearly aware of these differences,
but in his recent Paideia Proposal he ignores them.

Adler proposes a

prescribed curriculum for undergraduates divided into three areas:
acquisition of organized knowledge; development of "intellectual
ski 11 s~-ski 11 s of learning"; and an enlarged understanding of ideas
and values. These proposals seem a combination of traditionalist and
progressive ideas.
Reflecting the spirit of compromise, the booklet is dedicated to
Horace Mann, John Dewey, and Robert Hutchins "who would have been our
leaders if they were alive today.As Adler knows, if Dewey and
Hutchins were still our "leaders" today, they would most likely lead
in opposite directions.

Dewey's thought led to problem-solving

curriculums tailored to the individual student at colleges such as
Bennington, Sarah Lawrence, and Hampshire, in which "integration is
something to be sought in the individual

student, not in the

curriculum." In contrast, St. John's Reflects the position of
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Hutchins and Adler, with its prescribed curriculum centered upon the
great works of Western civilization.
The proposal is sufficiently vague to allow progressives such as
Simmons' their own versions.

However, when Adler asserts that we have

known for a long time what the best education is and have simply
failed to implement it, his version of the "best education" differs
significantly from that of Simmons'.

Adler's position is essentially

the same as it was in the 1930s, when he argued vehemently against the
application of Dewey's "progressive" thought to liberal education, and
Simmons' position is along the lines of Dewey.

But Adler enraged many

people at that time and he has since learned to be more tactful in
expressing his views, though at the loss of drawing clear distinctions
between his views and those of progressives.

The Proposal obscures

the conflict between the two positions, reading like a party platform
worked out through compromise with an eye to what will sway the
public.
Simmons' apparent lack of awareness of the history of liberal
education and Adler's willingness to make vague the traditionalist
position illustrate two sources of our present confusion regarding
liberal education.

A third source lies in the liberal's continued

attempts to reconstruct the concept of liberal education to better fit
liberalism, a tendency reflected in Sinmons' article but even better
illustrated by Zelda Gamson's study. Liberating Education.

Responding

to the pronouncement of the Carnegie Commission in 1977 that the state
of general education was a "disaster area," Gamson began her own
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search for a unifying principle for general education detailed in this
book.

Of particular interest to our discussion is a roundtable

discussion among Gamson and a "commission" of seven people
representing "different sectors of higher education" on the question:
What should liberal education mean?^^ Though the discussion is largely
shaped by the values and assumptions of liberalism rather than liberal
education, one of the members, Roland Braithwaite, seems to view the
matter more from a humanist than a liberal perspective.

His

interchanges with other members of the commission illustrate how the
contemporary humanist is tripped up by liberal assumptions and
values—including his own.
Braithwaite's own liberalism is apparent early in the discussion
when he supports his belief that liberal education is important by
citing that studies have shown "college educated people, compared to
people with less education, are most likely to support civil
liberties, dues process, and freedom from arbitrary laws; they want
less protection from controversial ideas.

They are also more in favor

of equality and humanitarianism"--in other words, they become
committed to liberalism.^^
Though a liberal, Braithwaite seems to view liberal education
more from a humanist perspective.

He seems least in favor of the

contemporary liberal assumption that minorities and others deemed
disadvantaged should have an education particularly tailored to their
unique needs.

This is interesting because Braithwaite is a Black

professor teaching at a Black college, whose students have a poor
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background in the skills of speaking and reading.

Though one of the

white liberals asserts the need of an education fitted to the
realities of people who are very different" than the "middle-class,
white, male,
cultural

Braithwaite emphasizes an understanding of Western

heritage as the primary aim of a liberal education.

Unfortunately, he supports this contention with the kind of practical
calculation that characterizes the liberal mind, but which is
demeaning to his original assertion.

He argues that Blacks have "to

learn to compete in a European system of standards, deal with the
Western world and improve their condition in the majority society."
Rather than a source of personal enrichment the study of cultural
heritage seems like a tool for dealing with a predominantly white
society.

But I do not think he means that, for he adds: "We want our

students to learn the ideas of the tradition and carry them out at
their best." This seems to indicate an appreciation of Western
cultural heritage, but Braithwaite is trapped within the liberal mind,
too quick to argue on the basis of the practical and the realistic,
even though he values the tradition for its own sake.^^
With Braithwaite apparently not quite clear in his own mind
which of his educational values is most important to him, he is swept
along by the liberal consensus which ignores his emphasis on cultural
heritage and instead stresses the idea of "empowerment," empowerment,
for example, "for people who have felt dumb or put down all their
lives." Earlier another member of the commission had talked about the
value of women's studies in this regard, and Braithwaite responded
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that it sounded like she was talking about "indoctrination-the very
opposite of what a liberal education should be." But the rest of the
commission seems attracted to the notion of empowerment, so
Braithwaite only adds the qualification that liberal education is
"moral to the core, without indoctrination."^^
The commission ends the discussion with one member asserting
that they need a new term for the education they have in mind, and
someone suggests "liberating education," an education for critical
awareness, use, which can lead to empowerment.

Most of the group seem

to believe that if individuals become aware of all that limits them,
they will be on the pathway to freedom (empowerment).

However, I

suspect that Braithwaite understands that this negative sense of
freedom is but half of the issue, that the concept of freedom also
requires a positive content which he and other humanists point to with
the idea of culture.

Perhaps he also senses that while "liberating

education" seems to imply a unifying principle, it actually encourages
unbridled diversity since it is "whatever is liberating at a
particular moment in time."^^ I suspect Braithwaite is not quite sure
himself how his own view differs from that of the others, for it is
lost within the liberal consensus which allows him to have his own
idea of "liberating education" while failing to take seriously his
humanist concerns.
Brai thwai te's position within the commission seems to reflect
the position of humanists in general within higher education.

We can

imagine how confused humanists, such as Braithwaite, must get as they
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attend conferences in which Cleveland talks about "getting-it-alltogether," and Sawhill provides more and more "essential" subjects for
their students to study, and Giamatti talks about the "love of
learning," while the less rugged of their students burn out through
the competition.

Perhaps humanists will also feel the need for new

courses psycho-therapizing their own students, or confuse Adele
Simmons as one who shares their views, or be further confused by the
progressive language in the progressive-traditionalist Paideia
Proposal.

And then when they sit down with others also interested in

liberal education to discuss what it might be today, they soon find
that they too are thinking in terms of liberating education, though it
does not quite seem to fit with their own emphasis on cultural
heritage.

This is what it is like for humanists to try to think and

talk about liberal education these days.
Perhaps the commission's separation of liberating education from
liberal education is a good sign, for it might make it easier for
those of us still interested in liberal education to revitalize the
old concept.

However, to really be able to do so, we must understand

the tradition in its historical context, and how in the American
context the concept was first distorted by Puritan orthodoxy and then
freed from this orthodoxy by liberalism only to become distorted again
by the liberal ideology.
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A Gap in the Literature
While there are scattered allusions to the incursion of liberal
thought into higher education throughout the general histories on this
subject, there is no extensive study relating the rise of liberalism
to the decline of the traditional concept of liberal education and our
current confusion over the subject.

This seems due to the uncritical

perspective from which the major historians of education (Butts,
Cremin, Rudolph, & Veysey) have viewed this history.

Their histories

tend to reflect a neo-enlightenment world view combined with a
progressive temper to produce a liberal humanitarianism, a view which
has dominated American social, intellectual, and political life for
over half a century.^®
From this point of view the history of higher education has
essentially been one of progress.

It is the story of a higher

education increasingly fashioned to meet "the needs of individuals and
society," rejecting elitism and providing a means for a meritocracy, a
story of the growth of knowledge and the growing accessibility of a
college education to all.

While the loss of the traditional sense of

liberal education is alluded to with lament, it is a sub-plot in a
story of progress.

For example, Rudolph notes that the elective

principle "almost obliterated the humanist content of higher education
and substituted for it an often excessive concern with practical power
and the equality of men," but he essentially negates this criticism by
concluding that this same principle "moved the American college and
university into the mainstream of American life, where it had long
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been sorely needed and where it for long sorely needed to be." Thus,
the impression one receives is that the general direction of higher
education has been essentially good and inevitable, and, although it
has created problems in overspecialization, they are surmountable.
Thus, Rudolph ends his The American College and University with what
seems to be an upbeat note describing the American consensus:
Every American was free to write his own definition
of both knowledge and enrichment, but no definition
would avoid a fundamental attachment to the
American consensus: "Let knowledge grow from more
to more, and thus be human life enriched.
Rudolph's "American consensus" suits our liberal ideology but is
not consistent with liberal

education.

Our individualism,

egalitarianism, and preoccupation with new knowledge have created
conditions hostile to a liberal education.

Overspecializing is a

result of the high value that liberals have traditionally placed upon
scientific expertise and their willingness to reduce higher education
to a vehicle for individual success in order to bring it into the
mainstream of American life.

Welcoming the success of liberalism in

higher education, the liberal historians have taken little notice of
how our present problem with general education is a result of this
triumph.
I admit these historians are not specifically concerned with the
concept of liberal education, and that is part of the problem.

Even

revisionists such as Clarence Karier and Walter Feinberg are not
particularly interested in liberal education.
critical

While they add a

perspective on the effect of liberal assumptions on
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educational development, their interest is primarily in the disparity
between what liberalism promises and has to date attained.

They, like

the liberals they critique, are concerned with the broad relation
between education and society, rather than in the specifics of a
liberal education offered in a given classroom or school.

Though

Karier is quite conscious of the history of traditional liberal
education, Feinberg reveals an alarming ignorance when he uses
"progressive education" synonomously with "liberal education."^®
Feinberg's mistake suggests the partial

success of the

progressives to promote their own view of liberal education.

Since

Dewey's reconstruction of both liberalism and liberal education, the
progressives have tried to replace the traditional sense with their
own, portraying the traditional sense as elitist, archaic, and
impractical.

In their efforts to promote their own views they have

not bothered to distinguish them from traditional notions of liberal
education.

Thus, they are the least likely to analyze the

contemporary confusion over the concept; instead they tend to blame
our half-hearted attempts at liberal education on the "conservative
nature and plain obstinacy of some faculty.
If we turn to the traditionalists (Van Doren, Barzun, Foerster,
Adler, Babbit) we do get insight into the tradition of liberal
education and the problems it has faced in this century, but
traditionalists focus on specific villains such as modernism,
scientism, humanitarianism, or progressivism rather than relating all
of these to liberalism, of which they are aspects. They rightfully
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believe that liberal education must be adapted to present
circumstances, but disagree on the nature of adaptation, and nearly
always the adaptation requires an acceptance of some liberal
assumptions.

Thus, traditional

views have all too often been

liberalized, further blurring the distinction between liberalism and
humanism.

It is difficult to know which of these adjustments to

liberalism have come about through changes in philosophical outlook
and which have been prompted by pragmatic realism.

In order to remain

at the center of educational debate in this century one has had to
identify one's educational philosophy with the "true" liberalism, and
deny that one was simply being conservative.^^
Another important problem with traditionalist accounts of
liberal education is that in their effort to defend the ideal they
have given little recognition to how poorly this ideal has been
realized in this country's history.

Thus, while the progressive

ignores the past history of liberal education as archaic, the
traditionalist also tends to ignore this history by idealizing it, and
adds to our confusion by not acknowledging the validity of the
liberal's criticism of its actual practice.
Each attempt at telling the story of liberal education in our
century leaves out important aspects which are needed to understand
the path towards our present confusion.

Integrating the insights of

these various works requires supplemental study of the mind-sets of
Puritanism, liberalism, and humanism.
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Summary
In this chapter I have outlined both the possibilities for a
meaningful education inherent in the ideal of liberal education and
the primary obstacle to fruitful thought about these possibilities—
the confusion of liberal education with an education in liberalism.

I

began by describing how traditional ways of making sense of the world
have broken down and then suggested ways in which the humanist
tradition of liberal education can contribute to our making sense of
things.

This is not possible, however, as long as we continue to

confuse liberal education with liberalism education.

I supported this

contention by describing the nature of discussions these days about
liberal

education, showing that these discussions are conducted

largely from the perspective of the liberal ideology making it very
difficult for a humanist to be heard or even to think clearly about
the issue.

Finally, I discussed the nature of historical discussions

on the subject suggesting that the central reason that these accounts
have not shed much light upon our confusion is that none of them
examine the relationship between the rise of liberalism and the"
decline of liberal education.

Altogether, this chapter has been a

description of the nature of our confusion of liberal education with
liberalism, which in turn has undermined the contribution that liberal
education can make to our search for meaning.
The next four chapters will be devoted to an examination of the
path towards our present confusion.

We will begin by examining the

Greek roots of liberal education in order to develop a sense of its
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original spirit and meaning.

We will then note how the spirit and

meaning changed as the concept was passed along from the Romans to the
Christian scholastics, then to the Renaissance humanists, and finally
to the Puritans who established higher education in this country and
to the liberals who now control it.
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CHAPTER

II

THE GREEK SPIRIT OF LIBERAL EDUCATION
Among the Greeks, then, we find this boundless
impulse of individuals to display themselves, and
to find their enjoyment in so doing.
Hegel
The tradition of liberal education has two primary elements,
that which has given it form and that which has given it life.

The

form was clarified as the seven liberal arts by the Romans in the
third or fourth century A.D., and though changing over the centuries
has continuously given shape to the idea of liberal education.

This

form stemmed from the admiration the Romans had for the Greek culture
and was their attempt to emulate it through formal education.
Breathing life into this form, has been the spirit of ancient Greece,
or more accurately, our recurring tendency to cast our mind's eye back
to ancient Greece for inspiration.

Liberal education is more than a

given curriculum; it is a way of teaching and learning, of, in fact,
living with the ideals of the Greeks.

There have, of course, been times in which the liberal arts were
taught in ways that seem totally out of keeping with the Hellenic
spirit, most notably the Reformation. When v/e look at the Puritan's
teaching of the liberal arts, firmly based on Reformation experience,
we sense that it is not quite right to call it a liberal education
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because the spirit that infuses it is so different from that of the
Greeks.

Such uneasiness is particularly evident in the history of

American education because Puritans started liberal education in this
country, and their restrictive influence dominated in the early part
of our history.

Later, when liberals reacted against such

restrictiveness they presented themselves as advocates of a "true
liberal education,

while, in fact, they were not primarily concerned

with revitalizing liberal education but rather with developing a new
education in keeping with their own particular vision of progress.
In order not to confuse the Greek spirit with that of the
Puritan or the liberal, in this chapter I will describe this spirit
relying primarily on the work of Hannah Arendt and Werner Jaeger.

I

will outline what I believe to be the essential elements of Greek life
in which that spirit dwelled, partly by contrasting the Greek view of
life with our own, and discuss the relationship between the spirit of
liberal education and its formal elements, as well as between the
liberal arts and systematic philosophy.

Those tensions, problematic

as they are, are an inherent part of the tradition of liberal
education.

Interpreting the Hellenic Spirit
Every selection of material in a sense interferes
with history, and all criteria for selection puts
this historical course of events under certain man¬
made conditions.
Hannah Arendt
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Lionel Thrilling pointed out, "every Greece is different from
every other, each being shaped for a particular purpose."^ In John
Dewey's Greece, for example, the Greek spirit is essentially
scientific in nature, moved along by the spirit of free inquiry and
experimentation.

In my Greece there is an emphasis on free inquiry as

well, though I do not give this scientific bent the centrality that
Dewey does.

A few years ago an advocate of vocational education

argued that Greek education was essentially utilitarian in nature for
it gave individuals the skills necessary in politics.

It is this

tendency that we all have to construe the essence of the Greek spirit
to accord with our own purposes that suggests how the Puritans too
could find inspiration in the Greeks, despite their obvious
differences in outlook.
Therefore, before I describe the Hellenic spirit, let us admit
that within the parameters of factual evidence this Hellenic Spirit is
a synthesis we each make of the Greek elements that inspire us.

While

there are similarities in each version, there are also differences
depending upon our biases.

For this reason I state frankly that the

following is my interpretation of the spirit of ancient Greece, even
though it is largely based on the interpretation of others whose
knowledge of the subject far exceeds my own.
Most interpretations, including my own, focus very narrowly on
one small part of Greece.

Except for certain moments of heroism our

Greece is not Sparta, nor the other cities of Greece except when we
can find something extraordinary, such as Ionian science.

Our Greece
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is essentially Athens, and especially Athens of the Periclean age,
except for philosophy, which rises as Athens declines.

And within

Athens, we are certainly imagining the life of the perhaps 20,000 male
citizens and not the rest, and, at least for me, ultimately there is
that one citizen, philosopher, soldier who represents the true Greece,
as those citizens who condemned him to death do not.

As we see, there

is a great deal of selection that takes place immediately in our
discerning the true Greece and the Hellenic spirit.
Most interpretations also emphasize the Greek (Athenian) pursuit
of excellence ("to be of one's best and to be the best of all"), the
pursuit of truth through reason, the centrality of politics in
everyday life, and a sense of beauty that permeated all things and
endeavors, so that the motive for excellence could be described as the
desire "to take possession of the beautiful."^ Some version of this
description of the Hellenic spirit is usually given by educators as
the basis of a liberal education.
The problem with the description as a basis for liberal
education is its potential for varying interpretations.

In using any

of these terms, such as "excellence," "politics," or "freedom," we are
encumbered by the present day meanings of these words derived from
American life.

What we need to do is to find a way of remaining ever

conscious of the fact that in speaking of the ancient Greeks, the
founders of the Bay Colony, and ourselves that we are speaking of
three different worlds and each world used a different language.
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Compare for a moment our way of life with that of the Greeks.
While our society centers upon business, Greek society centered upon
politics, a "politics" whose meaning differs from our own sense of the
term.

Since business is central to our lives, many of our words are

at least partially colored by the image of the marketplace.

Harland

Cleveland, mentioned in the last chapter, uses metaphors and examples
drawn from business because the image of the marketplace is in the
foreground of his thought.

However, even when we are further removed

from the marketplace than Cleveland, the meanings of words such as
politics, excellence, or freedom are colored by the assumptions of the
marketplace.
For example, in the introduction to this dissertation I referred
to the "marketplace of ideas," in which the truth is supposed to win
out over time.

This assumption reflects our positive sense of open

competition, in which the best or most worthwhile wins.

This is a

central myth in our lives and shades the meanings of other important
words.

In terms of education, in addition to the high-minded view of

the marketplace of ideas there is the lower-minded concern with the
marketability of the skills one learns.

In its most benign

interpretation the metaphor of the marketplace conveys a sense of the
triumph of the most deserving.

While some will deny this and point

out that many others are at a disadvantage in the marketplace because
of their race or sex, they rarely challenge the idea of the
marketplace itself but only its living up to its promise.

Their

response to the problem is usually some form of affirmative action.
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programs like "Headstart" designed to help the disadvantaged to find
an equal place at the starting line in the great race towards success.
All of this is but to suggest that as framed by the marketplace
we think of life largely in terms of success or failure within the
standards of the marketplace.

Our sense of the word "freedom" is

similarly colored by the marketplace, a freedom which is essentially
the opportunity to succeed economically.

To understand the

marketplace, its myths and its inconsistencies, and our reaction to
them is to understand much about our way of life.

However, our image

of the marketplace obscures our sense of the Greeks, because it was
not a part of their culture.

Consequently, words like "freedom,"

"politics," and "excellence" had distinctly different meanings in
Greek life than they do in our own.
The center of Greek life was not business but politics, and for
them the illuminating metaphor is the polis rather than the
marketplace.

While the youths in our society grow up wondering how

they will find a place in the marketplace, the Greek youths who were
free to be citizens were concerned with eventually winning distinction
among their peers.

Rather than a place for making deals, the polis

was, as Hannah Arendt describes, the "space of appearances" organized
"out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between
people living together, no matter where they happen to be."^ It was
here that the Greek fulfilled "the need, not of mere pleasure, but of
the display of individual powers, in order thereby to gain distinction
and consequent enjoyment," according to Hegel.

The ultimate goal was
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to win imperishable fame, or immortality, to become a story passed
through the ages.
This basic difference in orientation between the Greeks and
ourselves leads to numerous other differences as well.

As success is

determined by economics in our society, the fame sought by the Greeks
related to the idea of arete, or excellence, which Werner Jaeger has
called "the central

ideal

of all Greek culture."^ To the Greeks all

things and human endeavors had a specific form of excellence, for
example an arete for each art form, an arete for a particular age of
life,

an arete for a man and for a woman, and, most importantly, a

civil

or political arete.

"action well
it does

This last was called eupraxia and it meant

done." This distinction did not hinge upon success, as

for us, but upon the quality of conduct itself, who one

revealed oneself to be through the action.
Arendt writes,

"man,

As an example Hannah

if compelled to fight, is still free to fight

bravely or in a cowardly way," and it was the way in which one fought
that was most important, not that one won. We know of Achilles to
this day, not because he won battles, but because he chose to avenge
the death of a friend, knowing beforehand that his action would cause
his own death as well.^
That the actions of the warrior were considered political
suggests a sense of politics that is both different and broader than
our own.

Literally

all

that happened within

this

"space of

appearances" was political, meaning that political referred to all of
the shared aspects of the Greek citizens' lives.

It is helpful here
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to note that when Hegel writes of the "boundless impulse of
individuals to display themselves," that the self being displayed was
not an independent personality, as we would assume in our more
individualistic times, but "the ideal that inspires us."^ The self
being displayed was the individual's response to the arete and in
"striving to do one's best and to be the best of all," one confirmed
the shared ideals of the polis.
While our own sense of politics stems from that of the Greeks,
it has become so colored by the attitude of the marketplace that
though our politicians refer to ideals in their speeches, we perceive
their policies and actions as negotiations and deals.

As voters we

are concerned with getting "a piece of the political pie," and any
mention of deals makes us shrug our shoulders and say "its all
politics," meaning that we can ignore the public statements as
posturing since we know the issue is being decided by behind-thescenes manipulations.
Rather than images of the marketplace, the Greeks used metaphors
of the performing arts, such as dancing, healing, and flute playing to
describe political activities.

As with the performing arts the

excellence of a political act was a matter of virtuosity, which was to
be found in the performance itself and not "an end product which
outlasts the activity that brought it into existence." In that the
action itself is short lived, acting individuals, like play actors,
need a publicly organized space for their "work," and the "presence of
others before whom they can appear."^
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Their sense of freedom is as different from ours as are the ends
of the polis and the marketplace.

Our freedom of the marketplace is

the freedom to make deals, to acquire objects and skills which will
increase our value in the marketplace; over time this is our path to
success.

As Tocqueville observed, this freedom, rather than being

political, is a freedom from politics, from the public life, the
freedom to devote oneself to individual pursuits.

Also, this freedom

of economic opportunity focuses upon future possibilities rather than
the present moment; it is a freedom from restraints and a freedom as
potential.

In contrast, as suggested by the term "virtuosity," the

Greek freedom is of the present moment, the freedom to perform well
now.

As Hannah Arendt writes, "Men are free...as long as they act,

neither before nor after; for to ^ free and to act are the same."®
Thus, free action, actualization of the ideal, and virtuosity,
are different ways to refer to the same performance of excellence.
From the actor's point of view what particularly distinguishes this
free action is that it does not come from internal motivation, but
springs from principles, such as honor, or glory, or love of truth,
which "inspire, as it were, from without."^ For the Greek hero, this
inspiration was so great that he disregarded the dangerous
consequences of his action.

As exemplified by Achilles, he "despised

danger in comparison with disgrace.
Altogether, the Greek sense of free action suggests an action
inspired by
consequences.

a

principle and performed with a disregard of

While I have cited Arhilles, it was not only in war
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that such virtuosity could appear.

An equally good example is the

performance of Socrates at his trial.

In reading Plato's description

of Socrates' defense one feels one is witnessing a man free from fear
and acting solely upon principle - in this case the love of truth.
Though his life is in the hands of his judges, rather than trying to
curry favor with them he virtually insults them with the suggestion
that it is only the dislike of others that has put him on trial.
Knowing that he is not helping his own position, he states to the
judges:
You are wrong my
spark of decency
death; the only
does anything, is

friend, if you think a man with a
in him ought to calculate life or
thing he ought to consider, if he
whether he does right or wrong.

Such was the moral heroism of eupraxia, and it was around such actions
that the life of the polis centered, where the "raison d'etre would be
to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom as virtuosity
can appear.
Such moral heroism was considered the highest form of arete, and
it is central to our sense of the Hellenic spirit, but not a complete
description.

Any number of fanatics, after all, have an

uncompromising sense of right and wrong, and what distinguishes the
Greek spirit from that of the fanatic is the Greek's extraordinary
capacity for making distinctions.

Nearly all the words we use to

differentiate branches of knowledge and activities, e.g., chemistry,
theology, politics, comedy, aesthetics, etc., are Greek in origin, and
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this drawing of distinctions is arguably the intellectual act most
characteristic of the Greeks.
We have carried the Greek art of making distinctions to the
point of separating reason from emotion and ethics from aesthetics,
while for them these distinctions also assumed connections.

Virtue,

excellence, and beauty were woven together in the Greek view, which is
why arete at times signifies virtue more than excellence, and why it
could be said that the aim of arete "is to take possession of the
beautiful." There was not a clear line drawn between ethics and
aesthetics because the good was thought of in terms of the excellent
and the excellent was thought of in terms of beautiful.
This tendency to think and speak in terms of the beautiful is
well illustrated in the Symposium.

Alcibiades praises the beautiful

soul of Socrates, whom Alcibiades thinks most able to help him "attain
the height of excellence."

Socrates responds:

If what you say is true about me...and if there is
in me some power which can make you better, you
must see some inconceivable beauty in me immensely
greater than your own loveliness.^^
Here virtue, excellence, and beauty mirror each other and provide a
viewpoint from which can be seen "every part as subordinate and
relative to an ideal whole" {Jaeger).The problem of doing right
was not a matter of the will but a matter of knowledge, a knowledge of
the beautiful, and it was the beauty of virtue which moved one to be
virtuous.
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The formal studies of Greek youths reflect this emphasis on
aesthetics.

Music, gymnastics, and epic poetry formed the curriculum,

giving the youth a sense of beautiful sounds, beautiful forms, and
beautiful deeds.

This was the preparation for the way of life of the

free man, free to devote himself to the beautiful.

The "liberal" of

liberal education refers to the pursuits worthy of this free man and
the quality of liberality, or generosity with one's possessions, which
characterized the free man's spirit, though the Greeks themselves did
not think in terms of liberal education per se.

The concept of

liberal education as study of the liberal arts was conceived by the
Romans Yarro and Cicero as a way of emulating the Greek way of life
through formal education.

The Greek word "paideia" denotes education,

culture, and the ideal altogether.
Paideia was particularly the ideal pursued in daily life.

In

the Symposium a youth is advised "to love one body and there beget
beautiful speech" and "from one to two, and from two to all beautiful
bodies, and from bodies to beautiful pursuits and practices, and from
practices to beautiful learnings, so that from learnings...he may know
at last that which is the perfection of all beauty.As the youth
becomes a young man he is advised to spend his time in the company of
those whose knowledge of the beautiful is most complete, which is why
we imagine Socrates accompanied by numerous young men, including
Plato, Xenophone, and Alcibiades.

When Leo Strauss writes, "Liberal

education supplies us with experience in things beautiful," he is in
accord with the Hellenic spirit.^^
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However, the Greek spirit has not been simply a matter of
aesthetics.

The analysis that we are now doing is also a legacy of

Greece -- its greatest contribution being reason and the idea that
mankind could be rational.

To the rhapsody of spirit unified and

moved by beauty to pursue excellence, we must add the divergent note
of reason.

As Auden has suggested, the Greeks were the first "to

think about our thinking, to ask such questions as "What do I
think?"^® And it is Socrates who is credited with asking this
question most persistently both of himself and others, and, in so
doing initiating the individual conscience.
I have argued that Greek individuality was a reflection of group
ideals, and thus the opposite of our notion of individual ism.
Socrates initiated philosophic individualism.

Earlier we noted a

similar heroism between Achilles and Socrates, but there is also a
very significant difference.

Achilles' sense of right followed

traditional values while Socrates reasoned his way to a sense of
right.

As Jaeger has stated, the Homeric man "measured his own arete

by the opinion which others held of him.

Yet the philosophic man of

later times could dispense with such external recognition."^^ There is
no reason to believe that Socrates was indifferent to the attraction
of enduring fame that moved his fellow Greeks, only that he found
living in harmony with himself to be even more important than the
praise of his fellow citizens, especially since their opinions did not
seem well thought out.
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Rationality was the crowning glory of the Greek spirit, but it
emerged only as Athens was declining.

Educational consciousness, as

developed by the sophists, and individual conscience, as developed by
Socrates, came about as the nature of Athenian life was changing and
traditional standards were breaking down.

That theories on the

pursuit of arete were first developed during this period indicates, I
suspect, that the paideia of the Greek way of life was no longer
adequate to teach arete.

Nietzsche at least finds that "the summer of

Greece" occurred before reason evolved.
In Socrates, however, there does seem that momentary balance
between the traditional unity and the new individualism, in which
excellence, beauty, and reason all are prized.

In Socrates we seem to

have found the civilized man in whom unity and diversity exist without
strain.

His individualism is not a denial of shared ideals but his

own assessment of what they mean.

Early in his life Socrates turned

away from Ionian science since he could not find any illumination into
the ultimate purpose of human life.

While most things we do are the

means to ends, Socrates asked what is the ultimate end which is not a
means to something else but which is an end itself.

It is this sense

of ultimate purpose that underlies the idea of "liberal pursuits

that

Aristotle will later describe as ends in themselves.
The image of Socrates is one of irony and paradox.

In fact, one

wonders if Socrates taught Plato the meaning of irony.

Here in this

world which so emphasized the beauty of the senses, we find the most
beautiful of souls in an ugly body.

We find the individual who is
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most commonly held up as the Ideal teacher to be one who claimed to
know nothing and to have nothing to teach.

And perhaps most Ironic is

that he who died in disgrace in the eyes of his fellow citizens should
become arguably the most immortal of the Greeks, the individual whose
fame seems least likely to perish.

The Spirit and Form of Liberal Education
Just as others are pleased by a good horse or dog
or bird, I myself am pleased in an even higher
degree by good friends....And the treasures of the
wise men of old which they left behind by writing
them in books, I unfold and go through them
together with my friends, and if we see something
good, we pick it out and regard it as a great gain
if we thus become useful to one another.
Socrates
At the beginning of this chapter I distinguished between the
spirit of liberal education and its form.

When considering Socrates

and liberal education there is a corresponding distinction between
seeing Socrates as the inspiration of our idea of liberal education on
the one hand and understanding Socrates' role in the formalization of
liberal education on the other.

The spirit of Greece is a combination

of excellence, beauty, and reason, but in the legacy of Greece reason
has come to dominate, particularly in the form of scholarship.

But

reason as scholarship is not well suited to grasp the spirit that gave
rise to it, the spirit of Socrates and Athens.

This is simply because

scholarship is based on analysis, a breaking into parts, while spirit
must be captured as whole.

It seems that the better we are at
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breaKIng something down Into parts, and the better we can define these
parts - I.e., the clearer our formal knowledge - the further removed
we are from the overall spirit.

This d11enr,a has been pointed out by

Jacques Bartun In an article describing why our contemporary
university with Its emphasis on scholarship Is particularly unsuited
for an education In culture, the traditional aim of liberal education.
Barzun argues that the mind does not work analytically in the
process of cultivating culture.
understanding

For that process we need "intuitive

which is derived from the experience directly and

cannot be conveyed in definitions but only suggested by analogies and
imagery.

His main point is that culture must be grasped gradually

through reflection, meditation and conversation, and this statement
takes us to the heart of the idea of liberal education -- to what
Socrates and his friends were doing and what would still be worthwhile
for us to do.^^ Thinking and dialogue concerned with excellence
gradually teaches us what is praiseworthy and what is not.

In this

integration of mind and spirit, thought and feeling, we gradually
place our experiences in order, which leads to a considered point of
view, and one which is much more than simply a reflection of our
prevailing liberal ideology.

Such dialogue is the central dynamic of

liberal education and the primary legacy of Socrates and Athens.
Throughout the history of liberal education the centrality of
conversation about excellence has given way to other concerns.

Formal

education, whether directed by Church or State, has largely been a
matter of socialization into the predominant ways of thinking and
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acting of a given society, and the actualization of liberal education
has in turn been shaped by these concerns.

Again as exemplified by

Socrates, the idea of liberal education is always in conflict with the
prevailing ideology of the day, any ideology, simply because ideology
limits the capacity for thought.

In turn, no ideology, whether

Puritan or liberal, emphasizes this process of working out one's own
sense of excellence, for each has its own doctrines of what to praise
and what to condemn, although this is obscured in the latter's case by
its rhetoric of freedom.
This problem of imbuing liberal education with a spirit and
purpose foreign to the Greeks is not only a modern problem.

For as

long as the tradition of liberal education has existed, there has been
a tendency for its spirit and its aim to be obscured in the
formalization of that spirit.

By formalization I am referring to two

interrelated developments, the creation of systematic philosophy on
the one hand and the liberal arts on the other.

While both began in

the life of Greece and were inspired by Socrates in particular, the
path pursued by each was largely away from that which inspired them.
Though systematic philosophy stems from Socrates' application of logic
and definition to his pursuit of excellence, the emphasis of
philosophy soon changed to the method itself, to a matter of logic and
formal knowledge.

Its origins in conversation concerning excellence

were largely forgotten.

And the liberal arts, which stem from the

Greek assumption "that the only genuine forces which could form the
soul were words and sounds, and-so far as they work through words or
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sounds or both-rhythm and harmony" (Jaeger) would become categories
of knowledge, emphasizing the memorization of rules and the analysis
Of

passages.

This preoccupation with truth, logic, and formal

knowledge can be seen as the legacy of one part of the Greek spirit,
analytic reason, dominating at the expense of both beauty and
excellence.

The pursuit of formal knowledge has become the primary

goal of all education, taking us away from conversation concerning
excel 1ence.
As I interpret it, the aim of liberal education in the Socratic
mode is not knowledge, but thought, which orders our knowledge in a
way that we find fitting.

While most writers familiar with the

tradition of liberal education share this emphasis on thought rather
than knowledge, the traditional tendency to emphasize knowledge as
superior to mere opinion has led these writers to defend the tradition
in terms of knowledge.

For the purpose of clarification let us

briefly consider the origins of the formalization of liberal education
in order to understand how a tradition essentially inspired by the
ability of one man to make others think would become a tradition which
became identified with knowing.
Liberal education must ask whether cultural excellence can be
taught.

While the pursuit of excellence had been central to the Greek

way of life for centuries, it was not until the Sophists of the 5th
and 4th century B.C. that theories were developed on how to achieve
this ideal of culture.

According to Jaeger, the Sophists were the
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first to conceive the conscious ideal of culture, and In turn "made
Greece conscious of her own culture."25 n was the Sophists who
invented rhetoric and transmuted the old educational tradition of
poetry into the language and ideology of rationalism.

In particular,

it was the claim of these itinerant teachers to be able to teach
excellence, particularly of the political sort, that we must note, for
this is where Socrates enters the picture asking the Sophists and
others exactly what they mean by "excellence."
In Plato's early dialogues we find Socrates investigating the
nature of arete and its relation to the soul.
arete?

Can it be taught?

Knowledge?

He asks: What is

Is it knowledge, and, if so, what kind of

If it is knowledge, doesn't someone have to know it well

enough to teach it, yet no one seems able to quite say what it is?

Is

this a knowledge by which to attain arete or is there a knowledge
which is itself arete, where "knowledge is the being of him who acts
weii?"26 Throughout all this questioning Socrates claims not to
know the answers himself, and though others accuse him of using this
supposed ignorance as a trick, he asserts to the contrary, "It isn't
that, knowing the answers myself I perplex other people.

The truth is

rather that I infect them also with the perplexity I feel myself.
Do we believe him?

Here we are touching upon the question of

"Socratic irony," made more questionable because we cannot be sure
where to draw the line between Socrates and his portrayer, Plato.

For

some, such as the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, this irony is "that
disconcerting affection of ignorance and simplicity which was Socrates
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most effective dialectical weapon."28 por those who think this
defines the essence of his Irony, Socrates Is a rather Irksome
individual, undeserving of his acclaim.

Yet, I think It can be safely

assumed that this Is not the Image of Socrates which Inspired
humanists from Cicero to Erasmus to John Adams.

For those who have

been fascinated with Socrates over the ages, the Irony Is much more
profound than this.

It Is not that Socrates never uses his Ignorance

as a weapon, but that in the deepest sense he does believe himself
ignorant, the irony steiiming from the sense that in his awareness of
his ignorance he knows more than those who falsely believe they know.
There is also irony in the possibility that he knows that the method
he uses, the pointing out of contradictions and the pushing for
definitions, will not directly lead to the knowledge that he seeks,
but will only clear the ground of false knowledge.

Dialect clears the

mind of false knowledge so as to be open to perceive the "flying
spark" of truth.
He often implies that if we could see the good clearly it would
be impossible not to choose it over the bad.

He is fully aware that

this clarity of vision is beyond our reach, yet in the process of
talking about it one somehow comes to care for virtue (excellence).
Although the equation "virtue is knowledge" is often attributed to
him, it is not clear what he means, his sense of knowledge having an
ironic twist to it.

What he does say clearly in the Apology is that

he is most concerned with persuading others to "care more exceedingly
for the soul, to make it as good as possible.Exactly how making
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the soul good is to be accomplished we cannot be sure, so Socrates has
always remained a source of controversy, infecting us to this day with
his perplexity.

He has had a unique place in history, able to

continue his self-described function as midwife, able to bring our
thoughts to birth rather than instruct us.
This vision of Socrates has inspired both the tradition of
liberal education and the development of systematic philosophy, but
it has generally been lost in the course of the formalization of each.
Formal education, even v/hen called liberal, is more concerned with
instruction than infecting people with perplexity, and philosophers
have not been content to leave philosophy as a matter of circular
discussions revolving around the questions of excellence and virtue,
as a brief look at each will reveal.
As for philosophy, Hannah Arendt well captures the difference
between Socrates' idea of philosophy and what was to follow:
It seems that he, unlike the professional
philosophers, felt the urge to check with his
fellowman if his perplexities were shared by them
-- and this urge is quite different from the
inclination to find solutions for riddles and then
to demonstrate them to others.
In short, systematic philosophy took the idea of liberal education
away from its initial home in conversation about the questions of
excellence and made the central question that of truth and the central
activity solitary analytic reasoning.

Some, such as Nietzsche or more

recently Robert Pirsig, would even blame Socrates for making truth the
central category of thought rather than excellence, but most arguments
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on the issues revolve around the differences between Plato and
Ari stotle.
I am not certain who characterized all individuals as either
Platonists or Aristotelians but certainly the distinction points to a
conflict in liberal education as well as in philosophy.

Platonists

tend to think Aristotle missed the subtle sense of the meaning of
truth to Socrates/Plato and firmly believe that the dialogue was not
simply a literary device but essential to the pursuit of this truth.
Those who favor Aristotle see Plato as an eloquent but rudimentary
precursor of Aristotle.

The Aristotelian distains Plato's mixture of

prose and poetry, and the Platonist sees Aristotle as dwelling too
much on logical forms and categories.

The Platonist seems to see the

truth as a personal vision, the Aristotelian as a matter of verifiable
propositions.^^
The significance of this debate for our purposes is that
Aristotle would become the central figure of Christian philosophy.
Aristotle set the foundation for a philosophy that would become
preoccupied with matters of truth and logic rather than excellence, a
philosophic bent more suitable to the priest than the political
individual.

Aristotle does not seem to have attached any particular

significance to the method of dialogue itself, and in noting the
importance of Socrates he only praises the systematic aspects of
Socrates'

search.

Then, in his system he placed the issues of

excellence in the relatively minor philosophic category of ethics.
Rather than logic applied to dialogue aimed at the clarification of
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knowledge about excellence, dialectic came to be a study of logic
itself, with Aristotle systematizing, for example, the logical
strategems used in an argument.As the preeminent philosopher of
the Christian world, Aristotle's influence led to the scholastics of
the medieval period "whose philosophy was so logical in its nature as
well as its method that even modern scholars have found it all but
impossible to differentiate between the logical philosophy and the
purely didactic logic,It would be this abstract theology
accessible only to minds trained in scholastic logic which would be
the main target of the polemics of Eramus and the other Christian
humanists.
If we turn now from philosophy to the development of the concept
of liberal education itself, we will note a similar pattern for the
two are largely intertwined.

What became clarified as the seven

liberal arts in the third or fourth century A.D. stemmed from the
admiration the Romans had for the Greek culture and their attempts to
emulate it through formal education,

Cicero in particular felt the

Greek arts and letters to have a civilizing effect and were essential
in cultivating humanitas, from which the term "humanist" comes.
Cicero viewed these arts as a preparation for a life of politics and
philb'sdphy, as did the Greeks.

What would become the trivium of

grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric can be traced to the Greek study of
poetry, the rhetoric of the sophists, and the dialectic of Socrates,
but as Cicero imagined it, all of the liberal arts were a preparation
for philosophic thinking and political action.

Philosophy as civility
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and peace of mind, politics as the ability to persuade through oration
and the wisdom to know what was the best—this is what Cicero and his
friend Varro had in mind when shortly before the fall of the Republic
they envisioned an education to civilize their fellow Romans.

As the

polis and republic receded into history and Christianity expanded in
influence, the liberal arts became an education for priests rather
than political men.

Philosophy became an aid to Christian theology

rather than a civilizing influence in politics.^^
Summing up the paths of philosophy and educational history in
such a general fashion misses much indeed.

But it does seem helpful

in terms of our discussion to note, if very roughly how the rise of
systematic philosophy and the formalization of liberal education go
together.

Though the inspiration of Socrates was central to both, the

more philosophy became a matter of solitary individuals working out
their systems of thought rather than as an aid to conversation, and
the more the liberal arts petrified into seven subject areas with
rules and principles to be memorized, the further removed were the
forms of liberal education from its original spirit.

Summary
In this chapter I have portrayed the Greek spirit and in so
doing have given some sense of how their view of life differed from
our own.

I have also described how the ideal of liberal education has

been inspired by the Greeks, and in particular Socrates, and how in
the process of giving form to the spirit as the liberal arts or as
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systematic philosophy the spirit was often lost to a deadening
formalism.

Therefore, there is much in the tradition that even a

traditional humanist world not embrace.

This is particularly true in

the period after the Renaissance when the humanist spirit gave way to
that of the Puritan, and liberal education became an instrument of
discipline and piety, as I will show in the next two chapters.
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7T.
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CHAPTER
HUMANISM AND CALVINISM:

III
THE GREEK SPIRIT

FOUND AND LOST

Nothing in human experience has been less in accord
with the spirit of Hellenism than the study of the
classics in western European and American
education...In spite of their pagan origins the
cl assics.. .were inculcated in a strongly Christian
atmosphere which rejected the whole pagan theory of
life.^
Harry Elmer Barnes

There is every evidence that the learned class of
Massachusetts Bay became cultivated men, interested
in humane letters as well as theology, and that
they successfully brought to the Mew World much of
the best of the heritage of European civilization.^
Richard Hofstadter

The quotations above illustrate a fundamental conflict in the
roots of liberal education in this country.
Barnes,

to call

From the perspective of

the education the Puritans practices “liberal

education" seems ridiculous even though they thought of it as such.
However, from Hofstadter's perspective the contention does not seem so
ridiculous,
maintain

for they did indeed prize the life of the mind and

the traditional

forms of liberal education.

Since the

Puritans now seem left behind, this ambiguity does not evoke much
attention.

However, as I will argue in the next chapter, the Puritans

were leaders upon the pathway to our present confusion about liberal
education,

so we need to clarify our sense of Puritan liberal
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sducation.

In this chapt6r and thG nsxt I will

dGscribG how the

Calvinist Puritans maintained the tradition of liberal education and
the nature of the spirit in which it was maintained.

I will also

describe the humanist revival of the Greek spirit of liberal education
in the Renaissance and how Calvinism evolved out of this humanism.
the process I will

In

describe significant differences between the

humanist and the Calvinist, their differing views of the ancient
Greeks and their differing sense of the purpose of liberal education.
To understand the Puritans and their version of liberal
education requires some understanding of what is and is not
encapsulated in Hofstadter's phrase "much of the best of the heritage
of European civilization " If one considers the spirit of Hellenism
an essential element of our European heritage, Hofstadter's contention
is misleading, for the Puritan sense of right stands in stark contrast
to that of the Greeks or even to the Renaissance humanists who revived
this spirit.

While the Puritans certainly did study "humane letters,"

there was little of the enjoyment of study, the play with words, the
sense of toleration and intellectual freedom that characterized the
Renaissance scholar. And while the Puritans inherited an emphasis
upon the intellect from their humanist and scholastic predecessors,
theirs was an intellect aimed at defending a rigid Calvinist theology.
They studied Plato, but their interpretations of his works and their
appreciation of Socrates as a model of a life well-spent was not that
of a humanist scholar such as Erasmus.
reading about Socrates...

Erasmus would declare upon
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A heathen wrote this to a heathen, yet it has
justice, sanctity, truth.
I can hardly refrain
from saying Saint Socrates, pray for me..."^
but to the Puritan it was clear that none of these heathens would be
found in heaven, that, as Perry Miller writes, "the best of heathens
fell short of the least of Christians."
While the Greeks turned their attention outward with their love
of

public

self-display, the Puritans turned inward to personal

struggles in preparation for an afterlife.
not at glorifying themselves,

Their actions were aimed

a form of sinful vanity, but at

glorifying God.
The Puritan is characterized by a degree of internal struggle
unknown to the Greeks; he epitomizes what Socrates feared.
individual

He is the

in almost constant disharmony with himself, seeing his own

depravity in contrast to the stainless purity of God.

Yet, something

in this contrast draws him zealously onward, gives him a sense of
mission, makes of him an instrument of the Lord.
image of the civilized individual

Socrates is the

in whom unity and diversity are

balanced with little strain; the Puritan is a fanatic who holds unity
and diversity together only with the greatest of effort, but perhaps
as Perry Miller states, with a "delight in ordeal." The Puritan loves
perfection because he sees so clearly his own imperfection.
love he will

be a radical

With this

force in Europe, for he will not tolerate

anything short of his vision, and for the same reason he will be a
conservative force in the New World.
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The Puritan vision includes an escape from Catholocism on the
one hand and a purification of Catholocism on the other and is nicely
captured in a sentence by Sebastian Frank:

"You think you have

escaped from the monastery, but everyone must now be a monk throughout
his life."^ While the marketplace suggests the central image of our
own world, and the polis that of the Greeks, the corresponding image
for the Puritahs was the world-as-monastery.
This vision and spirit are the legacy of John Calvin who brought
the city of Geneva under his sway approximately a century before the
Puritans came to the New World.

To understand how liberal education

and Calvinism came together we need to consider the role of the
Renaissance humanist as a reviver and conveyor of the Greek spirit on
the one hand and a progenitor of the Reformation on the other.
The Renaissance is often thought of too simply as the rebirth of
ancient learning.

However, Jaeger placed it in the right perspective

by noting that the 4th, 12th, and 13th centuries also had periods of
revival

of interest in antiquity; what we know as the Renaissance was

merely the greatest of these revivals.
certain

scholars

turned away

From about 1350 to 1600,

from an ascetic and abstract

scholasticism and searched for a new criteria of a life well spent.
They

found

it

in

the literary remains of Greece and Rome, "the

manuscript evidence of which had to be literally recovered from
medieval

garrets and forgotten scrap heaps.While there are many
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generalizations that one encounters about these "humanists," the one
clear-cut characteristic they shared was "the desire to establish
clear and correct versions of the ancient classics." They originated
scholarship as we know it.
From the standpoint of education, what was particularly
noteworthy about the Renaissance was that there was a greater emphasis
upon teaching.

More

significant than the humanists'

scholarly

accuracy was that as they discovered the ancient world and related
these discoveries to their own lives they revealed to students how to
do the same.

Men of wide culture, if they taught French, for example,

did not simply teach the language but also taught history, geography,
and literature.

Gilbert Highet suggests that these were men "who

could teach...how to read, to talk, to think, to know, to act, to
live."^
Thus, we see humanists such as Erasmus and his friend More not
only learning Greek and translating ancient texts, but also enriching
their lives with the spirit of Greece.

Their works are spiced with

the irony and humor that reflect the Socratic-Platonic tradition,
"that teasing wit, that gently mockery, that vivid sense of the
absurd." They seem to have what Walter Ong has called "the sense that
utterances can somehow touch mysterious depths which analysis can
never quite fathom," the sense that the deepest truths cannot be
communicated directly.

Erasmus shocked the graver of his fellow

scholars with a book which mocks his and their efforts, suggesting
they were all

ruining their eyes for no good reason.

And More

89

referred to himself as too old a fool to change his ways as he awaited
his own execution for refusing allegiance to his Protestant king.^
One can imagine Socrates smiling at such self-mockery.
Renaissance humanists, however, lived in a vastly different
public space than 5th century Athenians.

Most notably there was no

polis, no space of excellence in which to perform.

The unity of

spirit of Socrates was not possible for them, since politics and
philosophy were no longer interwoven.
free thinking with public service.

It was now hard to reconcile

More took the path of public

service, rising to be Lord Chancellor of England, only to liken civil
life to a prison--this before the metaphor became literal.

Erasmus

said of his friend, "he disliked the court and the company of princes
because he had a peculiar hatred of tyranny and love of equality."
For his own part Erasmus chose to keep out of politics, other than to
advise princes through a book.

As Hugh Trevor-Roper describes the

choice, he "preferred poverty with scholarship and freedom to the
golden servitude of court life."® The humanists also differed from
the Greeks in their tendency to see culture very narrowly, solely in
aesthetic terms, so that the very word "aesthetic" comes down to us as
largely a matter of refinement, usually excessive refinement, without
the more robust political connotations.
These differences between Renaissance humanists and the Greeks
are similar to the differences between ourselves and the Greeks.
Though the Greek way of life compels admiration, their world was so
different from ours, or of 15th and 16th century Europe, that we are
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left with a major problem of translation; How can we translate that
which was admirable in their lives into our own?
The Renaissance humanists dealt with the translation problem in
one way, largely in reaction to Scholasticism which was itself an
attempt to emulate what was perceived as a classical, rational
approach.

There have been many other attempts at translation

including those of the Platonists, Epicureans, Neo-Platonists and
rival camps of Aristotelians, and by the Reformation all of these
currents of thought were present in the universities.^
Calvin and his followers, however, differed significantly from
the other humanists.

Many Renaissance humanists made an effort to

approach the ancients on their own terms seeking illumination from
them for their own lives.

The Calvinist, on the other hand,

approached them with his mind made up.

While the humanist's pursuit

of truth was a matter of developing clear and correct versions of
ancient texts, encouraging free discussion and varying views, the
Calvinist looked solely to the Bible for a singular truth--God's
divine plan”-giving rise to a uniformity of thought.

Let us examine

how this singular mind evolved out of the intellectual diversity of
the Renaissance.
In 1523, six years after Luther had posted his theses, and while
Erasmus was reaching his 58th year and bemoaning the direction of
events, a 14 year old Jean Cauvin became a student at the Sorbonne.
We know him as Calvin because in the fashion of the day he had
Latinized Cauvin to Calvinus, an indication of the humanism that was

91

still vital at the time.

During his years of education, it seemed

that Calvin himself was destined to become a humanist scholar.

While

he studied the law in obedience to his father's conmand, his real
passions as a student, according to one biographer, were for the
languages, literatures, and cultures of antiquity.

His first

published work was solidly in the humanist vein, a study of the
political thought of Seneca which barely mentioned scripture.

He had

even given up the law and was preparing to enter the priesthood, when
as he put it, the Lord "subdued my heart (too hardened for its age) to
docility.
Since Calvin was not of a self-disclosing nature, biographers
have not been able to specify the exact date of his conversion, and it
is hard to know whether it was prompted by the proceedings of heresy
that the Sorbonne brought against him in 1533, or vice versa.

For our

purposes it does not matter, but had he been born a few years earlier
it is easy to imagine him lost in obscurity, living the life of a
little known scholar, for this is the life that he always wished for,
if we are to believe his statements on the matter.

Calvin describes

himself as timid and retiring, shrinking back from conflict with
others, desirous of the contemplative life.

That the path he took

seems so contrary to his human tendencies is typical of the Calvinist
spirit of self-denial, of being subdued by the Lord to an instrument
of his will, despite personal considerations.
Calvin's public views are most evident in his work in Geneva.
Though ordered to leave Geneva in 1538, he was asked to return three
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years later to help them enact the religious and social reformation of
the city.

Calvin's desire was a reaction to what R. H. Tawney has

described as the "cynical materialism which seemed a denial of all
that had been meant by the Christian virtues, and which was the more
horrifying because it was in the capital of the Christian church that
it reached its height." The humanists felt a similar repulsion but
they chose to believe in "the gradual regeneration of mankind by the
victory or reason over superstition and brutality and avarice.
Calvin either did not believe this or found the consequences
unacceptable; the Lord expected more than this.

Calvin knew how

"stubbornly addicted to the superstitions of the papacy" he had been
himself until

he

received the Lord's grace, and he never

underestimated the extent of human depravity.

Believing that "any

grace which a man possessed came from the free action of God alone"
left Calvin with little faith in the power of reason to regenerate the
world, particularly a reason which itself was corrupted by the fall.
As John S. Brubacher has suggested:
The confidence that the pagan and, to an extent,
the Humanist had in being able to lift themselves
by education alone, Calvin could only look upon as
vain conceit and pride.
Only with a reconstructed Church and State, in which every department
of life, public as well as private, was penetrated by religion could
society be renewed.

Thus, while Thomas More set up a school in his

home, Calvin sought to make all of Geneva "the most perfect school of
Christ that ever was in the earth since the days of the Apostles,
which is how John Knox later described it.
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From Geneva, Calvinism spread through France, Holland, Scotland,
and England as visitors, such as Knox, were fired by the Calvinist
vision.

And as the Calvinist spirit spread. Calvinist education

reflected both his conviction of human depravity and his revolutionary
sense of mission, inculcating the discipline necessary for a Christian
life of self-denying labor based on scriptural authority.
The following description by Barnes refers to the general
influence of the Reformation upon education, and reflects the value
Calvinists placed upon tedious mental labor as an instrument of both
mental and physical discipline.
From the use of classical literature and philosophy
as a preparation for life, the classical tradition
degenerated into a stereotyped and dull cultivation
of syntax and linguistics.^^
Education came to be largely a memorization of Latin passages and
grammatical rules, and this was the kind of education the Puritans
brought to America.
There is another aspect of this education, however, which gives
the Puritan

a certain

intellectual

stature.

The Puritan

minister-leaders were exceedingly logical in their approach to the
Bible.

This was the legacy of the scholastics whom the Puritans

derided while using methods of thought inherited from them.

It is the

now little known Petrus Ramus who acted as intermediator in providing
the Calvinists with a way of thinking similar to the scholastics but
without their Papal connotations.

Although not a household word

today, there was an "astounding circulation" of his works around the
academic world of the 16th and 17th centuries.
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Calvin provides us with paradigm of the soul of Puritanism, but
Petrus Ramus shows us the Puritan mind.

Described as a "pedagogue's

pedagogue," by Walter Ong, Ramus lived in mid-sixteenth century
France, a scholar with a strong Calvinist bent.

Ong describes him as

a "singularly unimaginative person," lacking interest in making
conversation, with a positive aversion to witty and pithy sayings,
such as those that dotted the works of Erasmus.

He was exclusively

interested in developing a systematic and efficient curriculum, and
wrote extensively on educational methods, particularly on how to
develop suitably organized textbooks.

His primary legacy was his

logic, which was a noteworthy part of the Puritan's European heritage.
As Lawrence Cremin has stated, he was one of the three authors most
emphasized by the educated American Puri tans.Ramist logic was a
logic of what was given, not a logic of speculation or inquiry.

His

approach to a subject was to search for relevant matter, and then to
arrange it in statements and syllogisms, an approach reflected in
early American Puritan sermons.
This logic was used to order growing knowledge of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.

It was particularly attractive to the

practical minded Puritans who were primarily of the commercial classes
and preferred clear-cut thought—things to manipulate and rearrange—
to "the imponderables that haunted the world of learning." The
Puritans were accustomed to dealing with commodities and preferred
their knowledge to be of the same order, unappreciative as they were
of the elusiveness of wisdom. Ramist logic was also well suited to the
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Calvinist inclination towards useful knowledge, plain speech, and a
literal interpretation of the Bible.

It would be used to analyze

Biblical passages in order to deduce the "true" message out of what
often seemed conflicting messages.
Along with Calvinism, Ramist logic made its way to England where
it was in vogue in Cambridge and, to a lesser extent, in Oxford in the
1620's where the Puritan leaders who would create the Bay colony were
being educated.

They attended Cambridge and Oxford against a backdrop

of political and religious tension than in 12 years would erupt into
civil war.

Both the education they received and the political

atmosphere of the English universities affected the curriculums the
Puritans would establish in the Mew World, so a brief consideration of
those universities is necessary.
In the already beginning contest between Catholic and Protestant
points of view--with the Church of England being the bone of
contention--theology was "the one great, absorbing intellectual
interest" at Oxford and Cambridge, not to mention the general society
as well.

According to Mori son, we have no subject that compares today

to the pervasiveness of theological discussion in the seventeenth
century.

Of course, this interest in religion was not new.

Since the

middle ages, "the main, almost exclusive, scholarly preoccupation of
the English universities" had been "theology in both its aspects.
First, there was the form the church would take in relationship to the
state.

Second, there was the question of "divinity—the philosophical

aspect of Christianity, the relation of man and nature to God and the
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nature of God himself." This should be kept in mind as a balance to
Hofstadter's assertion that Cambridge and Oxford at this time "had
long since been thoroughly infused with humanist scholarship." This
seems an excessively simplified sunniation, for, as Mori son states, the
"deep and fruitful labors of Renaissance humanists in collecting and
editing texts of ancient classics went on outside university walls."
Also, these universities "did not foster creative literature" nor "do
much to foster creative scholarship...outside the important branch of
theology." And neither Oxford nor Cambridge had any teacher to
compare with the Italian, Dutch, and French humanists of their day.
Lastly, the great figures in Elizabethan literature who did go to
college, men such as Spencer, Marlowe, and Milton, "regarded their
college careers as a waste of time," an opinion that John Locke would
concur with a few decades later.

Such was the "intellectual life of

Cambridge" (which set the pace for the intellectual life of New
England) as described by a very sympathetic observer of the
Puri tans.^®

FOOTNOTES
^Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural History of the
Western World (New York: DoverTressTTg^^TTTTTJT:-2

Richard Hofstader, Anti-Intellectualism in America (New Ynrk*
Vintage Books, 1963), p. 61.
--^Barnes, op. cit., p. 559.
^Ibid., p. 509.
5
John S. Brubacher, A History of the Problems of Education (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 249.
^Gilbert Highet, The Art of Teaching (New York: Vintaqe Books.
1950), p. 189.
^Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Intellectual World of Sir Thomas More,"
American Scholar, Winter, 1978/79, p. 26.
®Ibid., p. 28.

q

York:

Barnes, op. cit., p. 566.

^^John T. McNeill, The History and Character of Calvinism (New
Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 104-103.

H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1926), p. 110.
^^John S. Brubacher, op. cit., p. 311.
^^Barnes, op. cit., p. 492.
^^Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: The Colonial
Experience 1607-1783 (New York: Harper and Row, l9/0).
^^Walter Ong, S. J., Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology (Ithica:
Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 142-164.
^^Samuel Eliot Morison, The Intellectual Life of Colonial New
England (New York: New York University Press, 1970), pp. 18-22.

97

CHAPTER

IV

PURITANICAL HUMANISM:
THE FOUNDING OF LIBERAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA
The tradition of liberal education was brought to America by the
Puritans and infused with their spirit.

Samuel Eliot Morison, the

historian of Harvard, has pointed out that though the Puritans did not
possess the gentle spirit of the humanists, we should nevertheless be
grateful that they maintained the humanist tradition at all, since
"the mere physical labor of getting a living in a virgin country is so
great as to exhaust and stultify the human spirit unless it has some
great emotional

drive." In such situations, he claims, the

"alternative to intellectual Puritanism is intellectual vacuity." Our
concern here is not to praise or blame the Puritans but to understand
their contribution to our present confusion.

Until the late

nineteenth century in this country, liberal education was infused with
a Puritan Calvinism that carried with it a quite particular
interpretation of the classical past: the Greek sense of excellence
became Christian virtue and the Greek gods were seen as angels of the
Lord.

Thus, while the Puritans did maintain the classical tradition,

they altered it in ways that led to its rejection.

As Alfred North

Whitehead noted early in this century, "Of all types of man today
existing, classical scholars are the most remote from the Greeks of
the Peri clean times.
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While the Puritan origin of liberal education in this country
sewed the seeds of our present confusion, we do not find this clearly
spelled out and reflected upon in the literature on the subject.

At

times Puritan liberal education is portrayed as something fortunately
transcended and now forgotten.

At other times, as with Morison, they

are honored for maintaining the classical tradition, but it is not
made clear how in altering the spirit of the tradition they altered
the tradition itself.

Thus, we receive a blurred picture of the role

of Puritanism in the course of American higher education, a picture
that we aim to bring into focus in this chapter.
From 1636 to the last half of the 19th century, American higher
education was generally conducted and controlled by Calvinists.

As

Lawrence Veysey has noted:
In nineteenth-century America, educational and
theological orthodoxy almost always went together.
Orthodox Christianity, as the college president
usually understood the term, meant a diluted
Cal vini sm.^
Although dominated by Calvinism, throughout this period there was a
growing rebellion in higher education against the constraints of the
Puritan way of life or at least a liberalization of these constraints.
The issues of academic freedom, student election of courses, and, in
the 1960s, the student rebellion against in loco parentis, were all
reactions to the "College Way" initiated by the Puritans at Harvard.
In this chapter we will examine the nature of the Puritan mind and its
version of liberal education as a first step towards an understanding
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of the struggles between the Puritan and the liberal for control of
higher education.

A Learned Clergy and a Lettered People
We shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eies of all
people are upon us; soe that if wee shall deale
falsely with our god in this wee have undertaken
and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help
from us, wee shall be made a story and by-word
through the world.
John Winthrop
(in a sermon while aboard
ship, heading to the New
World)^
Winthrop well expresses the Puritan sense of destiny in coming
to the New World.

They left England believing that the efforts at

reform of the church were failing, that the Protestant efforts to
reform Europe as well had only gone part way, that they needed further
guidance, and that they, the Puritans, were being called into the
wilderness to establish a true orthodoxy, a City upon a Hill.

As a

Puritan said "...that which other Nations have not attained to this
day, may by the blessing of God be reached by us."
While some of their Puritan brethren in England viewed their
migration as a flight from the battle, they viewed their move as a
maneuver against the Anglican Church, which they were still determined
to dominate eventually.

It was in this spirit that the Puritans

founded the Bay Colony in 1630, and subsequently Harvard College in
1636.^
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In the introductory chapter of The American College and
University, Frederick Rudolph suggested that there has been too much
emphasis on the "narrow religious purpose" Harvard and other early
American colleges, a position echoed by Richard Hofstadter as well.
Indeed, Morison argues that "the two cardinal principles of English
Puritanism which most profoundly affected the social development of
New England and the United States were not religious tenets, but
educational ideals:

a learned clergy and a lettered people."^

While this emphasis on the Puritan concern for "education for
posterity" dispels one false impression-^namely that they were
unintellectual religious enthusiasts--it seems likely to create
another, an impression that the Puritan concern for education was
somehow separate from and more important than the place religion held
in their lives.

Nothing was more important than their religion, but

they thought of religion in the broadest terms, penetrating all
aspects of society, as did Calvin.

That they were not solely

concerned with training ministers is true: they were equally
concerned with educating their magistrates in piety, so that they
would work harmoniously with the ministers in maintaining the City of
God.

It was not that theology alone was studied but that all was

studied from the perspective of theology, as we will discuss later.
On the other hand, the Puritans were more concerned with the
intellect than an emphasis on their piety might suggest.

They prized

both intellect and piety, and there was an ongoing tension between the
two, as Hofstadter points out:
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Puritanism has always required a delicate balance
between the intellect, which was deemed as
essential to true religion in New England, and
emotion, which was necessary to the strength and
durability of Puritan piety. This balance proved
to be precarious...”
In one sense. Harvard College was founded in order to maintain this
balance.

Therefore, much of what follows is an examination of the

relationship among intellect, emotion, and piety.
When I speak of the "Puritan" in the following pages, it is
primarily the minister-leaders, the purest of the Puritans, whom I
have in mind, and their concerns were not always identical with those
who followed them.

As Norman Petit writes:

The settlers were mainly concerned with preserving
their freedom and economy, while the clergy
struggled to preserve the ritual structure of the
churches; and indifference to the inner life became
more and more pronounced.'
Even in the early days, as the story goes, one minister preaching to
an outlying village congregation was told" "Sir, you are mistaken:
you think you are preaching to the people of the Bay; our main end is
to catch fish."
That the "mood" varied among the ministers according to their
individual temperments may also be assumed; some would emphasize the
depravity of their audience in order to humble them into submission to
the word of God; others would emphasize the importance of striving for
individual salvation.

There was nevertheless a certain shared frame

of mind concerning God's relation to man, with clear lines separating
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orthodoxy from heresy, and it is these rudiments which we will now
consider.

The Problem of Human Nature
To the Puritan "the infinite variety of the world's misery (is)
reducible to a concrete problem, the relationship of the individual to
the One. ° And this problem was man made in the form of Adam's fall
from grace which "has put all out of order, and has brought Confusion
and Desolation on the works of God." God created a splendid universe
based on a majestic plan, but man ruined it through his own weakness,
and in the process lost his ability to comprehend God's will.

An

inner conversion was the door through which one regained a feeling of
harmony with this divine plan.

Thus, as with Calvin, the conversion

was the most significant event in the life of the Puritan, and it
was not wrought by "morall
intervention.

perswasion" but by God's powerful

While the process of regeneration remained a mystery,

"the translation from sin to grace was so abrupt that a man could tell
when it happened to himself, and others could recognize the outward
evidence.
And more hinged upon this conversion than a feeling of harmony
with God's divine plan.
seemed to be.

One's salvation was at stake, or at least

While Calvin had believed that only a comparatively few

individuals were predestined to be saved, and all others damned, it is
not surprising that the Calvinists after him came to think that they,
being the best people that they knew, were probably the elect.

The

American Puritans tended to go a step further and believed that true
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conversion Implied true election.

Believing also that this true

conversion was detectable by their fellow Puritans gave them even more
essurance on this score.

Yet, one could never be sure, since one

could only be imperfectly sanctified, given human depravity; thus,
even those who thought they were "the elect were not always certain;
they had their fluctuations of doubt and their melancholy lapses from
grace." Their ministers played upon their fear that God might
withdraw his help in this life, even though they might be saved in the
next, using plagues and crop failures as evidence of God's displeasure.
However, to explain the Puritan striving simply in terms of fear
of damnation or disaster befalling them is to miss the heart of the
true Puritan, although we may suspect fear to be the motivation of the
less devout.

According to Miller the true Puritan has motivated by

the "rellish and taste of the sweetness of God's love" rather than
fear.

Thomas Hooker, a Puritan Minister, used the metaphor of two

women and a physician to explain true piety, the one woman being sick
and wishing to be healed, the other wishing to marry the physician,
pointing out that the "soule that is carried in a kind of love and
affection to godliness, he would not have Christ only to heale him,
but he would be married to Christ.
Though we may

today view Puritan piety as a "gloomy,

otherworldly, and tragic conception of life," Perry Miller argues that
the Puritans did not experience it this way.

The true Puritan

welcomed the opportunity to serve God and glorify him in a corrupt
world.

The Puritans thought they had "not only their assurances, but
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also sometimes their extasies,"—those moments when they would see a
glimpse of the divine plan and feel harmony with God.
ordeals were tests to be met with delight.

Therefore, all

Rather than having a

tragic view of the world. Miller contends that they lacked a sense of
tragedy, which, as the sense of sin became less urgent in the 18th
century, led them to smugness and snobbery.
The problem the Puritan faced was that he could never be quite
certain that his actions stenmed from a love of Christ rather than a
concern for his own salvation and his crops.

As Miller sums it up:

A Puritan was forced to go through life thinking
that if what he had supposed was his regeneration
was authentic, he was secure; if it was not, he was
worse off than ever.^^
The machinations of his own depravity must have seemed infinite to the
Puritan, "for he could undertake self-search, perceive his sin, pray
for repentance, and then was secretly so satisfied with himself for
becoming humble as to spoil the whole enterprise." Thus, the Puritan
was often embroiled in "meticulous and unceasing self-examination,"
and at times so distrusting of himself as to prompt the following
advice: "Therefore, you had need pray for the repentance of your
repentance and to beg pardon of all your prayers.Guilt or
innocence before the Lord did not hinge on what one did but on what
one intended, so they unceasingly attempted to decipher what their
true intentions were (and undoubtedly the intentions of others as
well).
Thus, Puritan piety was characterized by brief moments of
ecstasy and clarity and undoubtedly longer periods of doubt and
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despair.

As Miller states: "Puritanism had no use whatsoever for the

saint who was pure by nature and holy without struggle and
temptation." However, they did not want their internal struggles to
become externalized in religious bickering and factionalism.

Thus,

discipline was emphasized, both self-discipline as well as of the
community upon the individual.

And to inform this discipline, to give

the saints criteria to separate the work of Satan from that of God, a
system of religious tenets were scrupulously upheld.

It was also

however a traditional aspect of Protestantism that such tenets were
not simply to be taken upon trust--a notion scorned and attributed to
Papists—but must be supported by reasons and arguments as well.

Reason
If the religion of the Puritans was simply a matter of the
ecstasy of conversion there would have been little need for the
founding of Harvard.

However, their religion was not simply a piety

but an intellectual system as well.

As Augustine had, the ministers

argued that one must first believe in order to know, that revelation
indeed superceded reason and that knowledge itself would not save.
But while faith was a prerequisite, faith itself was not simply an
emotional experience but a matter of understanding.

The Puritan

minister Samuel Willard argued: "Faith is grounded upon knowledge,
for how can a man choose the ways of god unless he knows what they
are?" If knowledge without faith is empty, "zeale is but a wildefire
without knowledge," argued John Cotton.And, as we shall soon see.
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Cotton and other Puritan leaders were very wary of a "wildefire"
burning out of control.
The Puritans seem paradoxical because their piety was both
emotional and intellectual, in a "delicate balance" as Hofstadter
mentioned.

In support of conversion they would condemn reason; in

support of reason they would condemn overzealousness; what they wanted
was a perfect combination of the two.

The ideal, as Miller states,

was "guidance of the heart by the mind," but it was a mind guided by
the truth of Scripture.
The Protestantism of Luther had begun with the notion that God's
truth was in the Bible for anyone to see--thus, negating the need for
the Catholic Church as intermediary between man and God.

It quickly

became evident though that in reading the Bible individuals could see
different truths.

The general conclusion drawn by each of the

Protestant sects was not that the Biblical message was ambiguous, but
that their opponents were not using the proper method of
interpretation.

Thus, the truth of the Bible, though not exactly

self-evident as originally thought, was there to be found by those who
used logic properly.

At least this was the Calvinist view; some sects

were more anti-rationalist.
Thus, while the mind was to guide the heart, the mind primarily
consisted of an ability to interpret the Bible logically.

As Charles

Chauncy, a president of Harvard, argued:
Yea how shall a man know when a Scripture is
wrested, or falsely applyed, or a false use is made
of it, or a false consequence is drawn out of it,
or a true, without some principles of logick.
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Most Skilled, of course, in the use of this logic were the ministers
themselves, who would have to defend the orthodox theology against
heresies" and simple "errors." However, they did not reserve their
carefully reasoned disquisitions for controversies with other scholars
but used them in their sermons as well, which were lessons to the
congregations in Ramist logic as well as theology:
A Puritan preacher never surrenders to feeling; he
does not celebrate the glories of religion in
sustained paeans or bring home its terrors by
shouting, but argues his way step by step,
inexorably disposing of point after point, quoting
Biblical verses, citing authorities, watching for
fallacies in logic, drawing upon the sciences for
analogies, utilizing any information that seems
pertinent.
The Puritans would support piety with reason, but would not
acknowledge reason when it was used to criticize his doctrines.

As

with John Cotton, "in fundamental and principall points of Doctrine or
Worship, the Word of God in such things is so clear, that he cannot
but be convinced in Conscience of the dangerous error of his way after
once or twice admonition..." The dissenter who illustrates the
fallibility of reason "is not persecuted for Cause of Conscience, but
for sinning against his Owne Conscience.The Puritan was not about
to have his tenets undermined by reason; reason used in such a way was
obviously not "right reason." We can see how such fine distinctions
were confusing to the layman.
Given this somewhat arbitrary application of reason and logic by
the clergy, their warnings about its fallibility, and the great
emphasis placed on emotional conversion, it is not surprising that the

109

layman came to question exactly why such a learned clergy was
necessary.

For the clergy this was exactly the wrong conclusion to

reach from their preachings, especially when one argued for it
publicly as did Anne Hutchinson.
The Hutchinson controversy is particularly significant for our
purposes, since it formed the backdrop of the founding of Harvard and
forced the magistrates and ministers to delay the actual establishment
of the college until Hutchinson and her followers were dealt with.
Not only did Hutchinson question the need for a learned clergy, she
also argued that once "the Holy Ghost dwells in a justified person"
the saint should "surrender his will to the promptings and propulsions
from within." This was the "wildefire" of which Cotton warned, for
who knew what one might be prompted to do or say by an inner voice?
Governor Winthrop imagined such thinking leading to ethical anarchy,
and, after a church synod excommunicated Hutchinson, he banished her
from the colony.^^
If there had been any doubt among the Puritan leaders about the
urgent need for a college, the Hutchinson controversy quelled it.
Whatever fine phrases were used, such as "learning for posterity,

the

founders of Harvard must have also been motivated by the fear of the
overzealousness of their own followers.

Harvard would help to

maintain the balance, which would tip once again towards emotion in
the Great Awakening of the 18th century.
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The Purpose of Harvard College
Now, what was the purpose of all this effort? The
usual explanation is that Harvard and the other
colonial colleges were intended to educate
ministers. This is only a half-truth. The dynamic
motive, to be sure was to train up a learned
ministry...But the purpose of the founders was much
broader than that; and the curriculum they
established was not a divinity curriculum.^®
Samuel Eliot Mori son
Mori son is the recognized authority on the history of Harvard
College, and his views have influenced all others writing on early
American higher education.

In reading Morison it is helpful to

understand that his major works were written in the 1930's in reaction
to the anti-Puritan histories written in the 1920's , most notably
those of James Truslow Adams and V. L. Parrington.

Morison's works

balance his predecessor's harsh portrait by emphasizing the more
humane aspects of Puritan life, not always, unfortunately, entirely
accurately.

He tells us, for example, that in Harvard's early years

the liberal arts were studied as well as theology, implying that
Harvard offered what we might think of as a traditional, balanced
liberal education.

Yet Perry Miller writes that the curriculum was an

attempt "to combine in one systematic belief both piety and the
inherited body of knowledge," suggesting a clear subordination of
knowledge to systematic belief.

Morison's desire to humanize the

Puritans leads him to minimize the fact that the liberal arts were
addressed to a training in orthodoxy just as theology was.

Ill
Miller, once a student of Morrison and eventually the most
acclaimed scholar of Puritanism, could see the conflict between the
Puritan s style of humanism and liberal education.

Their aim was for

students to absorb not reflect upon knowledge:
Puritan education did not intend that students
think for themselves, but it did intend that they
should take in the vast quantity of received and
orthodox information.^^
With Miller's help let us reflect a moment on the nature of
Puritanical humanism by focusing upon two aspects of the early Harvard
College:

its role in maintaining the Puritan orthodoxy and the

organization of the college and its curriculum which were designed to
fulfill this role.
In reference to the contention of Harvard's founders that the
college was formed with broad educational purposes in mind. Perry
Miller comments:
instead of being a charter of academic liberalism,
it was rather a manefesto of orthodoxy against
radicals who had contended, or were then
contending, that religion and preaching should be
taken out of the control of colleges and
professors.
On the other hand Mori son sees the issue as intellectual versus antiintel 1 ectual, assuming falsely that "the advancement and perpetuation
of learning was one and the same with a succession of literate
ministers" (Miller).The followers of Hutchinson were hostile
toward classical learning ("What has Christ to do with Apollo?") but
their hostility was particularly aimed at the assumed connection
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between this education and religion, a position held by some In
England as well and known as Antinomianism.
Antinomians were not tolerated in the Bay Colony, so we have no
direct evidence of their reaction to the situation there, but we can
look at their counterparts in England.

There, two well known

advocates of Antinomianism, William Dell and John Webster, professed
to have no quarrel with education per se; they objected to making
learning "...the criteria of a candidates fitness for the ministry."
They argued that ministers, like geniuses, were not made by education
but born of the spirit.
Miller suggests that ministers defending the necessity of a
learned clergy had not entirely disinterested motives:
The clergy had a base and ulterior motive in
defending the schools...they loved learning neither
for its own sake nor for its assistance to faith,
but simply because it got them privileges and
worldly power.
Learning and worldly power and privilege were all one, united issue to
the mind of the Puritan founders for whom society, economics, and the
will of God were one and the same.

They perceived themselves as the

indispensable instruments of God's will and, without any consciously
self-interested motives, defended learning because they themselves
were learned; what was good for them and their kind was identical to
what was best for society.

In defending learning the founders were

defending orthodoxy and the social
particularly their own.

status quo as well, most
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We should consider the purpose of the intellect as understood by
the Puritan minister-founders.

The Puritans placed a high value on

the intellect, but it was an intellect expected to deduce the truth in
that which was already acknowledged.

When Henry Dunster, the second

president of Harvard, concluded through his own thinking that infant
baptism was unscriptural, he was forced to resign for upholding such a
Baptist

heresy.23

And, as we all know Roger Williams was rewarded for

his arguments in favor of religious tolerance by banishment.
If the Calvinist "slogans and injunctions...were not conceived
as limiting the scope of learning," as Mori son asserts, it was only
because whatever was to be learned was to be learned in a way
congenial

to Puritan orthodoxy.

As Charles Chauncy, the third

president, declared in 1655, "only those works suitable* to
Christianity were to be used in the classroom." Many Greek and Roman
works were included, but only because of the Puritan ingenuity in
finding support for their orthodoxy in them.

As Miller states;

They tortured texts of great writers and did
violence to meaning in order to prove that the
agreement between pagans and revelation resulted
not only from the inherent similarity of the law of
nature with the Gospel, but from actual
plagiarizing by Greeks and Romans of Jewish lore.
They particularly interpreted Plato in this
fashion.2^
They studied a broad curriculum but not in the spirit of inquiry or
speculdtion.

Instead, it was a way of verifying the troth of

orthodoxy by revealing that God's plan was so imprinted in nature that
even the poor pagan could perceive some of it
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Still It would have been impossible for generations of students
to have read the classics without some glimmerings of the
possibilities beyond orthodoxy.

Lawrence Cremin sagely speculates:

...whatever the spirit in which the classics were
taught, there was certainly immense diversity in
the manner in which they were learned; indeed the
ideas gleaned from them were doubtless discussed,
disputed, and eventually acted upon in ways quite
at odds with what Harvard's founders had
intended.
And Miller has also suggested that while studying the liberal arts
students encountered ideas that could not entirely be subjugated to
orthodox interpretation.

Surely education at Harvard did stimulate

some thought, enough thought, in fact, that by 1716 good Puritans like
Cotton Mather could no longer look upon it as a bulwark of Puritan
faith.
The founders of Harvard wanted their lay leaders and their
ministry to share a common knowledge and a common logic so that the
magistrates would agree with John Cotton and his successors "that in
fundamental and principal points of Doctrine or Worship the word of
God is so clear" that Church decisions would be supported, as the
banishment of Anne Hutchinson was supported by Governor Winthrop, a
governor as well as minister of the Church.

And they wanted the logic

taught at the college to trickle down through sermons to the
unsophisticated layman, for logic was seen as a corrective to sinful
passions and heresies, which might wreak havoc upon the established
order.

Mori son sees the founding of Harvard as the creation of a

bulwark of the intellect "in a country where social and economic
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conditions fostered crude materialism, pietistic conceit, and
complacement ignorance," but it can also be seen as a bulwark for
maintaining the pietistic social order and the place of the ministers
on top of this order.
Although we have not considered it in this light, the Puritan
piety, as well as Protestantism in general, ironically nurtured
individualism by its emphasis on the personal relationship God had
with each individual,

"who in the final analysis had no other

responsibility but his own welfare." While it was assumed there was
only one correct interpretation of the Bible and God's plan, some
individuals could not be prevented from concluding that since it was
their own salvation which was at stake, the interpretation should be
their own.

To combat this, Protestant theologians developed

increasingly elaborate systems of "proof" to safeguard the "right"
interpretation from the many wrongs ones. In establishing Harvard the
founders were protecting against such "misguided" individualism and
thereby protecting the pietistic social order itself.*^'
This brings us to our second point-~the organization of the
college and its curriculum that would maintaih this orthodoxy.

It was

not enough for the studeht at Harvard to take in "the vast quantity of
received orthodox information"; he was also expected to make use of
it.

The curriculum was organized according to a doctrine called

"technologia," which was "an assertion that the arts direct conduct to
ends enunciated by God."^® Whatever was seen as "unserviceable" for
translating the will of God into rules and precepts for action was
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ruled out.

Logic in order words was primarily addressed to the

organization of knowledge rather than inquiry or speculation.

To be

learned was the logical system of interpretation that had been
developed over the previous decades by Calvinist theoreticians, and
the essential point conveyed was that the right doctrine had already
been deduced.

All that was left was the essential task of applying it

to one's life and to society at large.
Puritans would have been surprised to know that over the next
two centuries their educational ideas were attacked for their lack of
utility, since to them they were eminently utilitarian; theirs was an
education in how to make a world in keeping with God's will.

As many

Harvard theses would repeat during the seventeenth century: "Art is a
method of various precepts useful to life."^^ In this they were
echoing the words of William Ames, the teacher of their ancestors at
Cambridge, who had written: "Every art consists of rules, whereby
some Act of the creature is directed.To Miller, the ingeniousness
of this approach lies in "its integrating conduct with the very
definition of knowledge." And he concludes that "there can be no doubt
that Protestantism in its Calvanist form encouraged the shift of
emphasis in theology and philosophy from contemplation to action, from
beatitude to utility." Having prescribed "the limits and ends of all
disciplines and faculties" the Puritans came to believe that there was
no need for "metaphysics as distinct from other disciplines," and in
1653 theses metaphysicae disappeared in the Harvard commencement
exercises, and theses technologicae were added the following year.

31
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To the Puritan the imponderables of knowledge had been pondered and
organized; the purpose of higher education was to inculcate in the
student this way of seeing the world.
The desire for such inculcation and the attendant power of
control was evident for years to come in the lay board of trustees and
the development of the "Collegiate Way." Jergen Herbst suggests that
historians, such as Morison and Rudolph, have not looked closely at
the governmental structure of the early colleges.

In the case of

Harvard they have inferred from curriculum similarities with Emmanuel
Col 1 ege--where many of the Puritan elite were originally schooled—
that the American college was modeled after the English, with some
changes made out of necessity.

To Daniel Boorstin lay control was

just good old Yankee ingenuity at work: "...lay boards of control
helped marshal...limited resources and kept the college in touch with
the whole community, without whose support there would have been no
college at all."^^ However, as Herbst points out, lay boards of
control

had long been a characteristic of Protestant education,

stemming from the desire of these reformers to bring educational
institutions under the control of representatives of the civil and
ecclesiastical order.

Before 1636, such boards were operating in

Geneva, Leyden, and Edinburgh as well as in the post Reformation
English grammar schools.

Given the Calvinist insistence upon

orthodoxy, one might well infer that the board members had more in
mind than simply marshaling the support of the community.
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As for the

collegiate Way of Living," Morison suggests "it was

only by living as members of the same collegiate community, in
constant association with one another and their tutors, that the young
men could really be educated." This rosy image of a community of
scholars takes on a different coloration in David A11mendinger's
description of communal dining at Harvard.
Communal dining in this style involved much more
than convenience and economy. Commons was an
instrument of discipline, manners and power. The
Harvard laws of 1734 required students to sit in
their places, "behave themselves decently and
orderly," and wait for the blessing before eating,
"and whosoever shall be rude or clamorous at such
times, or shall go out of the Hall before thanks be
returned. Shall be punished by one of the tutors,
not exceeding five shillings."^^
This was how "young men could really be educated," and why Cotton
Mather spoke so approvingly of the "Collegiate Way," for it was a way
of overseeing the manners and morals of the students, and of
"protecting" them from the vices of the surrounding community.
Learning at Harvard was, from its founding, subservient to the
Puritans' emphasis on remaking the world in accordance with God's
plan, their reliance on compulsion and regulation in doing so, their
tendency to reduce knowledge to make it more useful to enacting the
plan, their intolerance of any opinions that contradicted the one true
Christian way, and their dislike of intellectual novelty.

Certainly

when learning came to challenge orthodoxy, as it did in 18th century
Harvard, it had advanced too far for the true Puritan s taste.

He had

no desire to perpetuate this learning to posterity and switched his
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allegiance to Yale, which, in Rudolph's words "proceeded to make a
place for itself in the sun by being what it was said Harvard had
promised to be—a safe, sound institution where the faith of the
fathers was carefully protected."35

Conclusion
While liberalism often is portrayed as a rejection of what I
have been describing, it is rather the case that liberalism grew out
of Puritanism and retained much of its spirit.

All the Puritan

virtues were retained in the Protestant work ethic as was the Puritan
emphasis upon reasoned self-control.

Liberalism continued the shift

in emphasis in religion and philosophy from contemplation to action
and retained the Puritan sense that right reasons leads to right
action.

And liberalism retained the Puritan zeal for perfecting

society, but put its faith in science rather than Biblical revelation
for determining the outline of God's plan.
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CHAPTER

V

LIBERALIZING LIBERAL EDUCATION
In the first chapter I described the "liberal mind" and its
ideology that colors and shapes our present day thinking.

In this

chapter I will outline how the liberal ideology developed in this
country and also trace its incursion into higher education, showing
how it has become our prevailing mode of educational thought.
The cornerstone of the liberal ideology has always been the
primacy of the individual and his or her "natural rights" over and
against those in authority.

The liberal tradition in American

education--as distinct from the tradition of liberal education—has
most importantly been the gradual incorporation of this principle of
liberty into the thought and structure of higher education.

Along

with this principle of liberty came a whole set of related assumptions
and emphases, developed largely by Locke and the 18th century
philosophes of the Enlightenment.

Liberalism is characterized by the

secular nature of its thought, its faith in science, its acceptance of
capitalistic individualism, and its emphasis upon future possibilities
and new knowledge rather than traditional arrangements of thought.
Another point to keep in mind is that our present day sense of
this ideology has been influenced by the natural equalitarianism of
American history.

Classical 1 iberalism was not democratic, and the

European philosophes tended not to share Rousseau's optimism about
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human nature.

However, our interpretations of the Enlightenment have

tended to stress both equality and optimism about human nature, and
our liberalism has become democratic.
In the last chapter I focused on the Puritan perspective which
is necessary to understand because the liberalization of American
higher education has largely been a matter of replacing the Puritan
perspective with that of the liberal Enlightenment.

Just such a shift

in perspectives led to the rise of the universities in the late 19th
century.

This process of liberalization freed the concept of liberal

education from the Puritan emphasis on discipline and piety but led to
a new set of emphases, and a new way of thinking that has distorted
and confused the concept of liberal education as much as the Puritans
did.
My chapter begins with a description of the origins of the
liberal ideology in the thought of Locke and the philosophers who
succeeded him.

I will then describe the interplay among Puritanism,

Classical liberalism, and American equal itarianism which made 19th
century liberalism largely a liberal Puritanism wrapped in democratic
rhetoric.

I will then discuss the three stages of the liberalization

of higher education: The first stage was a period of the gradual
incursion of Enlightenment thought into higher education, and the
formulation of an enlightened liberal vision of higher education as a
challenge to the vision of the conservative Puritan.

The second stage

began after the Civil War when laissez faire liberalism, in the form
of the elective principle, opened up the classical college to become a
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university in accordance with the enlightened liberal vision.

The

third stage began in this century with John Dewey's reconstruction of
liberalism which gave "liberal education" a whole new meaning.
The chapter will also emphasize the difficulties traditional
humanists faced earlier in the century trying to revitalize the
tradition of liberal education amidst the burgeoning universities.
Dewey's influence added an entirely new dimension to the problems the
humanists faced,

for while they were trying to renovate the

traditional concept of liberal education, Dewey was proposing an
entirely new model, from a new perspective.

John Locke and the Enlightenment Theory of Progress

John Locke: Progenitor of the
Modern Liberal Mind
Though the word "liberalism" was not used until the 19th
century, its fundamental principles can be traced to John Locke.
Locke lived through a period of great political turmoil in England,
turmoil infused with religious hostility between Protestants and
Catholics, as well as between the Anglican Church and its own Puritan
faction, and other Protestant sects.

Locke sought a principle of

political legitimacy that was based neither upon divine right nor
tradition.
In A Second Treatise of Government, published in 1690, Locke
argued that the authority of government derives from the consent of
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the governed, and that government's sole purpose is to protect the
hatural rights of property, to protect the interests of the mercantile
class, of which he was a part, from a government dominated by nobles
and the king.

In ascribing natural rights to individuals, Locke

initiated a new idea in political philosophy, and gradually these
"rights" would expand to include freedom of the press and free speech
as liberalism evolved.^
Locke's thought was modern in that he based his arguments upon
natural law rather thah upon God's will or tradition, and he made the
political

event which had given him the freedom to publish the

Treati se, the Revolution of 1689, seem a triumph of natural law.

In

the preface to the Treatise Locke stated that the new king of England,
William of Orange, was "the only one of all lawful governments" to
govern by the consent of the people.^ The revolution could have been
viewed simply as one group of nobles overthrowing another, but Locke
gave the event a new and different meaning.

In the minds of the

philosophes who came after him it would signify progress in human
affairs, a first step towards an international community of nations
governed by the consent of the people.'^
Locke was also modern in his emphasis on religious toleration,
which he believed not only humane but also necessary for political
stability; a theory of knowledge based upon empirical observation; and
an emphasis on an education that is useful and pays attention to
student interests.

Over time these educational emphases would become

magnified, even distorted, and certain of Locke s overstatements were
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used to represent h1s views, e.g., "of all men we meet with, nine
parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their
education," and "I imagine the minds of children as easily turned this
or that way as water Itself."'' In such statements lie the beginnings
of the liberal's faith In education as the primary Instrument for
perfecting society.

It Is Important to note, though, that Locke's

emphasis on a practical education was particularly aimed at those
people who were not destined by social class to become gentlemen.
This is significant because Lockeian liberalism is rooted in the
assumption that only a few will be sufficiently educated to be
reasonable enough to govern.

Locke was not a democrat, and he

addressed his educational essay to the "gentlemen" rather than to
"those of the meaner sort." He looked to the gentlemen, for if they
"are by their education once set right, they will quickly bring all
the rest into order.Thus, Locke's sense of liberal education, like
the American Puritans' was an education based upon the classics, and
his primary criticism of this education was that too much time was
spent in rote memorization of Latin and in disputations.^
Just as Locke was not a democrat, neither were most of the
philosophes who succeeded him in the 18th century.

They shared with

him the emphasis upon the secularization of ideas and politics, the
attendant emphasis on reason and science, the toleration of religious
differences, and the faith in the power of education, for at least the
few if not the many.
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Lib6rd1is[n and the Theory of Progress
In the 13th century philosophes such as Voltaire, Montesquieu,
and our own Franklin and Jefferson further developed and publicized
the modern mind as in Locke.

Most notably they developed a theory of

progress which included a faith in the perfectibility of society.
Central

to the philosophers thought was the question of social

organization.

As Henry Steele Commanger has pointed out, what

distinguished the philosophe from the philosopher was that the former
was interested in "those truths which might be useful here and now,"
while the philosopher carried on a "search for truth which was both
universal

and permanent."^ For useful truths, the philosophes

particularly looked to science.

Though Locke had influenced their

thinking, they based their theory of progress upon the science of
Newton.

Following Newton's conception of natural law, which had

influenced Locke as well, they believed that society could be
organized in such a way as to allow for the continuous improvability
of the human condition, if in the process mankind could be freed from
the superstitions of organized religion and tradition.

With the

noteable exception of Rousseau, the European philosophes did not have
a particularly high estimate of human nature--no higher than
Locke's--but their faith in science was sufficient for them to believe
that society could be organized to become more humane despite the
Q

limitations of human nature.°
The philosophes' emphasis on enlightened social organization was
always interwoven with Lockeian political theory in the evolution of
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liberalism.

In the course of such evolution, however, emphases and

interpretations changed, and it will be helpful to keep the general
nature of these changes in mind.

While both 19th and 20th century

liberalism share the assumption that society will progress if it is
organized in accordance with natural law, the interpretation of the
right social organization and education has changed as society has
become more complex and democratic.

To the classic liberal, natural

law suggested that laissez faire economics and politics formed the
best approach to increasing the wealth of nations and in turn
developing a more humane society.

As Kenneth Dolbeare has stated,

classical liberalism "emphasized self-interest as the principle
motivational force in social life."^ The classic liberal believed in
giving this motivation free reign, based upon the argument that
laissez faire economics expressed the natural law of the marketplace.
As Adam Smith had argued in 1776, organized interests, such as the
guilds and the privileged companies, were bad for society since they
worked against the natural law of the market.

Capitalism was fit into

the Enlightenment vision of progress and gave material substance to
this sense of progress.

Enlightenment humanitarianism also had a

place in this theory, but was guided by the principle of laissez faire
as well.

The classic liberal tended to believe that education,

charity, and personal matters in general should be left to private
initiative, using the increasing wealth of the free market economy.
This sense of liberalism peaked in the rugged individualism of the
late 19th century.
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The rapid urbanization, industrialization, and democratization
of American life in the late 19th early 20th centuries gave rise to a
new interpretation of natural law.

In John Dewey's view, mankind did

not best survive as individuals but as collective groups, and the
rugged individualist was not an answer to social problems but a source
of them.

While the classic liberal believed government should do as

little as possible, the 20th century liberal would place increasing
emphasis on the positive use of state power both to regulate the
marketplace and to create a more humanitarian society through support
of educational and social programs.
The hineteenth century liberal viewed liberalism education as
central to progress, but it was an education aimed at developing
stauch individualists who would lead in the direction of the
enlightened society.

The liberal vision of education in this century

is far more pervasive and the liberal's reliance upon it much greater.
Education will control the "future through shaping the thought,
action, and character of its citizens.In this all pervasive sense
of an education in liberalism, the traditional concept of liberal
education has largely disintegrated.

It is this disintegration that

we will now trace.

Liberalism in the Young Republic
The histories written in this century have too often been
written from what Clarence Karier has called a liberal humanitarian
perspective in which the liberal, the enlightened, and the democratic
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all

blend together into a theory of progress which, in turn, is

implicitly equated with the good.

As commonly told, the story becomes

one of ascension from the somber darkness of Puritanism into the light
of the liberal democratic Enlightenment.^^ Such liberal histories
obscure the Lockeian roots of liberalism and its general compatibility
with Puritanism.

They also tend to ignore the fact that Jefferson's

liberalism was elitist and that the college presidents who led the
rise of the universities were liberal Puritans.

It was precisely

their Puritanism that provided the zeal with which they sold the idea
of higher education to a public largely indifferent to it, if not
hostile.
Therefore, in this section I will

describe 19th century

liberalism by suggesting how it evolved out of the interplay between
Puritanism, the Enlightenment, capitalism, and the equalitarian nature
of the American context.

In broad ways I will describe similarities

and distinctions among the liberal and conservative Puritans,
democratic liberals and the populist democrats.

I emphasize the broad

nature of these distinctions since they will

necessarily be

simplistic, but they must be drawn if we are to free ourselves from
the blinders of 20th century liberal humanitarianism.
Let us begin by placing Lockeian liberalism in the American
context with the help of Louis Hartz.

In The Liberal Tradition in

America, Hartz argues that our liberalism especially begins and ends
with Locke, that we have not progressed in terms of our liberalism but
have simply maintained it in the face of changing circumstances.

The
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colonists even before the American Revolution were "born free" with
the Lockeian principles of private property, the atomistic society,
popular sovereignty, and natural rights already established.

For

Hartz, the outstanding point to keep in mind is that American
liberalism had no feudal system to struggle against, no aristocracy
for the liberal

to assault in the name of the people.As a

consequence, after the Revolution Lockeian liberals like John Adams
and the federalists were left in the awkward position of imnediately
becoming conservative, facing too many Americans who mistakenly took
the rhetoric of equality to include them.

Alan Heimert points out

that when it came time to develop a constitution Adams was most
concerned with placing checks on the power of the multitude, in spite
of years of arguing for the arousal of the "people" as a control upon
arbitrary government.
Adams was a liberal Puritan and his view reflects that of the
Puritan elite in general, whether liberal or conservative.

What

distinguished the Boston "liberals" from more conservative Puritans
was their religious beliefs not their political ones.

The Boston

Puritans were "liberal" because they based their Calvinism upon
empirical observation and reason, believing that "God's will could
best be derived, not from His word, but from His works.Their
particular emphasis on reason also made them more receptive to the
Enlightenment emphasis on "useful" education based upon the sciences
and other modern subjects, though they preferred to keep "Harvard a
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house of learning under the spirit of religion" rather than be secular
in nature.^^
Politically, the liberal and conservative Puritan elite were
united in their fear of the irrational or selfish multitudes and their
desire to keep government in the hands of the well-born and
well-educated.

The liberal, or rationalist, clergy of Boston was at

best tepid in its support of the Revolution.

They "were in the

1770's, nearly to a man, if not outright Tories, then praying that the
magistrates and merchants to whose judgment they deferred would subdue
the revolutionary enthusi asm.

Over the previous fifty years the

Puritan elite had faced enough revolutionary enthusiasm in the form of
the Great Awakening.
The Puritan elite were also liberals in terms of capitalist
economics.

Calvinism had always been congenial to capitalism, and

most of the American Puritans had come from the mercantile class in
England.

Although the early Puritan theocracy held capitalism in

check, by the 19th century they too tended to believe in laissez faire
economics.

Henry May has summed up the situation:

Organized

Protestantism supported the dominant economic beliefs and institutions
even more unanimously than it accepted the existing forms of
government.Calvinism had always seen value in the hard work and
saving of capitalism, and the protestant work ethic is perhaps the
most obvious legacy of this Calvinism.
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Of

this suggests that by the time of the Revolution

liberalism and Puritanism were hardly opposites.

Such tension as

there was lay between the Puritan elite and the democratic liberals
such as Jefferson and Tom Paine, between the Boston view of liberalism
and that of Philadelphia. Jefferson welcomed the French Revolution
Adams decried It and Its slogan: "Liberty, equality, fraternity."
Jefferson was optimistic about government In the hands of the
multitudes; Adams was pessimistic.

We now see Jefferson as the

liberal and Adams as the conservative.
Such a distinction is hardly accurate though, since Jefferson's
liberalism was as elitist as that of Adams.

Jefferson shared with the

liberal Puritans the belief that the nation needed an elite of highly
educated leaders.

The most significant difference between Jefferson

and the liberal Puritans was their disagreement about whether this
elite should be a "natural aristocracy" culled from all classes or
should continue to be made up of the rich and well-born.
The significant similarity of Jefferson's liberalism and the
Puritans' is most evident in contrast to the populist or Jacksonian
"liberal" who saw no need for specialized training for democratic
leadership, and viewed Jefferson's University of Virginia as simply
another bastion of privilege.

Yet even here the distinction blurs

when we realize that a typical Jacksonian was one who had almost, but
not quite, succeeded in becoming privileged himself, and that "every
stroke of his axe and hoe made him a capitalist.

Richard
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Hofstadter states:

in the Jacksonian period the democratic upsurge

was closely linked to the ambitions of the small capitalist."22
These distinctions and their tendency to blur suggest a far more
complex situation than that presented in liberal humanitarian
histories in which heroes and villans are clear.

My own summary,

though necessarily oversimplified, would emphasize these points: In
the 18th and 19th centuries a vision of liberalism education was
developed by liberal Puritans and Jeffersonians who largely agreed
upon the kind of higher education America should have.

The vision was

opposed by the conservative Puritans who controlled the colleges and
soon would also be opposed by the Jacksonian democrats who resented
their exclusion.

The enlightened liberal vision of higher education

emphasized "usefulness," but only a very high minded "usefulness."
The enlightened liberals were no more inclined to let the people
decide what higher education should be than were the conservative
Puritans.
However, in order to sell their vision of an intellectual
aristocracy to the Jacksonians, whose support they needed, the
liberals increasingly portrayed this vision in terms that most
Americans could appreciate.

At a time when "being good" was giving

way to "making good"--as Randolph Bourne describes the nineteenth
century--the liberals promoted their vision as a vehicle for economic
and social mobility.
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Higher Education Before the Civil War
Prior to the Civil War, higher education emphasized the
conservative Puritan values of discipline and piety.

The broad thrust

of the liberal's efforts was to replace the Puritan emphasis on the
supernatural and biblical revelation with an emphasis on the natural
world and reason.

The liberal tradition was centered upon efforts to

free higher education from the influence of religious orthodoxy, and
was most clearly represented by Jefferson's enlightened liberal vision
of higher education embodied in the University of Virginia.

Such

liberal reformers and their enlightened views had only very limited
success during the period before the Civil War, but they initiated the
direction higher education would take in the latter half of the 19th
century and so must be understood.
Even prior to the Revolution the Enlightenment vision had made a
few inroads into the eight colleges of the colonies.

The broadest

influence upon the curriculum was that of Newtonian empiricism,
largely because even the conservative Calvinist ministry tended to
believe that empirical science could be harmonized with scripture.
1766,

By

six of the eight colleges supported professorships of

mathematics and natural

phi 1osophy.The particular bent of

Philadelphia towards the Enlightenment is suggested by the
establishment in 1756 of a three year course of study at the College
of Philadelphia based upon the principle of usefulness.

The

curriculum placed considerable emphasis on the mastery of written and
oral English and upon training for government service.

Altogether
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about a third of the program was devoted to science and practical
studies.

According to Frederick Rudolph, this was the first

systematic course of studies in America that did not derive from the
medieval tradition nor serve a religious

purpose.

There were several attempts at reforming the colleges along
liberal Enlightenment lines between the Revolution and the Civil War.
However, the ascendancy of the Enlightenment vision, asserted by
Rudolph, was a very slow ascendancy.

Most of the attempts at reform

were short lived, stifled by Puritan conservatism within the colleges
and "a lack of any overwhelming popular demand for a new kind of
higher education.The reforms are significant however in what they
suggest of a new vision of higher education, and we will discuss three
of those attempts, Jefferson's plan for the University of Virginia,
George Ticknor's reforms at Harvard, and the experiment at Amherst
College to integrate the new studies with the old into a core
curriculum.

Jefferson's vision is significant in its articulation of

the democratic liberal rationale for higher education that we still
use today, while Ticknor's vision seems to have had more influence and
is a clearer indication of the interests of liberal academics.

The

Amherst experiment illustrates an attempt to reconcile the liberal
vision with that of traditional liberal education.
In order to keep these attempts at reform in perspective, we
should note that while the number of colleges increased in this period
from 8 to over 160, most of these colleges had only a handful of
students and were in continuous financial difficulty.

Over "seven
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hundred colleges died in the United States" before 1860.26 jhus.
while the liberal reformers were envisioning the development of great
universities most colleges were barely surviving.
Jefferson's plan for the University of Virginia, which opened in
1825, embodied all the elements of the modern liberal university,
including an emphasis on specialized knowledge.

It was relatively

free of sectarian control, gave students some freedom in their pursuit
of knowledge, and aimed at placing them in a "high state of
science."^' Jefferson also provided the rationale for state support
of higher education by claiming that the central purpose of the
university was to train democratic leaders.

Today in discussions of

higher education we tend to blend together Jefferson's emphasis upon
an enlightened citizenry and training leaders for a democracy, but in
Jefferson's time they were separate issues.

In fact, in the

legislative proposal for the university, Jefferson had included a
system of public primary schools and academies, but the legislature
rejected that part of the proposal.2®
Jefferson's organization of the university emphasized
specialization.

The university was divided into eight schools

encompassing knowledge old and new: the ancient languages, modern
languages, mathematics, natural philosophy, natural history, anatomy
and medicine, moral philosophy and law.

While students were allowed

to proceed at their own pace and choose the order of courses, if they
wished a degree they were expected to select one school and, once they
did so, they were restricted to taking courses within that school.

29
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Student freedom was an aspect of Jefferson's philosophy, but greater
value was placed on mastering a particular area of knowledge.

The

democratic leader was already becoming a specialist.
George Ticknor's reforms at Harvard in the 1820s seem another
indication of the liberal bent towards specialized expertise.

After

four years studying in Germany and traveling through Europe, Ticknor
joined the Harvard faculty in 1819.

A few years later he proposed

that the Harvard instructional staff be divided into departments of
study, that students have a degree of selection in their courses, that
classes be divided according to proficiency, and that everything be
taught more thoroughly.^® The reforms were strongly opposed by the
faculty and finally established only in Ticknor's department of modern
languages, but, according to R. Freeman Butts, Ticknor's reforms were
in the long run more practically influential than Jefferson's.

Both

Ticknor and Jefferson emphasized student freedom, but Ticknor seemed
to have little sense of Jefferson's vision of the true place of a
university in a democracy, while Jefferson had little notion of
Ticknor's penchant for methods of attaining the most advanced
scholarship.

Eventually American higher education adopted Ticknor's

emphasis on scholarship using Jefferson's rationale of democratic
leadership.®^ The experiment at Amherst College in the 1820s
represents an attempt to integrate the old with the new; it was a
compromise between conservative and liberal Puritans.

The stimulus

for the change seems to have been the fear that the colleges were "in
danger of being left behind, in the rapid march of improvement," as
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stated in a faculty report.

The report eventually led to a two-year

experiment in which a parallel course of study was added that
emphasized the modern languages and sciences, while many subjects were
shared with those taking the regular classical course.

The experiment

was abandoned after two years due to lack of funds, lack of student
interest, and an "undercurrent of faculty skepticism" about the
project, according to Rudolph.
From these three examples, it seems that as to the question of
liberal

education, the energy of the liberals pointed in a new

direction altogether and the energy of the conservatives was aimed at
maintaining the status quo.
The problem facing these reformers was the same: either the
colleges would survive upon their religious zeal, or try to court the
public by emphasizing a more useful course of studies.

The humanist

sense of liberal education that I have talked about was hardly a
consideration, for, after all, there was no particular demand for it
nor any particular advocate.

The central question was whether the

colleges would remain small, pious, and on the periphery of American
life or whether they could be made into something that more of the
public wanted or believed they wanted.

The central concern for the

liberal was how to bring the latter alternative about.

The Dilemma of the Liberal Reformers
Until late In the 19th century, the liberal reformers faced the
dilemma of promoting their vision of the liberal university against
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the opposition of conservative Puritans who controlled the colleges,
the

hostility of the Jacksonian democrats, and the general

indifference of the public at large.

The year 1828 was significant in

terms of these struggles for it was the year of both the Yale Report
and the election of Andrew Jackson.

As Rudolph states, "the Yale

Report put the weight of a great American college behind things as
they were." Mental discipline through the study of the classics as
well as student recitations was defended and the "ludicrous attempt"
to emulate the German universities were disavowed.

Harvard and

Virginia might stir up some discussion of educational reform, but
neither exerted the national influence of Yale or Princeton, which
supported Yale's conservative stand.

These two were training many of

the enthusiastic founders of new colleges in the West and South and
clergymen who would become their presidents.
On the other front the liberals along with the conservatives had
to face Jacksonian democrats who saw the colleges perpetuating old
privileges rather than training citizens for democratic leadership.
The liberal and democrat views of education were at odds in several
ways.

To begin with, the Jacksonian believed no special education was

necessary for an individual to serve in public office.

Secondly,

while the Jeffersonians were in favor of publicly supported lower
education as well as higher education, the democrats noticed the
distinctly unegalitarian education offered at the University of
Virginia.

An editorial in a Virginia newspaper of 1845 reflects the

Jacksonian spirit in criticizing the state for using public money for
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"instructing from one hundred to one hundred and fifty youths, all of
whom have the means of finishing their course through their own
resources.The democratic reputation of the University dropped one
step further when, in 1856, the legislature revoked the room and board
provision for state scholarship students because, it was alleged, it
encouraged "idle habits.
Another reason the Jacksonians were suspicious of the colleges
stemmed from the Dartmouth College case of 1819, in which the Supreme
Court ruled that privately founded colleges were private corporations
not subject to control of the state even if they received state
support.

The liberal applauded this decision as protection from the

misguided ideas of the multitudes, while the Jacksonians did not want
to support colleges they could not control.

The result was that

legislative generosity fell to a low point.
The Jacksonians believed that institutions should serve all
equally, and this did not fit well with the ideal of a university
which obviously only some could attend.

The frustration the

Jeffersonian felt with the Jacksonian is well illustrated by the
situation faced by President Philip Lindsley of the University of
Nashville.

Arriving in Nashville in 1824 with a vision of a great

university in the making, he realized by 1829 that was not what the
natives had in mind:
The levelling system, which is so popular and
captivating with the multitude, may be made to
operate in two ways, with equal success.. .Colleges
and universities, as implying odious pre-eminence,
may be prevented from growing up among us: or
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©very petty village school may be dignified with
the name and legal attribute of a college.^'
The liberal's ideal of the university was beset on all sides, and the
liberal was in a tricky situation.
to believe in his ideal.

He needed to persuade the democrat

In his baccalaureate speech of 1829,

Lindsley sounded the theme that would eventually convince the
democrat.

He argued that the tendency to associate higher education

with privilege was a relic of the European idea of class which was not
relevant in America.

Thus began the notion of higher education as an

invitation to achievement in an open and mobile society--Horatio
Alger, welcome to the university.
In order for the liberal vision to become believable, the
college had to change from being largely a ritualistic endeavor in
which students received diplomas after four years (if they hadn't been
too unruly)," to a "creation of a professional relationship between
professors and students willing to compete with other students for
meritorious recognition."^® The change would produce what Burton
Bledstein has called a "culture of professionalism,"®^ and required a
change in the attitudes of the professors, the students, and in the
institutions themselves.

Professors needed to see their work as

vocations requiring advanced learning rather than being administrative
and supervisory positions. Students had to think in terms of personal
identity and destiny rather than the esprit de corp of the dormitory
or the class, and they had to accept the idea of written examinations
which had not been a part of the college experience.

(Harvard did not
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conduct its first written exam until 1833, and it was not until 1842
that President Wayland proposed written examinations at Brown.)
Altogether the colleges had to be reshaped to fit what Bledstein has
called the "drive for self-distinction and self-assertion" that
characterized the 19th century man.^^
This movement towards rugged individualism seems to have been
nurtured by liberal Puritanism.

William Ellery Channing, the leader

of the Boston liberal clergy wrote early in the century: "The only
elevation of a human being consists in the exercise, growth, energy of
the higher principles and powers of the soul."^^ Though Unitarians,
such as Channing, are credited with replacing the Puritan emphasis on
depravity with an image of the excellence of human nature, there was a
certain burden that accompanied this new vision.

In a pinch, the

early Puritan could throw up his hands at his own depravity, see his
dire need for the Grace of God and beg mercy for his undeserving soul.
But the liberal Puritan blessed with natural excellence was expected
to elevate himself and to show through his works that he had done so.
This opportunity for individual elevation became transmuted by
Ralph Waldo Emerson into the right of every individual to his chance
of success according to his own uniqueness.

Called the "Horatio Alger

of Education" by Gary Wills,'^^ Emerson strongly influenced audiences
of college students and young men's associations in the 1840s and 50s.
Andrew Dickinson White, who would become the president of Cornell,
recalled that Emerson's lectures "made the greatest impression on me."
And Charles Eliot reportedly came to know Emerson's essays as well as
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knew the Bihle. In lectures and essays Emerson told the young .en
W10 were trying to decide what to do with their llves-with al, that
natural excellence they were both with-that what was missing In
American education was an emphasis on each of them, the unique
interests and talents of each.

He also excited them with a vision of

a distinctly American Intellectual culture, rather than one which
tamely submitted to a prescribed curriculum from the Old World.

A new

education would be based on "respecting the pupil," understanding that
"nature arms each man with some faculty which enables him to do easily
some feat Impossible to any other, and this makes him necessary to
society." Therefore, education should be shaped so "that each is
bound to discover what his faculty is. to develop it, and to use it
for the benefit of mankind.
Thus was the vision that inspired many of those who would build
the universities, and it was a vision that they in turn would sell to
the public.
self-assertion

Such individual

drive for "self-distinction and

of the "captains of erudition" initiated the rise of

the universities.

As Laurence Veysey has stated: "During the early

years of the American university movement, until about 1390, academic
efforts burgeoned largely in spite of the public, not as the result of
popular acclaim.Such individualism diluted the Jacksonian
hostility to the budding universities, and at the same time, the
universities broadened their curriculum options as public primary and
high schools multiplied late in the century.

The Jacksonian hostility

towards the esoteric knowledge of the professional was assuaged by the
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possibility that each could become a professional if he, and gradually
she, had sufficient talent and will power.

By the time of the Civil

War the liberal reformers had hardly solved their dilemna, but its
hard edges had softened.

The appeal of individualism, either

Emerson s version or the Horatio Alger version, provided a basis for
an educational consensus between Jeffersonians and Jacksonians.
That this individualism contradicted the traditional belief in
the

value of a

shared learning seemed to bother only the

conservatives, but in the face of the rapid expansion of knowledge
they failed to develop a core curriculum that integrated the new with
the old.

The conservative's stance had been to grudgingly allow new

courses to enter the curriculum while dropping none of the old ones,
making all courses more superficial in nature.

Even the experiment at

Amherst College seems to reflect a compromise between liberals and
conservatives rather than an example of a new core curriculum.

As

individualism, in the form of the elective principle, gained greater
acceptance, core curriculum requirements were continuously reduced,
undermining the ideal of a shared 1 earning.

The Eliot Period--1869-1909
From the Civil War to the end of the century there were drastic
social and economic changes which aided in the creation of the liberal
university.

This was a period of amazing growth in machine technology

and large scaled industry; the exploitation of the West proceeded
faster than ever, aided by the transcontinental railroad; urbanization
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rapidly increased, and a growing middle class was preparing to pursue
the "culture of professionalism."
These developments created a greater demand for more practical
education and greater private and public funding for education at all
levels.

The number of public high schools, increased from 1,026 in

1870 to 6,005 by 1900, an indication of the growth and prosperity of
the period.

The Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 provided funding for

the establishment of state schools of agriculture and engineering.
Some of these funds helped already established schools, such as
Michigan, Wisconsin, and California, expand.

Accumulated wealth among

the captains of industry provided funds to endow other colleges such
as Johns Hopkins, Chicago, Stanford, and Tulane.^^
A number of energetic individuals fired by Emerson's words and
their own desire to make their marks would, as presidents, make
universities out of colleges: Eliot of Harvard, Noah Porter at Yale,
Daniel

Coit Gilman at Johns Hopkins, Andrew Dickinson White at

Cornell, Frederick Barnard at Columbia, James McCosh at Princeton,
James Burrill Angell at Michigan, and John Bascom at Wisconsin, were a
number of what Thorsten Veblen would later sarcastically call the
"captains of erudition.These men were themselves partaking of the
culture of professionalism, and they and their institutions were
consciously competitive with each other.

At mid-century they looked

around them and saw what Henry James, son of William, would later say
of the period, that most men of law, medicine, journalism, science,
public service, and industry were not college educated.

Their mission
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was to Change this, to place higher education in the mainstream of
American life.^®
There was also the pressure within the colleges to make more
room for the growing sciences and incipient social sciences, modern
languages, etc.

The culture of professionalism was demanding the

means for fair competition.

As Rudolph notes: "Everywhere more

attention was being paid to various sectioning, grading, and marking
schemes as instruments of scholarly stimulation."^^ The conditions
were finally ripe for the implementation of the liberal vision of
higher education.

In the process the idea of liberal education would

be redefined, and since Harvard led in this redefinition, let us take
a good look at what was happening there and at Charles Eliot, the
foremost of the captains.
Eliot's presidency (1869-1909) spanned the emergence of the
American university and he is generally considered the most commanding
figure in higher education in the last half of the 19th century.
Laurence Veysey has called him a "true liberal of his century," and
the elective principle that he championed has been called by Rudolph
"the academic application of 19th century liberalism."^^
He began his career as a conscientious but unpopular teacher of
chemistry at Harvard who showed little promise as a scholar, and he
left after losing a bid for a professorship.

However, he had shown

considerable ability in all matters of administration, from devising
written examinations to overseeing construction of a new building, and
he left that impression as well.^^ In addition, Eliot had a vision of
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the "New Education" which matched that of those who believed that
Harvard must expand with the country.

As outlined in two articles in

the Atlantic Monthly in 1868, Eliot argued for a greater use of
electives to match student needs, more reasonable preparation for
practical

pursuits, and the need for advanced study beyond

graduation,^^
Eliot's vision fit well with the course set by the previous
president, Thomas Hill, and many associated with Harvard wanted an
expansion and acceleration of what Hill had begun.

Hill had expanded

electives in 1865 and 1867 , advocated the establishment of graduate
education, and spoke of liberal education not solely in terms of the
classics, but as creating an understanding of history, political
economy, and philosophy.
Those who favored Hill's reforms talked of foreign universities
as models, practical studies, and "a liberal enlargement of the list
of elective studies." Opponents were those who felt that a classical
education was the most important distinction between the college man
and the common man and anything diminishing it would lead to anarchy.
These men also relished the bonds formed between classmates and
generations of students who largely shared a common learning.
battle lines were not always clear-cut.

But the

There were differences among

those who favored change, such as that between the scientists who
disdained the talk "of a practical education" and those who saw
science in terms of its practicality.

Another schism was between the

classicists and those who, while favoring literature over the
sciences, wished to expand the idea of liberal education to include
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the modern languages and literatures.

The attractiveness of Eliot's

vision was that there seemed room for everybody; everyone's fear was
that there was too much room for everyone else.

After quite a bit of

controversy, Eliot was selected president by the board of overseers.
Eliot wished to make Harvard into a university, of which there
were none in this country in 1860 to his mind, though many, including
Harvard, used the title.

Like Ticknor, Eliot had visited Germany and

France and was impressed by the range and variety of subjects offered
to students for their choice, and he wished to provide the same at
Harvard.

He also firmly believed that a young man could choose his

own course of study better than anyone else could for him, and that
all non-vocational courses had equal value as long as they were well
taught and studied.

All of these beliefs pointed to the use of the

elective principle which Eliot made famous and to some infamous.
With the elective principle Eliot was able to free the hold of
the classical subjects on the curriculum and to make room for the new
fields of knowledge--modern literatures, sciences, history, and
political

economy.

He was also able to attract donations for

professorships in these subjects, and teacher to teach them.

For

example. Harvard's first professorships in history and political
economy were endowed in 1869 and 1876 respectively.

With the

development of more specified student interests and departments, Eliot
could also build a graduate school which was begun in 1873.

This last

was against much resistance from the faculty but Eliot encountered
resistance on most of his proposals from those who did not want the
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familiar patterns to change.

Over his forty-year tenure Eliot's

patience and perseverance won out.

He either wore down, out-argued

or in the end, outlasted his opponents.

During his administration the

number of faculty members increased from 60 to 600 and the
institution's endowment increased from slightly more than two million
to twenty million dollars.^^
Eliot continuously wrung faculty concessions for electives,
until by 1894 only freshmen had a required course, and that was one
year of rhetoric.

Eliot's Harvard would also do away with compulsory

chapel and even temporarily abandon attendance regulations.

Eliot's

foremost theme was student liberty, and he followed this principle
even when it forced him to tolerate things he did not like, such as
the undergraduate clubs which were snobbish and used sadistic
initiation practices.^^
Yet Eliot was still a Puritan as well.

At the center of his

educational thought was the same emphasis on moral character building
that was found in more conservative presidents, like Noah Porter at
Yale and James McCosh at Princeton.

What made him liberal was that he

believed the exercise of liberty built character more effectively than
external discipline.

As he addressed the Harvard freshmen in 1906:

Do you want to be automata?...The will is the prime
motive oower, and you can only train your wills in
freedom.^'
In arguing for this student freedom, however, Eliot assumed a genteel,
moral context established by the examples set by the faculty.

Eliot

placed a great emphasis on the selection of his faculty, and he looked
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for men who took an active interest in public affairs, but did so in a
gentlemanly fashion (he is even known to have vetoed at least one
candidate because his wife was considered ill-bred).

True to the

liberal belief in the marketplace of ideas, Eliot often hired men
whose views were contrary to his own, as long as he believed they
provided a good moral influence for the students.

With the liberal's

vision of progress, Eliot saw the university "as the paradigm for the
eventual world...teaching diverse kinds of men to express their
differences in an atmosphere of self-control."^® In this the
professor as exemplar of manners and morals was key, and while he
liked his professors to be both reasonable and restrained he also
sought a strain of rugged individualism.
Eliot, the liberal Puritan, thought his students could build
their characters in an atmosphere of freedom, and he hoped the process
would teach them self-control.

As Mori son notes, "what he wished to

do in higher education was to apply in that field the shift in control
that Jefferson wished to apply to government, and Emerson in society
as a whole--the shift from external compulsion and discipline to
internal compulstion and discipline." He had none of Rousseau's
romanticism concerning human nature that would characterize later
liberals, and he expected that many students would misuse his elective
system.

He wasn't concerned about those educational misfits:

He

intended liberty primarily for the strong and able who knew what they
wanted and were willing to work for it.

h59
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He could speak as a democrat: "In a democracy the interests of
the greater number will ultimately prevail, as they should," yet one
has the sense that the "as they should" is largely a concession to the
inevitable, what Veysey calls "the patrician's intelligent adjustment
to a new threat from 'below'." His democracy was actually that of
liberal individualism, democratic only to the extent that he allowed a
wider variety of people to compete, both students and professors.

As

E. K. Rand describes the Eliot period: "His remedy was to upset the
hierarchy of the Arts and to put all academic subjects on a democratic
level.

Free field and no favor.

Let the best art win.

Liberte,

egalite fraternite?"^^
How did Eliot's vision effect the practice and concept of
liberal education?

According to Rand, who studied at Harvard during

the Eliot years: "Those of us who were in college in those days had
no doubt that we were enjoying a liberal education.

We were free to

wander in whatever field invited." Rand's observations are
particularly noteworthy because he would become a renowned classicist.
Eliot opened up the possibility for him to further develop his
knowledge of the classics, just as for another student it might be
chemistry or history.

And Eliot encouraged his student's freedom by

taking steps to improve teaching and give good teaching greater
credit.

Prior to Eliot students did not know who would teach a given

course until the course began.

Under Eliot, they not only knew who

would teach the course but were encouraged by their president to
choose the professor, not the course.
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With the elective principle. Eliot abandoned the "scale of
merit" in which students received only half as many merits for taking
elective courses as required ones and which deducted merit points for
poor conduct.

In 1871, it was decided that "every instructor may

assign his marks in such a manner as he shall judge most equitable and
effective." And most importantly, a similar latitude was allowed in
teaching methods, though since Eliot strongly disapproved of daily
recitation, it had largely disappeared by 1880.

Lectures, discussion,

and Socratic colloquies between teacher and student became the
prevailing methods.

In 1886, a commencement speaker put Eliot's

contribution to teaching in perspective:
Formerly, the only business of a teacher was to
hear recitations, and make marks for merit. Now,
he has the opportunity of teaching. This is one of
the greatest educational discoveries of modern
times—that the business of a teacher is to teach.
Thus Eliot opened up the possibilities of a liberal education more in
keeping with the Greek spirit, and the ideal of "liberal culture"
found a home at Harvard.
Eliot opened up Harvard to the possibilities of liberal culture,
but he also planted the seeds of its demise.

In opening Harvard up to

growth and freedom, Eliot had redefined the cultured gentleman as one
skilled in a particular area, thereby redefining the nature of liberal
education as well.

While holding on to the term, Eliot "liberalized"

it, freed it from its attachment to the classics and, in effect,
demoted them to a place equal to all other subjects which were
"liberally taught"—taught with the aim of culture or knowledge rather
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than vocational preparation.

He maintained the distinction between

liberal and vocational studies, but only by broadening liberal studies
beyond the recognition of conservatives and the advocates of "liberal
culture." The situation was further confused by Eliot's tendency to
speak for popular effect in terms of education for "utility" or
"efficiency." Eliot considered a course useful if it built character,
but surely others felt he was speaking of vocations and careers.

Such

confusion was perhaps deliberate, even manipulative; it was certainly
fruitful
If Rand and his friends could feel they were getting a liberal
education it was because Eliot's Harvard was a combination of old and
new.

Until Eliot's last years the subjects required for admission

were virtually unchanged and the classics still flourished in the
pre-college education; there was a unifying bond resembling that of
the old school.

Also, Harvard was still small enough (about 1000

undergraduates in 1887) and the literary tradition sufficiently
ingrained that, given freedom, students were more inclined to study
the new humanities--modern languages, history, etc.—than they were
either the sciences or incipient social sciences.

Rand recollects;

"We felt that despite the diversity in the feast of learning that
tempted us to different dishes, we were sitting at the same table.
Old and new were in a delicate balance in Eliot's day and in
committing Harvard to continuous growth Eliot was threatening the
equilibrium. Outside changes threatened as well.

The curriculum of

the high schools began to emulate the colleges in permitting elective
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courses, and when Eliot dropped Greek as an entrance requirement the
effect was to further dilute the classical emphasis in the high
schools.

The commoh learning that bound Rand's class within Harvard's

diversity was rapidly eroding.
Meanwhile the graduate schools were coming into their own and
Eliot's attention was dangerously divided.

While Eliot's primary

focus was upon the teaching of undergraduates, he also wanted to keep
Harvard in the vanguard of the university movement.

At Johns Hopkins

Daniel Coit Gilman gave graduate studies clear priority, and Eliot had
no choice but to accept the competition and further develop Harvard's
programs.

Eliot's vision of a new liberal education seemed lost in

the process of growth, specialization, and individualism.
At minimum, the idea of liberal education requires the presence
of bonding elements, either a shared curriculum or a similar approach.
During Eliot's presidency the bonding elements were all left over from
tradition, and his own energies were directed towards organizing the
university in the service of individualism, in opposition to
tradition.^^ Such emphasis on the individual and his liberty weakened
the old bonding elements and offered no new ones to replace them.
With Eliot begins the idea that a liberal education is what each of us
decides it is; liberal education is a private experience.

Eliot's

assumption that "authority curbs the will power of the individual"
obscured the humanist's sense of authority, an authority that one
submits freely to, "consents to undergo the ordeal of being fashioned,
formed, shaped.Eliot's "individualistic persons" would become
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isolated individuals incapable of revealing their individuality
because individuality requires a cohesive community to judge this
individuality.

In 1942, E. K. Rand would nostalgically look back on

his undergraduate days and complain: "Under President Eliot one might
specialize; now one must." It was Eliot's liberal abolutism. his
faith in individualism and science, and his rhetoric of utility that
opened the door to the age of the specialist.

Liberal Education in the Aftermath
of the University Movement
The years 1908-1910 witnessed much talk about reassessing the
direction of higher education and much criticism of the intellectual
chaos in the curriculum brought about by the rapid growth of the Eliot
period.

Even the university builders seemed to be having sudden

changes of heart.

President Lowell, Eliot's successor, spoke of the

need for "an intellectual and social cohesion" in the university,
placed restrictions on student electives, and built dormitories to
give greater social cohesion.

At Princeton, Woodrow Wilson introduced

a preceptorial system to develop closer ties between students and
teachers and attempted to build a residential graduate school, which
even then must have seemed like a quaint idea.

There were other

efforts to revitalize liberal education as well; central to them all
was the idea of "liberal culture.
The elective principle and the secularization of higher
education opened the way for a version of liberal education more in
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keeping with the Greek spirit than that of Puritan discipline and
piety.

The redefined aim of this new version was often called

liberal culture," and, though its proponents tended to be sympathetic
to mental

discipline, they also emphasized the importance of

maintaining our Western culture heritage, indeed even made a religion
out of the idea of culture as developed by Matthew Arnold, who was
often quoted.

These advocates tended to emphasize the literary

tradition and they were usually found in departments of English and
other modern languages.

They wrote a great deal about the course of

higher education and "preached the same gospel of civilization" as did
the editors of the nation's leading monthly magazines and the
organizers of the fine arts in the major cities.

As a result they

were able to focus a considerable amount of attention on curricular
issues.^®
The amount of attention given to the ideal of "liberal culture"
is not necessarily a true indication of its importance.

Its advocates

had a cause and pushed it, but those in the educational center, the
utilitarians and researchers, were doing quite well with the way
things were going, and were not even sufficiently threatened by such
talk as to respond seriously.

Thus, began the somewhat schizophrenic

discussion of liberal education in this century, in which the ideal
has been given much attention precisely because it has so little
effected the course of higher education.

To paraphrase a comment by

Lionel Trilling, the more we hear talk about a tradition the more
certain we can be that it is dead.

A primary reason we have become
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confused about the ideal of liberal education is that it has found
little in the way of implementation, other than in a few classrooms,
or an experimental

program or college here or there.

Higher

educational philosophy has meant nothing compared to the guiding light
of science and the "unspoken assumption that institutional rather than
intellectual factors determine the central course of educational
development."
The traditional humanist faced many problems trying to revive
the idea of liberal education.

First, the new universities were

organized in accordance with individual pursuits rather than shared
learning.

Secondly, the equal status of areas of knowledge, which was

Eliot's original idea, turned into a reversal of the old order with
the sciences on top.
revitalize the ideal

And thirdly, those who wised to maintain or
of liberal

education were divided among

themselves about what it should be, and divided by their own
individual interests.

In this section I will elaborate upon each of

these points, showing that part of the reason we have lost a sense of
the ideal of liberal education is that almost nothing within the
colleges and universities perpetuates it.
The new universities became as tied to the scientific method and
the ideal of research as the old colleges had been to the classics.
Coupled with liberal individualism the ideal of advanced research in
pursuit of the truth established an organization geared for
specialization.

The prominence science attained by the early 20th

century and the tendency of scientists to claim "possession of the
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only truth” gave rise to an ideal of research and a scientism that
undermined the traditional ideal of liberal education in several ways.
The model for research in science and other fields was found in
the German university, which, since the beginning of the century, had
stood for true scholarship.

By the end of the century some 10,000

Americans had studied in Germany, and these German trained
professionals came to dominate American colleges with their ideal of
painstaking investigation.

That the Americans either misunderstood

the German method, or simply Americanized it, now seems clear, for
underlying the German method was a sense of underlying spiritual
unity, shared by scientists and philosophers, that did not survive the
transplant to American soil.

Veysey speculates that Americans

combined a British philosophical empiricism with the German attention
to particulars and made the practice of research into an "allencompassing ideal.
The ideal of research and specialization pointed to the graduate
school.

By the 1890's, graduate schools developed an autonomous

existence at a number of American campuses, most notably Harvard,
Columbia, Chicago, and Wisconsin.

The undergraduate curriculum became

preparation for the graduate, and this too undermined attempts at a
shared liberal or general education.

The esteem given graduate

education reached a peak early this century when the board of trustees
at Columbia University seriously considered disbanding the
undergraduate college, considered worthless as compared to the new
graduate school
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Research became practically the only basis for the prestige of
individual professors, departments, and universities.

Although

lengthy I quote the following from Edward Shils for I think it well
illuminates the result of the emphasis upon research.
The effort to be among the best institutions or
departments was spurred by the growing prominence
of research. As long as universities and colleges
confined themselves to teaching, to the formation
of character and the "molding of men," they were
visible only locally and to those who had direct
contact with them.
Few easily and widely
recognized marks of accomplishment resulted from
such pedagogical activities. However, achievements
in research were discernible not so much by the
general public as by the public consisting of other
workers in the same or related fields. Colleagues
at other universities were more effectively present
in the minds of those academics who did research
than was the case with those whose affections were
given in the first instance to teaching. The
audience of the latter was the student body,
locally circumscribed; the audience for the former
was national and international.'^
In this situation teaching, of course, is of little value.

Against

this background the efforts to revive the tradition of liberal
education seemed little more than curious anomalies.
Real headway in reviving the tradition of liberal education
against the tendencies of the university would have required
considerable agreement among its advocates, which was hardly the case.
The defenders of liberal education were fundamentally divided among
themselves about what a liberal education should be.
century "liberal

Over the last

education" and "the humanities" have become

synonymous, at least to those with a sense of the tradition.
as Laurence Veysey has revealed, the term

humanities

However,

fundamentally
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Changed its meaning between 1870 and 1940, when the term became a
rallying cry for an intensive interdisciplinary campaign to resurrect
once again a flagging ideal.

This change in meaning provides a sense

of the schisms among the humanists.
The new subjects introduced under the elective principle (modern
languages, history, philosophy, art and music) competed with the
classics for inclusion under the title "humanities." Advocates of
these new disciplines allied with the classicists as representatives
of the heritage of higher civilization, though the classists did not
exactly welcome them.

Classicists such as Paul Shorey and Andrew F.

West died in the 1920s still insisting that the "humanities" should
only refer to Greek and Latin language training.
Yeysey,

What is striking to

is the tendency of the new claimants to the label of

humanities to assert that their own particular study is one of the
humanities without developing a broader conception of the term.
Sometimes, humanists implied that the humanities comprised all those
subjects that were nonscientific, but humanists were split between
those who emphasized an education in culture and those who were
believers in the German ideal of advanced research applied to their
own fields.And the humanists exercised their own individualism
along with everyone else.
Such was the rather confused situation before 1940.

It seems to

have taken the self-conscious arrival of the social sciences to make
the humanities a concrete grouping of academic disciplines.

Whatever

we might think of the advocates of science within the humanities.
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scientism had a "shred of the capacity to unify learned men in
intellectual

terms.

Those who reject the dominant scientific

conception of the pursuit of knowledge can only wander off in a score
of mutually unrelated directions," as Dorothy Ross has described the
situation.^^ Even though the scientist was often as critical as the
traditional humanist of the claims to science of the social scientist,
all advocates of the scientific method could at least agree what
scientific thinking was: "It abstracts what is measurable from finite
things in the interest of formulating precise and entirely unambiguous
concepts about them."^^ Despite antagonisms between pure and applied
scientists and between scientists and social scientists, there was a
unity of approach to scholarship itself that gave this perspective a
strength that the traditional humanists did not have.
The humanists were fragmented between the classicists and the
advocates of a more inclusive sense of liberal education.

As the

position of the classics declined there was no unity of approach among
humanists to compensate for the divisiveness of the departmental
structure.

The historian John Higham points out, "we have no single

humanistic strategy.

Perhaps the most that can be said is that

humanistic approaches predominate in all efforts to preserve and
appreciate the complexity of experience.Divided among themselves,
pursuing their own careers, trying to protect themselves from the
growing scientism, advocating a shared learning in an educational
structure that militated against it, the humanists stood on weak
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ground, which weakened further as the influence of John Dewey grew
Stronger.

John Dewey and Liberal Education
The ends he sought were public, not private. Truth
was, to him, not merely what worked for the
individual but what worked for the group, and it
was achieved by cooperative action. Morality was
social not individual.''
Henry Steele Commager
John Dewey's new liberalism was based on pragmatism, relativism,
and empiricism.

The traditionalists were trying to piece together

some of the old and some of the new in a vision of liberal education,
but Dewey wanted to change the pieces entirely.

To him liberal

education was that which would foster his vision of a progressive,
liberal society.

In other words, it was progressive education.

Dewey's new liberalism switched the emphasis from the individual
to society.

All those things that in the previous century were

thought of in terms of individuals, e.g., philosophy, education,
morality, freedom, were now all social questions.

Freedom, for

example, was not a matter of individual struggle, as it had been for
Charles Eliot or even William James, but a matter of the "social
medium" in which one found oneself; one's own degree of liberation
depended largely upon the liberating nature of the environment.
Dewey's new liberalism was to have profound results.

I will

begin by describing Dewey's vision of the new liberalism and how he
tied liberal education to it.

I will then describe how Dewey's vision
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eventually came to predominate.

As further indication of Dewey’s

influence I will describe the progressive/traditionalist split within
the movement for general education, which eventually led to Dewey's
denouncing the traditionalists as "reactionaries" in 1944 and forcing
them to defend their own liberalism,

I will conclude this section by

outlining the general nature of developments in higher education from
1945 to the present that have led to our confusing Dewey's vision of
liberal education with that of the traditionalists.
Ih Liberalism and Social Action Dewey evaluates the old
liberalism and gives his sense of the new.

He applauds the emphasis

on individual liberty and "the central role of free intelligence in
inquiry, discussion and expression" of the earlier liberalism, but he
is critical of the fact that this sense of liberty was tied to
individual economic self-interest.

He felt freedom to indulge

economic self-interest should have been viewed as merely the means for
the eventual "satisfaction of the needs of man in non-economic
directions," and not as an end in itself.

As an end in itself,

economic self-interest accentuated materialism and individualism to a
degree that he considered anti-social
He complained that the early liberals failed to realize that
"effective," as opposed to "legal," liberty is a function of the
social conditions existing at any given time.

Thus, the primary

social quest at any given time is to find "that form of social
organization, extending to all areas and ways of living, in which the
powers of individuals shall not be merely released from mechanical
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external constraint but shall be fed, sustained and directed." He
gives us a sense of what this means when he suggests that intelligence
IS not "an individualistic possession, at best enlarged by public
discussions; it is primarily a social phenomenon."79
A liberal or liberating education in Dewey's sense has a two¬
fold meaning.
medium

First, the classroom or school is itself a "social

that is liberating, sustaining human growth.

Second, a

liberating education will provide skills and attitudes that will
direct students to make society a liberating "social medium" as well.
As Dewey states in Democracy and Education, education should give
"individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control,
and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing
disorder."®^ The classroom then is the micro-liberating environment,
which,

through the cooperative, socially minded individuals it

produces, gradually makes the wider environment more liberating as
well.

These liberated individuals would believe in social liberalism

and want to put "the mechanism of abundance at the free disposal of
individuals" rather than allow it to serve a small elite class.

They

would also be schooled in the scientific attitude of mind, for Dewey
spoke often of the great aid science had been in the development of
industry and suggested it could be equally useful if applied to social
and political problems.
Our contemporary tendency to relate liberal education to problem
solving, to innovation, and to the non-authorian teacher stems from
Dewey's influence.

In his vision the student is as a potential agent
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of social change, given experience In cooperative action, directed
towards an Interest In social relationships and control, and equipped
with a scientific attitude of mind to be applied to the problems of
society.

The teacher is non-authoritarian because of the tendency of

conservative Puritan teachers to abuse their authority.

The teacher

is instead what some now call a "facilitator" of this problem solving,
helping the students solve the problems of their iimediate environment
and gradually turning their attention to the problems of the wider
environment.

Thinking is a matter of problem solving and practical

intelligence, rather than an intellect to be cultivated.

Since this

problem solving is tied to "experimental observation," students are
generally learning to be social scientists, and experiments in
education, as in any aspect of social life, are much valued.

This

perspective underlies much of the discussion on liberal or general
education that takes place today.
Dewey's influence upon the concept of liberal education at the
college level was gradual and developed indirectly, since his own work
dealt mostly with primary education.

Although he wrote comparatively

little about higher education, his position as America's most
influential philosopher and educator gave a disproportionate weight to
that which he did write.

In The Educational Situation (1902) he

argued for the elimination of the tradition-bound college as an
independent entity.

Such colleges maintained an elitist mentality,

did not deal with the centrality of vocation in human life, and were
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preoccupied with the past.

As he would later write in Democracy and

Education.
The mistake in making the records and the remains
of the past the material of education is that it
cuts the vital connection of present and past, and
tends to make the past a rival of the present and
the ore sent a more or less futile imitation of the

past.®^

Altogether, Dewey challenged the traditional concept of liberal
education for not being consonant with contemporary "social facts."
He wrote, "Liberal education must be consonant with realistic science
and with machine industry, instead of a refuge from them." To those
who argued that the traditional colleges were sanctuaries of culture,
Dewey responded that culture was meaningless if it could not operate
"in the conditions of modern life, of daily life, of political and
industrial life."®^ While traditional humanists were seeking ways to
find sanctuaries for culture, fearing that the idea itself was
becoming lost in the expanding universities aimed at research and
utility, Dewey was demanding that it either exist in the mainstream of
American life or not at all.
More important than his attacks on higher education, however,
was the influence that he and the progressive education movement had
upon pre-college education.

Between 1900 and 1940 the percentage of

the age group attending high school rose enormously, from 10 percent
to 60 percent.

A large number of these students were first or second

generation immigrants or Blacks who previously had been denied the
possibility of secondary education.

This population demanded a useful
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education, and so the scene was set for progressive influence.
According to A. Whitney Griswold this influence of "instrumentalism as
Dewey and his followers applied it to our schools" created "an
enormous new secondary school population, most of which was entirely
innocent of the liberal arts and their purposes."®^ The ideal of
liberal education in the traditional sense became somewhat esoteric,
and few had the preparation to pursue it ever if they happened to be
aware of it.
Also, schools of education, most notably Teachers College at
Columbia, were producing theorists who applied progressive theory to
the idea of liberal education.

Traditional humanists, such as Norman

Foerster, found themselves vying for the term "liberal education" with
what he called "disciples" of John Dewey.

In an article published in

1939 in an educational yearbook devoted to the concept of liberal
education, Foerster accused these "disciples" of transforming the
traditional concept of liberal education beyond recognition but his
complaints had little effect.Even his own Dean, a recently
graduated Ed.D., "called for ending most required courses and for
liberalizing the program to fit individual needs.A "liberal
education" tied to the new liberalism was gaining ground.
Through Dewey's direct attacks on the traditional idea of
liberal education, through the influence of the progressive education
movement in shaping the nature of pre-college education, and through
his "disciples" who applied his theory to higher education, liberal
education became an education in the new liberalism.

C. Wright Mills
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once Observed that Dewey did not write for popular audiences as much
as for “the new professional academics who became leaders in the
social sciences who in turn became policy advisors and interpreters
for men of power in both the political and corporate worlds."86 It is
the influence exerted by these academics combined with progressive
liberal politics that peaked in the "Great Society" of Lyndon Johnson
which have largely shaped our contemporary meaning of the word
"liberal."
There is a fundamental and unbreachable gap between the liberal
ideology and the traditional humanist perspective.

The liberals

believe in progress and assume that in education lies "the fundamental
method of social progress and reform." The general humanist position
has been that to develop thoughtful, cultured individuals is
tremendously difficult in itself.

Humanists do not feel that

education can guarantee social progress and reform, and fear that the
more education is aimed in that direction, the less it is education
and the more it is indoctrination.

General Education
The general education movement in this century has been an
attempt to find a modern equivalent to the curricular unity once
provided by the old liberal

arts curriculum.

Curiously, both

advocates of liberal and liberalism education have used the term
"general education," though they mean quite different things by it.
The progressive had little use for the traditional concept of liberal
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education and they used the term "general education" to describe their
alternative, the one which, in fact has dominated.

However, the

traditionalists also spoke in terms of general education, for it was,
so to speak, the only game in town.

They did not want to forsake the

traditionalist perspective, but they did want to be influential
participants in the search for the modern equivalent to liberal
education which had developed connotations of elitism and
i mpracti cal i ty.

In this section I will briefly outline the general

education movement, distinguishing between the efforts of
traditionalists and progressives within it, and also show how the
traditional sense of general education was relegated to obscurity when
Dewey pronounced it was "illiberal" in 1944.
As the story is generally told, Dewey initiated the movement
with a call, in 1902, for a new "philosophy of unity" to organize the
curricular chaos that had resulted from the rise of the universities.
Rather than glorifying the elective principle, as Eliot had, Dewey saw
it as unfortunate, arguing that students needed to be given "a survey,
at least, of the universe in its manifold phases," from which stems
the survey course.®^ Alexander Meiklejohn was the most notable
of those who initially applied this idea to higher education,
introducing a survey course in "social and economic institutions"
first at Brown in 1910, and later in 1914 at Amherst.

In the 1920s he

also organized and directed the experimental college at Wisconsin, a
two year program divided between a study of the ancient world in the
first year and modern America in the second.
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Meiklejohn's position towards general education has often been
identified with Dewey's since Meiklejohn also spoke of education for
democracy.

Actually he was critical of the simplistic relationship

that Dewey as "social reformer" drew between education and democracy.
As he wrote in 1939:
Dewey is both social reformer and philosophical
thinker. He has devised both slogans and ideas...
Leading men by means of slogans is not the same as
leading them into the use of ideas.
Meiklejohn's position is roughly located between the traditionalists
and the progressives and was an attempt to synthesize elements of
each, as the experiment at Wisconsin suggests.

I bother to point this

out because the misunderstandings that have evolved about Meiklejohn's
views show how difficult it to maintain clarity in the midst of these
ideas.
The traditionalists rejected Dewey's contention that the unity
of general education should be based on the principles of science with
a corresponding emphasis on the social sciences, and, instead,
believed that a study of the preeminent works of the past, chiefly
those of the humanities, was the best way to develop the "whole man,"
and in turn was the best direction that the undergraduate curriculum
could take.

The progressive emphasis, on the other hand, was towards

the study of modern society and the social sciences, "keeping higher
education closely attuned to current affairs, for it was there that
problems arose and in that context that solutions had to be tested."®^
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The movement for a general education gained momentum after the
First World War, with Columbia University leading the way.

The

progressive position was manifested in the Contemporary Civilization
course which was the center piece of Columbia's general education and
acknowledged the "direct responsibility of the College to the stated
democratic needs of society."^0 The traditionalist alternative first
appeared in the "great books" course initiated by John Erskine, which
was the model for the program Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler
advocated for Chicago, and later the St. John's curriculum, and the
Great Books Program.
Many of the prominent defenders of the traditional sense of
liberal education were involved in Erskine's course or its subsequent
facsimiles, as Mortimer Adler tells us in his autobiography.

Adler

and Mark Van Doren were section leaders of the course and Lionel
Trilling and Jacques Barzun were among their students.

Gilbert Highet

also taught the course, and Barzun and Meiklejohn were later on the
board of advisers of the Great Books Program, which involved the
publication of sets of these books along with instructions on how to
set up seminars for their discussion.

It might also be added that

Scott Buchanon, who along with Stringfellow Barr founded St. John's,
had also participated in a senior seminar with Meikeljohn at Amherst
and was a long time friend of Adler's, as was Robert Hutchins.

Thus

the most prominent defenders of a traditional liberal education were
to a great extent a coterie of friends, which suggests how narrow was
their general base of support.
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The traditionalist position as advocated by Hutchins and Adler
received the greatest national attention in the 1930s.

The platform

that Hutchins' presidency gave him combined with his own charisma made
him a very prominent spokesman for the traditionalist position.
However, his real influence upon the nature of general education at
Chicago was actually quite limited according to Adler and neither of
them considered their efforts successful.

Chicago was at least as

much of a stronghold of progressive thought as Columbia.

Dewey had

been at Chicago as a professor and had been a member of the "Chicago
School" of philosophy, led by George Herbert Mead.

The empiricism,

pragmatism, and relativism of these philosophers formed the main
tradition of the university since the beginning of the century.
Therefore, when we look closely at the situation it is rather ironic
that Chicago should be identified with the great books program and the
traditionalist position.

Though Hutchins was able to garner

considerable publicity for the traditionalist position, the great
books seminars were but a small part of the general education
experiments at Chicago, and not a particularly welcome part at that.
The attention the traditionalists were able to gain is
misleading in terms of its actual influence on higher education.

It

is my sense that the traditionalist position was always advocated by
only a small minority, who had to struggle even to be considered.
They were only able to gain the attention that they did by their
literary talents, the quality of their thought, and the particular
weight that Hutchins gave their arguments as the outspoken president
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of a prestigious university.

And the publicity that Hutchins was able

to gain for the traditionalists was a mixed blessing; it aroused the
ire of John Dewey who would eventually attack Hutchins and the
traditionalists.
Though Hutchins was the most prominent advocate of an education
that emphasized the great books, his position and that of Adler's was
not

really representative.

They placed an emphasis on the

^^^sTotelian tradition that the others did not, which is why they tend
to be labelled rationalists rather than humanists.

The authority that

Hutchins and Adler gave to the Aristotelian tradition made the most
prominent defender of the great books also, the biggest target of
attack by the progressives, for Hutchins' arguments not only went
against the grain of their general education but against their
liberalism as wel 1.
Publication of Hutchins' Higher Learning in America aroused the
wrath of many progressives.

His basic argument was that higher

education needed a philosophy of unity, but not one based on science.
Instead he proposed the development of a metaphysics based upon the
philosophical truths of Aristotle and Aquinas about the nature of man,
the nature of truth, and the nature of value.
Hutchins'

argument was captured by his oft-quoted syllogism:

"Education implies teaching.
is truth.

In the minds of many,

Teaching implies knowledge.

The truth is everywhere the same.

be everywhere the same.

iiQ?

Knowledge

Hence education should
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Nothing could have been more contrary to Dewey's theory of
education and society, and he attacked Hutchins' position in two
articles

published in 1937.

He attacked Hutchins for his

authoritarianism," his "contempt for science," and his appeal to
fixed and eternal truths." Hutchins in turn responded with a sharply
worded reply, to which Dewey responded in a similar tone.^^
Over the next few years the controversy continued, with Adler
attacking the progressives for their "false liberalism" in an article
published in 1939 titled "Liberalism and Liberal Education." This
article is noteworthy for it is one of the few works that directly
addresses the link between liberalism and liberal education, but in
broadening the question to one of politics rather than education,
Adler would provoke Dewey to do the same.
In 1944, Dewey published an article in Fortune magazine that
seems to me the coup de grace to the traditionalist position.

He

titled the article "The Challenge to Liberal Thought" and portrayed
Hutchins and those of like mind as "reactionaries," suggesting that
they were holding on to distinctions left over from an aristocratic
framework no longer valid in a democracy.

He argued that the

traditional dualism of the "liberal" and the "mechanical" studies was
no longer valid, because most Americans were involved with "industry
and useful commodities and services," and that technological progress
epitomized "rational insight or science," that which liberal education
is supposed to cultivate.

He developed his argument further in two

additional sections of the article.

In the first, he argued that we
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should be liberalizing our technical and vocational education by
making all workers "aware of the scientific basis of the industrial
processes." He then argued that his opponents, while seeming to
reflect the spirit of ancient Greece, actually reflect the spirit of
the middle ages during which the authority of books replaced what
Dewey called "the Greek view of knowledge as a product of intelligence
exercised at first hand," Thus, not only did opponents seem elitist
and behind the times, they did not even represent the Greek spirit.^^
He concluded the article by describing the traditionalists as
"reactionaries," generally of literary backgrounds with little
appreciation of science, proponents of a "philosophy of fixation,"
mistakenly believing that "linguistic skills and materials" should be
at the center of education, and that "an adequate education...can be
obtained by a miscellaneous assortment of a hundred books, more or
less..."

Finally, he summed up the issue as follows:
At bottom the issue is drawn between dogmas
rigid that they ultimately appeal to force)
recourse to intelligent observation guided by
best wisdom already in our possession, which is
heart of the scientific method.

(so
and
the
the

And as if Dewey had not buried his opponents deeply enough, he implied
a link between their thinking and totalitarian Germany.

It was

Germany that had been the home of the practices and the philosophy
based on strict separation between sciences as technical therefore
everchanging, and morals based upon fixed and unchanging principles.
What seems obvious here is that Dewey is exemplifying the
dogmatism he attacks, and, despite his emphasis on observation, I do
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not think he ever bothered to observe the actual life of St. John's
College, the most notable actualization of the thought of the
traditionalists whom he attacks.

Six months after Dewey's article

appeared. Fortune published a rejoinder by Alexander Meiklejohn.
Among other things Meiklejohn pointed out that approximately half the
classroom hours were devoted to a study of the sciences, which was
more education in science than most students received.

He also

stressed that what they strove to do at St. John's was to "develop the
processes of critical intelligence," and not to develop an allegiance
to the authority of the past.

Finally, he pleaded with Dewey not to

characterize those who opposed his views as "illiberal"; though they
disagreed with Dewey's assessment of science and the relationship of
fact to value, they were themselves liberals in the best sense of the
word.^^
Despite its validity, Meikeljohn's rejoinder had little effect.
Nothing could stand up to Dewey's ability to tie together the
prejudices of the liberal mind.

He would be echoed by spokesmen for

the progressive viewpoint for years to come.

Denouement
The traditionalist's position had lost much of its stature.
Dewey's assumptions were accepted, frequently without much
examination, by many influential academics, and, as a large number of
students were graduating from high schools with little sense of the
traditional

liberal

education,

the old concept lost its
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distinctiveness, blurred with the progressive's vision of liberal
education, especially since the progressives seldom thought it
necessary to distinguish between the two, after the Hutchins-Dewey
exchanges.
There were other contributing factors to the traditionalists'
downfall, such as the even greater accentuation upon research provided
by federal grants after the Second World War, money which has gone
largely to the sciences and social

sciences rather than the

humanities.^® Also, since the Second World War the United States has
become more closely tied to the rest of the world in its position as
"leader of the free world." Thus, the progressives' tendency to think
in terms of societal problem solving has been further accentuated and
broadened to include the rest of the world, leading to the dismaying
notion expressed by Harland Cleveland that we must come to understand
how everything relates to everything on a global scale.

And there was

the political and social upheaval of the 1960s with its demand for
educational

relevancy that made the traditional position seem

particularly archaic and staid in the face of the demand for immediate
social and political action.
Of course, all of these influences had cumulative effects, and
it is impossible to give an exact date to the demise of the
traditional position.
traditional

Lionel Trilling asserted a decade ago that the

humanistic ideal was at the center of the general

education movement through the thirties, forties, and fifties.

This

may be an overstatement of the strength of traditional humanism in the
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general education movement, but it certainly suggests that there was
still considerable life to it. at least at Columbia University.99
However, as Trilling states "by the sixties, something had happened to
reduce the zeal for such education as set store by its being general."
When Daniel Bell produced his thorough study of general education in
1964 there was hardly any interest in it at all.

The demise seemed

complete.
To summarize: First there was and there remains the problem of
the university structure which has not been congenial to any type of
shared learning.

Second, among advocates of a general education there

has been a stronger inclination towards Dewey's position which in
effect rejects that of the traditional humanists.

Third, Mark Van

Doren reported in 1940 that there was little general knowledge of the
history of liberal education, and there is much less knowledge of it
today.

When "liberal education" is mentioned, people are either

confused about it, or, even more likely, identify it with liberalism.
Finally, in the most recent renewal of interest in the idea of general
education beginning in the mid-seventies, the discussion has usually
begun with Dewey's sense of liberal

education as a premise,

emphasizing either interdisciplinary efforts aimed at societal problem
solving, or student freedom to choose the particular problems they are
interested in.

Many would still applaud the traditional humanist's

aim of introducing students to the beauty of reason and virtue as
expressed by the great minds and souls of the past, but such knowledge
is no longer central to the educational endeavor.

It is instead
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merely one more educational commodity to consume, one more area of
Study along with everything else.
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CONCLUSION:

HINTS FOR WOULD-BE HUMANISTS

Roman humam'tas applied to mon who woro froe in
every respect, for whom the question of freedom, of
not being coerced, was the decisive one—even in
philosophy, even in science, even in the arts.
Hannah Arendt
Having heard,

and read, my criticism of liberalism's

encroachment upon liberal education and liberalism's insidious effects
upon the humanistic ideal, a friend suggested I conclude on a more
positive note: How would I organize a conference for humanists on the
future of the humanist ideal?

It seemed a good idea, and I was

pleased by its possibilities until, as suddenly as she had suggested
it, she dismissed it as too improbable: "No.. .humanists don't go to
conferences like that." "What do they do?" I asked. "They write
letters to each other," she answered.
Rather than imagine a conference, I continued to think about my
friend's closing comment and gradually perceived a distinction between
humanists and those of us who are interested in organizing efforts to
protect the humanities and revive the humanistic ideal.

In our

efforts to organize, I suspect there are some elements of the liberal
Puritan, and often we lose sight of the spirit of humanism that we are
trying to protect.

So, I would like to conclude with an open letter

to those who fret about saving the humanities and reviving the
humanistic ideal.
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In contrast to the organizers, the humanists rarely talk about
liberal education, but tend to go about their business of cultivating
their own intellects and sharing this cultivation with others.

While

there are noteable exceptions, humanists don't usually write much
about liberal education.

Hannah Arendt, for example, wrote more books

and articles than I can count, but only one essay about education.

I

think that humanists who exemplify the life of the mind and treat
teaching as an art are reticent to talk about the intellectual virtues
they cultivate, fearing a certain priggishness in talking about those
things which are cared about for their own sake.^ These humanists are
not drawn to conferences on education, because they don't believe that
one can learn much there about the art of teaching, and they dread the
endless talk of "new visions of educational purpose and possibility,"
which tells them nothing that they have not heard before.
Akin to their reluctance to talk about education, humanists tend
to resist organization, even if the purpose of the organizational
efforts is to protect the humanities and themselves.

Because of the

absence of effective organization among humanists, the American
Association for the Advancement of the Humanities was founded in 1977
but disbanded a few years late due to lack of support from humanists
themselves.
The apathy of humanists towards such organizing efforts is often
attributed to excessive individualism on their part or even their
narrow preoccupation with their own specialized areas of study.

This

may be true for many, or even most, professors of the humanities--!
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don't know-but there is also a quality of individuality possessed by
the best humanists and I think we must distinguish such individuality
from an excess of individualism.
When organizers assert that "humanists especially should take a
greater interest in teaching the humanities well" or suggest that
people in foundations of education should band together with teachereducators to cooperate in the planning of revitalized humanities,"
they are failing to grasp the nature and purpose of humanists.^ Such
suggestions are an insult to true humanists, who regard teaching as a
natural extension of the life of the mind and treat teaching as an
art.

The implication that educators can teach humanists to be better

humanists is quite naturally offensive to them.

Those who make such

suggestions are implying that many professors in the humanities are
not true humanists, which is surely true, but I think we are misguided
if we think we can help them to be so through pedagogical aids and
discussions of curriculum.

We might be able to help some professors

become more competent instructors, but this has little to do with
reviving the humanist ideal.

We are instead trying, in our own way,

to patch-up the cracks in the humanist ideal resulting from the
liberalization of higher education.

Such efforts have little to do

with making our universities more of a home for the cultivation of the
intellect; they are merely a shoring up of the weakened position of
humanities departments within our universities.
Consider the possibility that our universities cannot provide a
home for culture as they are presently structured.

It is a real
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likelihood and should temper a bit our eagerness for organizing.
Jacques Barzun argues convincingly that our universities have made
scholarship an end in itself rather than a servant of culture.
Scholarship of this sort is diametrically opposed to culture, scholars
being too encumbered with the "minutiae of analytic methodism" to
cultivate minds; our concentration upon methods of analysis obstructs
our view of a work of art, "rather than giving a jewel the setting it
deserves."

The kind of scholarship encouraged by today's

universities probably does more to destroy than nurture culture.
If we cannot teach professors of humanities to be humanists and
the university cannot provide a home for culture, what, then, are we
would-be humanists to do with our desire to revive the humanist ideal?
Well, I think we need to think about that quite a bit.

In the process

we might consider Barzun's prediction that the best hope for the
humanities lies in the forming of small enclaves, "lay monasteries,"
which will protect the tradition of the humanities from a world
largely indifferent to it and nurture it for growth at some future
time.

At first this may seem a pessimistic prediction, but I suggest

we think of it as a realistic appraisal of our present situation and
use this acknowledgment of our present circumstances as the basis of
inquiry which may lead to change.

Such change is unlikely, however,

if we continue along with our liberal Puritan sense of what we and
others ought to do to save the humanities.

What we ought to do is

take pleasure in them, and listen to Barzun's reminder that we
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cultivate our minds not because we should but because It Is
pleasurable to do so.
There may be more scholars who desire this pleasure than Barzun
realizes.

I suggest that we look around our own institutions and see

If we can find people who wish to talk about these matters.

My guess

IS that there are a number of humanists and would-be humanists who
feel largely isolated and alone in their departments; the first task
would seem to be to find them, get to know them, and see what
affinities they share with ourselves and with each other.

What seems

essential here is that we find a basis for conversation which draws
people together, and I do not think the topic should be the
improvement of the humanities.

Any topic would work which would let

people discover a "kinship in what pleases and displeases,"^ which
leads them to want to see more of each other, to become colleagues,
intellectual friends.

Out of these friendships, efforts may or may

not develop to participate in interdisciplinary efforts, or whatever,
but the point is that these are the conditions out of which culture
might begin to grow once again, even amidst the divisive forces of the
university.

We might even come to find sufficient affinity and desire

for culture among enough academics that through our affinity groups we
can begin to consider ways in which to make our institutions more
conducive to the humanist ideal.

If, on the other hand, we come to

find that we cannot change our institutions much, we may look at such
efforts as the beginnings of an underground network of individuals who
cherish humane studies, the beginning of Barzun's "lay monasteries."
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Minimal though it may seem, my suggestion does at least start on
the right foot, and is markedly different in empnasis an attitude from
the ways we usually go about the problem.

First, it does not assume

that those most desirous of realizing the humanist ideal are to be
found in departments of humanities and does not confuse maintaining
these departments with maintaining the ideal.

Secondly, in making the

enjoyment of the company of others the basis upon which to proceed, it
sets a different tone for the enterprize than I detect in many of our
efforts, one of participating in culture rather than trying to
organize it.

Third,

it is based on the common insights that

individuals share rather than some model for integrating various
disciplines, and it makes conversation about what matters to us
primarily an end in itself and only secondarily as possible ground out
of which joint efforts may grow.

Unfortunately, most efforts at

organizing the revival of the humanities or the humanist ideal ignore
these points and so fail; one cannot revive the humanities while
ignoring their simplest and most basic tenets.
This difference in approach may be contrasted with our
liberalism which

values diversity over unity, action over

contemplation, and individual uniqueness over shared affinities.

The

liberal mind values clashes between diverse points of view, and values
analysis over intuitive understanding, so it does not readily notice
that the richness of conversation is based upon shared assumptions out
of which particular differences are developed.

Since our shared

tradition has broken down and the house of intellect is furnished in a
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hodge-podge of various methods, vocabularies, and values, our
conversations founder upon fundamental differences in assumptions and
the lack of common language.
Advocates of the humanist ideal must be able to recognize those
who speak from a liberal humanitarian viewpoint, so that we do not
mistakenly see affinities that do not exist, and may know when
fruitful

conversation is possible and when it is not.

Viewing

education as the primary instrument of social change and for meeting
the "needs" of individuals and society, the liberal simplifies
everything to fit this schema, including the relationship between
right reason and conduct.

The liberal's multi-faceted vision can

easily confuse us with self-righteous talk of "satisfying needs."
These assumptions manifest themselves in different ways, as I have
shown, one minute emphasizing what the citizen needs to know to be a
good citizen, the next making of education a kind of psychotherapy, a
few minutes later envisioning a particular kind of education for each
collective group, another moment one tailored to each individual.
Whatever value such efforts have, we must remember that they distract
us from our priorities as humanists.

With enough independence of mind

we can distinguish ourselves from those who would carry us off along
one of these liberal tangents or coerce us to meet their needs.
Our own need is to maintain and develop the distinctions between
humanist categories of thought and liberal ones, and to be wary of
being induced to use the liberal slogans of the day.

If we speak of a

"connected vision" we need to make clear that it is a personal vision
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based on a sense of taste which transcends a dichotomy between the
subjective and objective world that underlies the view of the liberal
social scientist.

The virtues we are cohcerned with are individual

virtues; the students are individual students.

Visions of shaping

society and solving social problems take us beyond what we are trying
to do.

And in what we are trying to do conversation is essential, for

while our visions are personal they are worked through with others and
reflect a relation with and often a debt to them.

The issues which

most concern us are those which we share as human beings; the
commonality of our temporary and uncertain existence in this world
outweighs our differences.

Whatever our particular differences and

our need to explore them, we keep in mind that ultimately we need to
come to terms with each other as human beings, not as members of
different races or sexes.
And the one need and only need that humanism seeks to satisfy is
the need to speculate meaningfully about our lives and our world.
This thinking-for-its-own-sake may confer "useful" benefits, but we
mistake the nature of this thought if we see it as essentially a means
to other ends.

If we are to speak of an education that "liberates,"

we need to make clear that it liberates us from the mundane and the
tawdry through the enjoyment of "things beautiful," and it liberates
us from being swayed by the unexamined opinions of others by
developing minds "not easily imposed upon." Some humanists now speak
of an education that "empowers" and I urge them to reconsider this
term.

I do not see how it illuminates anything in the traditional
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humanist ideal; if it illuminates anything, it is our liberal Puritan
desire to unite thought and action, on the firm, but misguided,
liberal principle that thought is only valuable as the precursor to
action.
For the ancient Greeks, the "right word at the right moment" was
itself a form of action, and they understood how the right word could
initiate an unpredictable series of actions.

Our conversations with

others may do more than we think to revive the traditional ideal of
liberal education.
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FOOTNOTES
^Michael Oakeshott's words on the matter seem typical of
J.TrhJ' V
Virtues may be imparted oSlJ by a
teacher who really cares about them for their own sake and never
stoops to the priggishness of mentioning them. Not the cry but the
rising of the wild duck impels the flock to follow him in flight." As
quoted in R. S. Peters, "Michael Oakshott's Philosophy of Education "
in Preston King and B. C. Parekh (Eds.), Politics and Experience
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 196817 P. 52.—^2
Christopher J. Lucas, "Positivist Socio-Pathology and the
Contemporary Plight of the Humanities," in Alan H. Jones (Ed.), The
Humanities in Education: Rebirth or Burial in the 1980s (Ann Arbor”
• P'^’akken Publications, 1983), pp. ^8-29. The quotations are
abbreviated for easier readability.
3
Jacques Barzun, "Scholarship Versus Culture," The Atlantic
Monthly, November, 1984, p. 103.
^Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Culture," Between Past and Future
(New York: Viking, 1968), p. 223.
-

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abelson, Paul. The Seven Liberal Arts: A Study in Medieval
Culture. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1906.
Adler, Mortimer. "Liberalism and Liberal Education." The Educational
Record. July, 1939.
--Adler, Mortimer J. The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto.
New York: MacMillan, 1982.
Adler, Mortimer J.

Philosopher at Large.

New York:

MacMillan, 1977.

Adler, Mortimer J.
The Revolution in Education.
University of Chicago Press, 1958.

Chicago: The

A11 mendi nger, David F. Paupers and Scholars: The Transformation of
Student Life in Nineteenth-Century New England. New York, 1975.
Anderson, Paul R.
Platonism in the Midwest.
University Publications, 1963.
Arnold, Mathew.

Culture and Anarchy.

Arendt, Hannah.
Press, 1968.

London:

Macmillan, 1983.

Between Past and Future.

Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition.
Chicago Press, 1958.

New York: Temple

New York: Viking

Chicago: The University of

Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind--Volume One--Thinking.
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.

New

Arendt, Hannah. "Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture."
Social Research. Fall, 1971.
Aristotle.
Pol itics, trans. Benjamin Jowett.
House, 1943.
Auden, W. H.

Forwards and Afterwords.

Mew York:

New York: Random
Random House, 1974.

Barnes, Harry Elmer. An Intellectual and Cultural History of the
Western World.
3rd Rev. Ed. 3 Vols. New York: Dover
Publications, 1965.
197

198

Barrett, William._ The Illusion of Technique: A Search for Meanin£_ln
a Technological
vi 11zatlon. warden city, NY: rn'chor, 1978.
Barzun
1959

JHe House of Intellect.

New York: Harper S Row,

Barzun, Jacques. "Scholarship Versus Culture " Atlantic Monthly.
November, 1984.
^^^^Row "^1983^^^*
Bell, Daniel.
Bell

Stroll with William James.

The End of Ideology.

New York:

New York: Harper and
The Free Press, 1962.

Daniel.
The Reforming of General Education: The Columbia
College Experience In Its National Setting! New York: Anchor,

Bernier,^ Normand R., and Williams, Jack E.
Beyond Beliefs:
Ideological Foundations of American Education. Englewood Cliffs*
NJlPrentice-Hall, 1973.
~
’
Bledstein, Burton J.
W. Norton, 1976.

The Culture of Professionalism.

New York: W.

Boorstin, Daniel. The Americans: The Colonial Experience.
Random House, 1958-1966.
'
Bourne, H. R. Fox.
S. King, 1876.

The Life of John Locke.

Boyer, Ernest, and Levine, Arthur.
Washington: Carnegie Foundation.

2 vols.

New York:

London: Henry

A Quest for Common Learning.

Bronowski, J.
Science and Human Values.
Brothers, 1956.

New York: Harper and

Brubacher, John S., and Rudy, Willis. Higher Education in Transition:
A History of American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1976. 3rd
rev. ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.
Butts, R. Freeman.
The College Charts Its Course: Historical
Conceptions and Current Proposals^ New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939.
Commager, Henry Steele. The American Mind: An Interpretation of
American Thought and Character Since the 1880's^ New Haven: Yale
University, 1950.
~
Commager, Henry Steele. The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined
and America Realized the Enl1ghtenmenti New York: Anchor, 1977.

199

Conrad, Clifton F., Wyer, J ean C. Liberal Education in Transition.
Research Report No. 3. Washington; American Association for
Higher Education, 1980.
Cornford, Francis MacDonald. Before and After Socrates.
University Press, 1932-1976.
--

Cairtiridop

Cremin, Lawrence. American Education: The Colonial Exoerience
1607-1783. New YoTki Harper and Row, 1970.

~

Cremin, Lawrence A. The Transformation of the School: Progress!vism
in American Education 1876-1957. New York: Vintage, 1964.
Dewey, John.
1945.

"The Challenge to Liberal Thought." Fortune, January.
-

Dewey, John. Democracy and Education.
1967. Originally published in 1929.

New York: The Free Press,

Dewey, John. Individualism Old and New.
1929-1930.

New York: Capricorn Books,

Dewey, John. Liberalism and Social Action.
Sons, 1935.
Dickinson, G. Lowes.
Page & Co., 1922.

New York: G. P. Putnam's

The Greek View of Life.

New York: Doubleday,

Dolbeare, Kenneth M. and Patricia. American Ideologies: The
Competing Political Beliefs of the TTTTT’TT Chicago: Markham,

wrr.-

Epstein, Joseph (Ed.). Masters: Portraits of Great Teachers.
York: Basic Books, 19^1^
Eliot, Charles W.
Mifflin, 1909.

Education for Efficiency.

New

Boston: Houghton

Feinberg, Walter. Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations
of 20th Century'Liberal Educational Policy^ New York: John Wi'ley
& Sons, 197S.
Foerster, Norman. The Future of the Liberal College.
Appleton-Century, 1938.

New York: D.

Garland, Martha M. Cambridge Before Darwin: The Ideal of Liberal
Education, 1800-1860. London: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Freeman, Kenneth J. Schools of Hellas: An Essay on the Practice and
Theory of Ancien t Greek Education from 600 to 300 B.TT London:
MacMillan, 1922.

200

Gamson, Zelda F. and Associates. Liberating Education
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984.--^

!san

Goodsell, Willystine. The Conflict of Naturalism and Humanism.
York: Teachers Colle"ge, Columbia University, 1910.-

New

Gray, J. Glenn. The Promise of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosoohv
of Education. “Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968.Gray, J. Glenn.
1977.

"The Winds of Thought." Social Research.
-

Summer.

Greene, Maxine; Lucas, Christopher J.; Spring, Joel; and Warren,
Donald R. The Humanities in Education: Rebirth or Burial in the
1980s. Ann Arbor, MI: Prakken Publications, 1983.
Griswold, A. Whitney. Liberal Education and the Democratic Ideal.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
Hansen, Allen Oscar.
Eighteenth Century.

Liberalism and American Education in the
New York: MacMillan, 1926.

Harris, Michael J. Five Counterrevolutionists in Higher Education:
Irving Babbitt, Albert Jay Nock, Abraham Flexner, Robert Maynard
Hutchins, Alexander Meikeljohn. Corvallis: Oregon State
University Press, 1970.
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of
American Political Thought Since the Revolution. New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955.
Havelock,- Eric A. The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics.
Jonathan Cape, 1957,
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich.
Sibree. Rev. Ed. New York:

London:

The Philosophy of History, trans. J.
The Colonial Press, 189!^.

Heidegger, Martin J. What it Called Thinking, trans. J. Glenn Gray.
New York: Harper and Row, 19/2.
Heimert, Alan.
Religion and the American Mind: From the Great
Awakening to the Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1966.
Higham, John (Ed.). The Reconstruction of American History.
York: Humanities Press, 1962.
Higham, John.
Scholarship.

New

Writing American History: Essays on Moderii
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1970.

201

Highet, Gilbert.

The Art of Teaching.

New York:

Vintage Books, 1950.

Highet, Gilbert. The Immortale Profession: The Jovs of Teachina anH
Learning . NewT6rk: Weybnght and Talley, 197^-—'
^
Hill, Mel vyn A. Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1^/5.-i9Ul)-l940.

Humanism: A Critique of Modern America
Char 1 ottesvil 1 e: University Press of Virginia, 1977.

Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition: And the Men
Who Made It. New York: Vintage, 1948.
--Hofstadter, Richard. Anti-intel 1 ectual ism in American Life.
York: Vintage, 1962-1953.
-

New

Hofstadter, Richard, and Metzger, Walter. The Development of Academic
Freedom in the United States. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1955.
’
Hutchins, Robert Maynard. The Higher Learning in America.
CT: Yale University Press, 1936.

New Haven,

Jaeger, Werner. Humanism and Theology: The Aquinas Lecture, 1943.
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1943.
Jaeger, Werner.
Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture.
Gilbert Highet. Vol. I. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1939.
James, Henry.
1869-1909.

Trans.

Charles W. Eliot: President of Harvard University
Vol. I. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1939.

Jaspers, Karl. Plato and Augustine, trans. Ralph Manheim.
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1962.
Jeffreys, M. C. V.
Methuen, 1967.

John Locke: Prophet of Common Sense.

New York:
London:

Karier, Clarence. "The Quest for Orderly Change: Some Reflections."
Higher Education Quarterly. Summer, 1979.
Karier, Clarence J. Man, Society, and Education: A History of
American Educational Ideas. Rochester: University of Rochester,

iwr.

Kaufman, Arnold S. The Radical Liberal: New Man in American Politics.
New York: Atherton Press, 15)68.

202

Leverenz, David. The Language of Puritan FePlinn- An Exoloration in
Literature, Psychology, and Social History.^ New Rriingu«irv—frrr
iTUtgers University Press, 1980.-«runswicR, NJ:
^'"'uVrary^JIsV. —York: Philosphical

Education.

Toward an Effective Critique of American
New YorklJ. B. Lippincott, 1968. '

Meiklejohn, Alexander. Education Between Two Worlds.
Harper & Brothres, 1942T
-—
1945.

* A^ox^oder.

Mill, John Stuart.

New Ynri^-

"Reply to John Dewey." Fortune.
-

On Liberty.

January

New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,

Miller, Perry (Ed.). American Thought: Civil War to World War I.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1954-1964.
Miller, Perry. The American Puritans: Their Prose and Poetry.
Garden City, NJl Anchor, 1956.
“
Miller, Perry.

The New England Mind.

New York:

Millet, Fred B. The Rebirth of Liberal
Harcourt, Brace, 1945.
Morgan, Edward S.
Co., 1958.
Mumford, Lewis.
29, 1940.

The Puritan Dilemma.

MacMillan, 1939.

Education.

New York:

Boston: Little, Brown and

"The Corruption of Liberalism." New Republic.

April

Mori son, Samuel Eliot. The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England.
New York: New York University Press, 1970.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. Three Centuries of Harvard.
Harvard Univesrity Press, 1936-1937.
Newman, John Henry Cardinal.
Longmans Green, 1852-1929.

The Idea of a University.

Nisbet, Robert A.
The
University in America, 1945-1970.
Nisbet, Robert A.
Books, 1980.

Cambridge:
London:

of the Academic Dogma: The
New York: Basic Books, 1971.

History of the Idea of Progress.

New York: Basic

203
Oleson,

Alexandra,

and Voss

^^wledge 1n Modern America'.

John

fFHc

^

n

Baltimore', HD:T^'nslopki'n^yress’;

Ong, Walter.
Rhetoric, Romance, and Technoloav.
University T^ess, l97l. ^-^

Tthir;,

^^^"^Knopf ’ 1957

New York: Alfred A.

Modern World.

Barton.

Characteristically American.

wvnt. Lorneii

New York: Knopf,

Peterson, George E.
The New England College in the Age of the
University. Amherst, iMA: Amherst College Press, 1964. Peters, R. S.
(Ed.).
The Philosophy of Education.
University Press, 197T;
Pfaff, William.

Condemned to Freedom.

New York:

Oxford: Oxford

Random House, 1971.

Great Dialogues of Plato. Trans. W. H. D. Rouse.
The New American Library, 1956-1964.
PI^To's Republic.
Hackett, 1974.

Trans. G. M. A. Grube.

New York:

Indianapolis:

Pieper, Josef.
Leisure the Basis of Culture, trans. Alexander Dru.
New York: Pantheon, 1952.
Rand, R. K.
1943.

"Bring Back the Liberal Arts." Atlantic Monthly.
-

Rudolph, Frederick.
Vintage, 1962.
Schuman, David.
Lexington, I'lA:
Shackleton, D. R.
1971.

The American College and University.

June

New York:

Policy Analysis, Education and Everyday Life.
D. C. Heath, 19^2.
Cicero.

New York: Charles Scribner and Sons,

Sloan, Douglas.
The Great Awakening: A Documentary History.
York: Teachers College Press, 19/3.

New

Sloan, Douglas.
The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College
Ideal. New YorlT^ Teachers College Press, 19/1.
Soloman, Barbara M.
In the Company of Educated Women: A History of
Women and Higher Education in America.
New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 19^5.

204
Southern, R. w.
University PresT, 1968.
Steiner, Elizabeth.
Library, 1981.
Strauss, Leo.

of the Middle Ages.

-^—

Educology of the Free.

New Haven, CT: Yale

New York: Philosophical

Liberalism Ancient and Modern.

New York: Basic Books,

Tawney, R. H.
Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.
Harcourt, Brace, 1926.
-

New York-

Thomas, Russell.
The Search for a Common Learning:
Education, ISOO-l^gin New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.
Tocqueville, Alexis de.
York: Knopf, 1945.
Trevor-Roper, Hugh.

Democracy in America.
-

American Scholar.

General

Vols. 1 and 2.

New

Winter, 1978/79, pp. 19-32.

Trilling, Lionel.
The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and
Society. New YoriTi Viking, 1950.
Trilling, Lionel. "The Uncertain Future of the Humanistic Educational
Ideal." American Scholar. Winter, 1974/75.
Van Doren, Mark.

Liberal Education.

New York:

Holt, 1943.

Veblen, Thorsten.
The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on
the Conduct of the Universities by Business Men.
New York:
Sagamore f»ress, 1957.
Veysey, Laurence R.
The Emergence of the American University.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
Warner, Rex.
The Greek Philosophers.
Library, 195'FT

New York: New American

Wellman, Robert.
"Cicero: Education for Humanitas." Harvard
Educational Review. Vol. 35, Summer, 1965.
Wertenbaker, Thomas Jefferson.
The Puritan Oligarchy: The Founding
of American Civilization. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 194/.
Whitehead, Alfred North.
The Aims of Education.
Press, 1967. Original Copyright, 1929.

New York: Free

Wills, Garry.
Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man.
York: New American Library, l979^

New

205
Wise, John E.
1947.

The Nature of the Liberal Arts.

Wolff, Robert Paul.
press, 1970.
Wolff, Robert Paul.
Press, 1968.

Milwaukee: Bruce,

The Ideal of the University.

Boston: Beacon

The Poverty of Liberalism.
-

Boston: Rearnn

Woody, Thomas.
Liberal Education for Free Men.
University of f^ennsylvanla Press, 1951.
“

Philadelphia:

Young-Bruehl, Elizabeth. Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World.
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
~
Zweig, Stefan.
Erasmus of Rotterdam.
New York: Viking, 1934.

New

Trans. Eden and Cedar Paul.

